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ABSTRACT
FACULTY PERCEPTONS OF THE EFFECTS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AGREEMENTS ON THEIR PROFESIONAL ROLES:
THE NEW ENGLAND PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION EXPERIENCE
By
Nancy J. S. Hamer 
University of New Hampshire, December, 2005
This study, a combination of quantitative and artifact analysis, examined how 
New England public college and university faculty perceived their professional concerns 
were affected by working under a collective bargaining agreement. The professional 
concerns, derived from the pertinent literature, included the following: the ability of the 
faculty to effectively influence who joined the faculty ranks; their powers to determine 
the curriculum, with their related instructional practices/delivery systems, and the setting 
of degree requirements; determining their teaching, scholarship, and service 
requirements; assuring the exercise of academic freedom, and reasonable shared 
governance.
Coupled with these professional concerns were three research questions that also 
were the study’s focus:
(1) Does collective bargaining facilitate or inhibit faculty professional autonomy?
(2) Is it important to their sense of professionalism?
(3) Do collective bargaining agreements support professional autonomy?
xii
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For the survey phase, 650 faculty, drawn from thirteen four-year public 
institutions within New England, were surveyed to ascertain their perceptions on how 
their contracts affected their professional concerns. For the artifact phase, the collective 
bargaining contracts of the thirteen institutions were examined to see if the contracts’ 
language might impinge on the professional concerns of the faculty.
The 141 total surveys received after an initial and a follow-up mailing, were 
analyzed using factor analysis and ANOVAs. The results showed that the respondents 
perceived that their professional concerns were adequately addressed by their collective 
bargaining agreements. Also faculty felt that their shared governance role was more 
secure.
There were differences among the survey responses based on union membership 
with regard to the agreements working as a balance on administrative powers, with 
significant differences found between those not in a union, and members of AAUP, AFT, 
and NEA. However, what faculty sought in their contracts to ensure a faculty role in 
shared governance was in fact very limited in the actual contracts’ language.
Information gained from this study may inform the collective bargaining process 
for both sides of the table and lend an understanding of the impact of these agreements 
upon their respective institutions.
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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In the landmark 1980 U.S. Supreme Court case dealing with collective bargaining
and higher education faculty within private institutions, National Labor Relations Board
v. Yeshiva University, Justice Brennan in delivering the dissenting opinion wrote,
The Court’s conclusion that the faculty’s professional interests are 
indistinguishable from those of the administration is bottomed on an 
idealized model of collegial decisionmaking that is a vestige of the great 
medieval university. But the university of today bears little resemblance 
to the “community of scholars” of yesteryear. Education has become 
“big business” and the task of operating the university enterprise has been 
transferred from the faculty to an autonomous administration, which faces the 
same pressures to cut costs and increase efficiencies that confront any large 
industrial organization. The past decade of budgetary cutbacks, declining 
enrollments, reductions in faculty appointments, curtailment of academic 
programs, and increasing calls for accountability to alumni and other special 
interest groups has only added to the erosion of the faculty’s role in the 
institution’s decisionmaking process (pp. 702-703).
The opinion, rendered over twenty years ago, was written at a time in which 
higher education may have had a more collegial environment rather than a more 
corporate environment of today in which students become consumers and research 
produces immediate applications. However, current scholars of higher education such as 
Christopher Lucas (1994; 1996) argue that the true collegial organization in American 
higher education never truly existed but is rather the product of rose-colored hindsight. 
But few today would dispute Justice Brennan’s viewpoint that higher education has in 
large part digressed from the concept of being a faculty centered, collegial organization 
with shared authority between faculty and administration to one in fact with
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
characteristics more akin to a corporate entity. These include a hierarchical decision 
making structure with specialized occupational classifications and categories with 
advanced stages of bureaucratization and an organizational emphasis on “orderliness, 
efficiency, accountability and quantification” (Lucas, 1994, p. 192).
As higher education in the United States in the twentieth century was challenged 
to broaden the base of its student population to include women, minorities, and older 
learners it saw its mission expand and diversify (Lucas, 1994). Then again, through its 
research partnerships with government and industry, it found its mission base expand 
even further along with its funding sources (Lucas, 1994). One of the related features of 
this expansion is that the new constituencies of students and funding sources demanded 
more input into the formulation of the mission of the institution and in how the institution 
would be run (Lucas, 1994). New demands on the institution’s mission led to new 
staffing patterns that demanded specialized skills, both professional and technical, and 
resulted in new organizational structures such as statewide systems of higher education 
that excluded the faculty from many functions and decision making paths within their 
institutions (Kemerer & Baldridge, 1975; Johnstone, 1981). New funding sources 
demanded increased accountability and so more new functions with positions assigned to 
them within institutions sprang up solely for that purpose. Over time faculty were 
restricted to mainly academic matters and in seeking to maintain an outlet for their voices 
to be heard in the decision making process, they attempted to rely on traditional 
structures of shared governance such as faculty senates (Cunningham, 1984). However, 
faculty whose voice was diminished by the din of so many other voices which attempted 
to influence decisions affecting them and their institution, turned to other means to
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reassert their influence, one of which was collective bargaining (Kemerer & Baldridge; 
Schuster, 1974; Johnstone, 1981). Ironically, faculty who sought relief from the 
bureaucratization of their academic institution, and a stronger voice in the decision 
making process beyond academic matters alone and on issues that affected their 
professional lives, turned to tools of the industrialized sector and its bureaucracies, 
collective bargaining and the labor union.
According to past research, in most instances the outbreak of collective 
bargaining activity on campuses can be traced to the faculty’s wish to counterbalance 
what is perceived to be an increase in administrative power and an erosion of the 
faculty’s influence (Schuster, 1974; Johnstone, 1981). In related studies it was found that 
collective bargaining can also be viewed as an attempt to at least maintain the status quo 
and retain certain academic traditions and values in the face of internal and external 
threats on faculty rather than introduce reform of the profession (Schuster 1974; Kemerer 
& Baldridge, 1975). Kemerer and Baldridge (1975) explained the thrust to unionize on 
the part of faculty as being driven by two types of faculty with differing motives: those 
who sought to preserve what they had earned (tenure, rank and stature), and those who 
felt deprived (in terms of salary, rank, and privileges). In the latter case, this sense of 
deprivation derived from a perception by newer faculty that due to changes in 
institutional administration, funding and oversight, they would never receive the working 
conditions that the senior faculty enjoyed, such as tenure, better salaries and job security 
(Kemerer & Baldridge, 1975). While newer faculty felt threatened by not being able to 
attain what had been promised, the senior faculty were anxious about losing what they 
had already earned (Kemerer & Baldridge, 1975). Based on studies of institutions
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undergoing changes in their governance structures, and another study on institutions 
engaging in collective bargaining, Kemerer and Baldridge (1975) found that the motive 
of alleviating perceived ‘deprivation’ on the part of faculty underlies the faculty incentive 
to unionize. This underlying motive of deprivation, coupled with the sense that academic 
traditions needed to be secured for the future, may explain in part why the unionization of 
faculty came first to institutions where faculty felt their influence to be weak on the 
institutional decisions that affected their professional life and working conditions.
However, the advent of unions as a mechanism to protect, preserve and negotiate 
for improved faculty working conditions posed and still poses a dilemma for some 
faculty. The dilemma is how to reconcile the needs of a profession with unionization and 
collective bargaining. For many, the terms unionization and professionalization are not 
an easy fit. The term ‘professor’ associated with engagement in the ‘academic 
profession.’ Indeed while the academic profession is not one of the three historic 
professions of medicine, law, or the church, it has through the evolution of time acquired 
that ranking (Bennett, 1998). As a profession it can, to varying degrees, fit the general 
description that, according to Rich (1984), includes: the attainment of specialized and 
societal valued knowledge over a prolonged period of time, a significant degree of 
autonomy to practice and apply specialized knowledge, an altruistic sense to serve the 
interests of related constituencies (service above self), a commitment to serving the 
public interest, and an associated code of ethics with self-regulatory mechanisms for its 
members.
The academic profession also possesses other characteristics that unite its 
members under one customary rubric and uniquely highlight its stature as the seedbed for
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5the other professions of medicine, law and the church. These characteristics include 
periods of apprenticeship (graduate training, research and teaching assistantships), a 
novitiate or residency (the pre-tenure years), generally accepted codes of conduct 
(academic freedom, research ethics), and for most of its members a shared commitment 
to a common calling (teaching, research and public service).
Utilizing a union model based on traditional industrial labor relations to represent 
a professional group characterized by individual autonomy in which personal merit is 
recognized through both the salary structure and tenure process challenges the 
applicability of the model for both sides of the issue, faculty and institutional 
administration (Rabban, 1991). This questionable fit opens the question of whether 
faculty can have their professional interests served by a model devised for workers whose 
productivity could be measured easily in quantifiable output. Some faculty may 
reconcile this problem by taking a dualistic approach. They consider union membership 
and collective bargaining as necessary to attaining desired working conditions, but they 
look to other venues to influence academic and professional concerns such as a faculty 
senate or through committee work (Rabban, 1991).
Union representation and the traditional industrial collective bargaining model 
for faculty also challenges the administration to attempt to deal with the faculty on two 
different levels: on one level as “employees” during the contract negotiation phases and 
when enforcing a contract, and as valued professionals when seeking input on curricular 
and student matters, thereby creating the potential of a two-silo approach to institutional 
management overall (Rabban, 1991).
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But this then raises some interesting issues. If each faculty member within higher 
education is considered a member of a ‘profession,’ what role has a union, and more 
specifically a collective bargaining agreement, playing in defining the rights and 
privileges of the group as professionals in matters outside salaries and benefits? In 
considering this question it must be assumed that a faculty union either devises a way to 
be successful in representing the professional aspects of the faculty role, or it remains 
constrained to deal only with traditional bread and butter issues. Another issue is if 
faculty unions, through collective bargaining, venture into the professional aspects of 
faculty life, is it, from the viewpoint of the faculty, an appropriate and effective means of 
preserving the rights and roles associated with their place and rank within an institution? 
On this point, the literature appears to be mixed to date. For example, some studies have 
reported that collective bargaining has strengthened the peer review process (Lee 1992). 
However, another example in this realm indicated that professional roles were weakened 
when the advent of collective bargaining created an adversarial climate between faculty 
who were in the bargaining unit and department chairpersons who were not in the unit 
(Cunningham, 1984).
And finally, if collective bargaining agreements can both encapsulate 
management’s prerogatives as well as define faculty rights, is it possible that the 
agreements could work more to enhance management’s discretional power to manage the 
faculty’s role and participation in governance than to insure the faculty’s rights as 
professionals? Considering this question for a bit, could it be that institutional 
administrations have found a way to use the collective bargaining process to reconstruct 
the faculty role into a new category of employee, that of the “managed professional” as
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defined by Rhoades (1998) rather than that of the autonomous professional? While 
educational institutions did not introduce collective bargaining for faculty, over time it is 
likely that management has made attempts to utilize collective bargaining to support its 
objectives. And conversely, it would also be probable that faculty attempted to use - 
collective bargaining agreements to make inroads into management’s prerogatives.
Purpose of this Study 
The purpose of this study is an examination of the relationship between the 
professional concerns of faculty and collective bargaining. The driving questions 
centered on whether unionization was fundamentally compatible with the traditional 
definition of a “professional,” as perceived by the faculty surveyed, and what faculty 
perceived about their collective bargaining agreements as being agents of hindrance or 
facilitation when it came to examining their professional concerns. Those professional 
concerns identified for the purposes of this study are identified below.
Faculty Professional Concerns
(A) The ability of the faculty to effectively influence who will join and continue on 
the faculty.
(B) The ability of the faculty to determine the curriculum.
(C) The ability of the faculty to determine what instructional practices/delivery
systems will be used their classrooms.
(D) The ability of the faculty to set the requirements for granting of a degree.
(E) The ability of the faculty to determine their teaching scholarship and service
requirements.
(F) The right of the faculty to exercise their academic freedom.
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(G) The ability of the faculty to exercise reasonable shared governance, (exercising a 
wider role in institutional governance beyond the classroom and the department 
level).
To accomplish this work, the study relied on a combination of survey research 
and contract analysis. For the survey phase, 650 faculty drawn from 13 four year public 
institutions within New England were surveyed to ascertain their perceptions on how 
their contracts may be affecting their professional concerns, as defined above. For the 
contract analysis phase of the research, the collective bargaining contracts of the 
institutions that employed the surveyed faculty were examined to ascertain if there was 
language in the contracts that might impinge on the professional concerns of the faculty 
or aid, facilitate, or hinder them.
Research Questions
(1) Do faculty perceive that collective bargaining facilitates or inhibits 
their professional autonomy?
(2) Do faculty perceive that collective bargaining in general is important 
to their sense of professionalism?
(3) Do the collective bargaining agreements support professional autonomy? 
Information gained from this study may assist unions in understanding the impact
that their management of the collective bargaining process might have on faculty’s 
professional concerns. It may also aid faculty in understanding more about the 
perceptions of their colleagues with regard to the role collective bargaining plays in 
influencing specific aspects of their professional lives. In addition, administrations 
engaged in collective bargaining might find the information gained from this study of
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possible use in understanding more about the collective bargaining process and its impact 
on faculty and administration relations.
Definition of Terms 
Academic Freedom: This definition is based on the American Association of 
University Professors 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure 
that was updated by that organization in 1970 (AAUP, 1999). In summary, it states that 
faculty should be entitled to the freedom to pursue their research and the publication of 
such results, with companion freedom in the classroom to engage in conversations about 
their subject. In addition, it affirms the rights of faculty as citizens, entitled to protection 
of their free speech rights as such under the First Amendment of the Constitution, without 
institutional censure when exercising those rights.
Alternative Delivery Systems: As a term, for the purposes of this study, this label 
is used to encompass the new array of technology in the classroom currently being 
employed by higher education institutions to deliver instruction both on campus and off.
It includes distance-learning technology through closed circuit television and cable 
systems, as well as videotaped courses and Internet based instruction.
Intellectual Property: This term refers to the general protections provided by the 
Copyright Act of the United States that grants authors and other creative occupations the 
exclusive rights to the recognized ownership of their work and with the sole rights to 
authorize the reproduction their work, or to use it as a foundation from which to create 
other works. Once authors, or other creative occupations, are awarded this formal 
recognition of ownership, no replication of their works can be made without their express 
permission (or that of their legal designees). The term is meant to encompass all creative
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works from course materials to software, the written word, and oral and performed works 
in addition to music compositions, and inventions of chemical, mechanical and other 
physical natures. It may even at times include ideas and concepts.
Managed Professionals: As opposed to the concept of “independent 
professional,” the “managed professional” works within a formal bureaucratic and 
structured organization, unlike the former, and is treated more as an employee than as an 
independent contractor. According to Rhoades (1998), managed professionals are valued 
for their technical knowledge and expertise, but they do not constitute the primary 
influence on the management decisions of the organization. Instead, the use of managed 
professionals within a formal organization reinforces the expanded use of managerial 
discretion to direct the work of such managed professionals.
Post-tenure Review: This term refers to a system of planned evaluation of faculty 
who have already been awarded tenure. The distinguishing characteristics of this process 
include such items as annual reports to judge productivity in research and teaching as 
well as public service on and off campus, coupled with peer review mechanisms, 
teaching evaluations by students, and prescribed reviews as part of overall accreditation 
and programmatic reviews.
Reward Mechanisms: This term encompasses the traditional promotion and 
tenure systems in place within most traditional, four-year higher education institutions 
based upon the three-pronged work of research, teaching and public service.
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Stratification: The byproduct of faculty collective bargaining agreements which 
contain an uneven treatment of salary issues and other matters related to faculty rank, 
tenure, and hiring conditions. Essentially, it is a byproduct that results in a situation 
where there are multi-layered systems of faculty appointments which function under a 
variety of salary scales and other related working conditions.
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CHAPTER2 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction
The literature that informs this study begins with a discussion of what constitutes 
a profession. From that beginning point, the role and work of faculty is discussed within 
the context of what constitutes a profession. Once the foundation of the professoriate as a 
profession has been laid in this discussion as noted above, the work of unions will be 
explored to further inform the background for the study. Next, collective bargaining in 
higher education and the pertinent court cases that shape the legal contours of collective 
bargaining will be reviewed. The last section, Related Studies, will discuss the research 
of Rhoades (1998) on the impact of collective bargaining agreements on faculty’s 
professional roles.
What Constitutes a Profession?
According to Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary, the third level 
definition under “professional” is “a vocation or occupation requiring advanced training 
in some liberal art or science, and usually involving mental rather than manual work, as 
teaching, engineering, writing, etc.; especially, medicine, law or theology (formerly 
called the learned professions)” {Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary, 1983, 
p. 1437).
But intrinsically, what sets apart work that is considered ‘professional’ from 
other categories of occupations? Why does one occupation that is more mental labor that
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physical, to refer to the definition in Webster’s, achieve the status of “professional,” 
while another with the same balance of mental versus physical labor does not?
Pavalko (1971) posited that there are eight central characteristics that set 
professional work apart from other occupations. Using these eight characteristics as a 
base, the degree to which a type of work embodies them leads to a determination of 
whether the work could be considered traditionally professional or not. These 
characteristics as described by Pavalko (1971) are:
(1) Theory or Intellectual Technique. This aspect refers to the level on which the 
work relies on a systematic body of theory and esoteric, abstract knowledge. In 
many cases such knowledge may be the result of scientific research or be 
comprised of a set of normative rules or customs. Adherence to, and a mastery of, 
the theory and technique associated with the field are the foundation upon which a 
professional’s expertise resides.
(2) Relevance to Basic Social Values. While it may often be difficult to fully define 
what a society’s social values are, work that is considered “professional” lays 
claim to the notion that it is centered on the goal of furthering or sustaining basic 
social values. An example would be the effort of legal professionals to support 
justice as a value of the society, or the work of doctors to pursue the goal of better 
health for the populace. Essentially, whether the work is intrinsically beneficial to 
alleviating in some way the woes of the society becomes another measurement as 
to whether the work is “professional” in nature or not.
(3) Training, Presumably Long, and Based on Complex Ideas. Professional work is 
characteristically marked by a long period of training leading up to its practice.
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The longer the training usually, the more “professional” the type of work 
involved. Additionally, the training is marked by its distinct effort to infuse into 
the novice, “professional in training,” a body of knowledge that is significantly 
developed and specialized in content with a high degree of reliance on abstract, 
esoteric knowledge. This training further involves understanding a knowledge 
base that is highly reliant on the manipulation of ideas and symbols rather than 
simply the manipulation of physical objects. But distinct to this type of training is 
the degree to which the novice professional is indoctrinated into a distinct set of 
values and norms, oriented in fact into a specific subculture with distinct role 
conceptions of behavior.
(4) Motivation. The coupling of service and self-interest as motivational platforms 
for why the work is done helps to determine if work is professional or not. If a 
group considers itself as embodying the characteristics of a professional calling, 
then its members adhere to the principle that service to the public and their clients 
is the ideal. In this ideal, the work is motivated by a desire to serve the best 
interests of the public welfare and the individual client, rather than for personal 
monetary gain. It is an ideology embraced not only by its members but one 
publicly acknowledged and with an expectation that it will be adhered to by the 
members of the profession. For example, patients may not be capable of 
ascertaining (at least, not in all circumstances) whether the advice they receive 
from doctors is accurate. They usually have to trust in the physicians’ training 
and their adherence to a code of ethics, which is supposed to put the patients’ best 
interests at the core of their motivation. In a similar vein, students place their
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While the precise individual motivations of distinct professionals in practice may 
vary, collectively, as a “profession,” the motivation of that group has to be one of 
altruistic service, or the occupation group really does not qualify for the label of 
“profession.”
(5) Autonomy. It is the expectation of the members of a profession that they have 
high degrees of self-regulation and self-control. As a collective, they usually 
control to a large extent who may enter into the profession, and they serve as the 
only adequate judges of what constitutes effective performance by members of 
their profession. To complement this collective autonomy, there is also the 
expectation that there is a significant degree of autonomy for the individual 
practitioner. “This concern is expressed, for example, in resistance to 
supervision, especially if supervision is by someone outside the profession” 
(Pavalko, 1971, p. 22).
(6) Sense of Commitment. A long-term commitment to the practice of the work and 
its ideals is a commonly accepted tenet of a professional life. At the extremes of 
this would be a sense of “calling” to the work, indicative of the clerical life. But, 
such attractions can also be found in examples of teaching, medicine, and the law, 
where practitioners often indicate they were drawn to the field by a sense of 
higher purpose and a commitment to a set of professional ideals.
(7) Sense of Community. The professions are further marked by the shared sense of 
identity felt among it members founded on a common set of norms and values. 
While these norms may in part work to control professional behavior, they also
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provide a context on which other activity may be based, such as how leisure is 
spent or how interpersonal relationships are conducted. Most important, these 
shared sets of norms and values are inculcated into the training of novice 
professionals, making the acceptance of them part of the orientation and 
socialization of new members into the group.
(8) Codes of Ethics. Codes of ethics in professional groups not only serve to
reinforce normative behavior among its members but work to further substantiate 
a professional group’s commitments to an ideal of service and a high standard of 
delivered expertise to the public. The existence of a set of ethics assures the 
clients served by a professional group that there are standards of practice for the 
service they are receiving and helps to regulate the profession internally. This 
internal regulation is important, for if only members of professions can be 
adequate judges of their peers because only they know if the service is being 
performed correctly, the existence of a code of ethics allows a standard for 
internal measurement. These codes of ethics therefore act somewhat as a 
safeguard from intrusive regulation by those outside the profession by providing 
evidence that the profession has a means of policing their own conduct.
To add further depth to the above criteria, it is helpful to consider that professions 
characteristically have been portrayed in sociological terms as mechanisms devised to 
contain, disseminate, and control the flow of expertise (Rhoades, 1998). The key is the 
autonomous control of the various terms, conditions, and domains of work that are the 
hallmarks of a profession, along with the control over who shall have the expertise 
(Rhoades). But intrinsically, a profession is a way to organize work in a way that adds to
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the values of society. Frequently, throughout history the boundaries of professional 
groups have clashed with one another to alter the boundaries of each and renegotiate new 
terms and territories of operation for each (Abbott, 1988). For example, the realms of 
medicine and law had to disassociate themselves from the boundaries of the church in 
Western society to become their own professions.
Additionally professions themselves exhibit internal struggles as they adapt to 
changes from without demanded by society and internally created by factional 
differences over how the profession should develop and be regulated (Abbott, 1988). 
According to Abbott (1988), negotiations take place on an informal basis to determine the 
roles each profession will play in society. He perceived professions as “systems” that 
have renegotiated boundaries after interacting with other professional “systems” based on 
each group’s self-analysis of the objective and subjective qualities of their work. At the 
basis of this “systems” concept is the control of tasks for each professional system.
Brint (1994) added to this picture of a profession as a “system” depicted by Abbot 
(1988) by offering the analysis that professions are also internally stratified based on their 
professional and political beliefs, as well as influenced by market forces and their 
location within certain organizations. He further postulated that professions are changing 
from styles of “social trustee professionalism” which is aligned with the moral 
dimensions of work and views professionals as the guardians of societal valued 
knowledge, to a style of “expert professionalism” where the technical advice of 
professionals is what is valued. Brint suggested that the professions are no longer rising 
above the excesses of the marketplace, as once theorized, but are now inexorably drawn 
into it and influenced by it.
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However, professions face a rapidly growing dilemma when placed in the reality 
of the workplace and the marketplace at the beginning of the millennium. Increasingly, 
members of the traditional professions are no longer lone agents acting as autonomous 
practitioners of their learned work. In order to do what professionals do, they must often 
do it in the context of a larger, often very bureaucratic organization. This is consistent 
with the work of professionals.
Doctors now usually work within hospital settings, or as members of a practice, 
and both settings are increasingly governed by the dictates of health management 
organizations and federal agencies with their regulations. Increased regulations generally 
lead to even more bureaucracy in order to insure compliance with standards, mandated 
rules, procedures, and legislated guidelines, so as the medical profession finds itself ever 
more governed by outside organizations, and federal and state mandates, the need for 
bureaucracy grows (Freidson, 1994). Another need for the increased bureaucracy has 
been the rise in the use of technology and the delegation of work into new specialties 
controlled by new professions or emerging, semi-professions especially throughout the 
later half of this century (Pavalko, 1971; Abbott, 1988).
Lawyers, generally considered members of a profession traditionally 
characterized by individual practitioners, now find themselves more and more working 
within larger organizations. This has resulted as the market in this country for the 
autonomous practitioner has dwindled, and the benefits of working within a large practice 
have been found so economically appealing both to the individuals in them and to the 
complex corporations in which many serve (Abbott, 1988). And while the clergy have 
historically been tied to a larger entity in most cases, they collectively have been
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impacted by the creation of bureaucracies established by relatively new professions. 
These new professions, particularly those related to psychiatry, counseling, and social 
work, and the rise of their related bureaucracies, have altered the scope of the clergy and 
redefined their profession (Abbott, 1988).
Teaching, like the clergy, has historically been rooted in a collective work group 
with varying degrees of bureaucracy at least since medieval times, and indeed, the roots 
of teaching, especially those in what could be deemed in higher education extend from 
their origins in the clergy (Freidson 1994; Lucas, 1994). However, teaching as a 
profession at all levels has been transformed, similar to the practice of medicine, law, and 
the clergy, by the encroachment of new, emerging professional groups, by technology, 
and by a focus on specialization within the field of education (Abbott, 1988; Lucas,
1994). It has further felt the impact of ever growing bureaucracies as it has been 
delegated an increasing number of responsibilities by society and its various players of 
government, corporations, and citizens (Lucas, 1994; 1996). And ironically, at the 
university level, teaching has been affected significantly by other professions that have 
looked to higher education to help define their own professional standards and as the 
place to settle issues arising from inter-professional jurisdictional disputes over forms of 
work and ownership of subject matter (Abbott, 1988).
The point becomes then that if autonomy is prized as a key element of 
professional work, how is it threatened when professionals find their work setting to be 
increasingly characterized as one that is predominately performed within a bureaucratic 
organization? How do professionals reconcile their autonomous role with their role as 
part of a larger organization?
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Two contrary points of view exist regarding the relationship between 
professionals and the bureaucracies in which they may work. The first view is based on 
one of conflict due to the possible, inherent, antithetical relationship of professional 
characteristics and those of a bureaucracy. In a bureaucracy, adherence to a defined set 
of organizational rules, standards, regulations, policies and procedures with the impetus 
for work founded on a common set of goals is the expectation for its members (Pavalko, 
1971). For the professions, autonomy, independent action and decision-making are most 
prized, with the rationale for the work done being grounded in an internalized desire to be 
of service (Pavalko).
In examining the differences between bureaucratic and professional styles of work 
Fichter (1961) noted other areas in which the two are antithetical. Chief among them is 
the placement of authority. In bureaucratic organizations authority is centralized, and 
dependent on anointed leadership positions, while competency and the demonstration of 
expertise is the foundation upon which leadership in the professions is grounded 
(Fichter). Also noted are the tensions between the bureaucratic nature to emphasize 
standardization of procedures and adherence to a defined united goal and the professional 
nature to address the uniqueness of each case and formulate individual solutions with 
loyalty to the client and to their professional community (Fichter).
Max Weber, one of the most influential writers of the twentieth century on the 
subject of bureaucracy, ascribed characteristics to it that do not seem to allow for 
professional behavior. The elements of Weberian bureaucracy “impersonality, hierarchy, 
specified duties, contracts, professional qualifications, salary, full-time careers, 
separation of office from ownership, and centralized control” seem to steer wide of the
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tenets of professional behavior except at the juncture of “qualifications” (Riggs, 1979, p. 
569). However, Weber may have left open the possibility that there might be flexibility 
in his model of an ideal bureaucracy when he wrote, “no exercise of authority can be 
purely bureaucratic, i.e., purely through contractually engaged and appointed officials” 
(Weber, p. 552, from Albrow, 1970, p. 42). This hinted at new exercise of individualized 
authority based on professional norms within a bureaucracy is akin to what Parsons 
(1971) put forth when referring to “line authority” with a “professional complex” in a sort 
of post-Weberian approach (Parsons, 1969, pp. 505, 508). In this situation, professional 
norms could come in conflict with bureaucratic norms and bring about a conflict as well 
between professionals and non-professionals in the same work system and lead to 
“disaffection on the part of the professionals” (Waters, 1989, p. 947). However, Sciulli 
(1986), argued that while the norms that professional members of an organization are 
committed to may be in conflict with their bureaucracy’s norms, the professionals’ strong 
need to place an emphasis on maintaining collegiality in the group overrides arbitrary 
exercises of power, but as an unintended result of the desire for collegiality among the 
professionals, not from a shared system of intended belief applications.
Similarly, Scott (1966) emphasized that the chief source of tension between 
professionals and their bureaucratic organization was authority, most especially the 
tension between the bureaucracy’s positional based, executive authority structure, and the 
professionals’ expertise and competency based authority structure. He cited two main 
areas of conflict: the resistance of the professional to bureaucratic rules, standards, 
supervision and the professionals’ tendency to give only conditional loyalty to the
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bureaucracy because their fundamental loyalty was owed to their professional tenets and 
colleague group.
Related studies that illustrate the tensions between professionals and the 
bureaucracy in which they practice highlight the ways in which professionals adapt and 
the form in which the conflicts may be manifested. Reissman (1949) conducted one of 
the first studies in this area and examined what he termed the “professional” and 
“bureaucratic” orientations of forty civil service workers. From this study he developed a 
typology that looked upon the orientations of the pure professional and the pure 
bureaucrat as being at opposite ends of a continuum. A professional who operated within 
the bureaucracy but felt his/her allegiance was primarily to his/her own, outside 
professional group was labeled a “functional bureaucrat” and placed at the professional 
end of the continuum. A professional who was completely oriented towards the 
organization and totally immersed in it, and derived his/her sense of recognition from it, 
was labeled a “job bureaucrat” and held the place at the end of the continuum marked by 
the wholly bureaucratic orientation (Reissman). Between the two extremes, functional 
and job, were the “specialist” and the “service” orientations as described by Reissman 
(1949). The “specialist” was near the “functional” level but derived a greater sense of 
identification from the bureaucracy, and the “service” orientation approached the “job 
level” but derived some sense of recognition from its outside professional group 
(Reissman).
Another landmark study by Gouldner (1957; 1958) on the faculty of a small 
liberal arts college focused on their levels of professional commitment and organizational 
loyalty. This work found that “there seems to be some tension between an organization’s
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bureaucratic need for expertise, and its social-systems needs for loyalty” (Gouldner,
1958, p. 466). As Reissman had done, Gouldner also distinguished a faculty’s 
orientation, whether more tied to the organization or to their professional interests, by 
how markedly they attributed their loyalties to either one or the other. For Gouldner, his 
“cosmopolitans” as he termed them (akin to Reissman’s “functionals”), were 
characterized by low loyalty to the organization but with high commitment to their 
specialized role skills, and an allegiance to an outside group that represented their 
professional specialty (Gouldner, 1957; 1958). Those with an orientation to the 
organization were deemed “locals” (comparable to Reissman’s “job bureaucrats”), and 
they were shown to have strong loyalty to the organization, a low commitment to role 
skills, and a significant degree of orientation to a reference group within the organization 
(Gouldner). Those found to be “cosmopolitans” were less likely to accept organizational 
rules than “locals” and were concerned mainly with their own research and the work of 
their own professional field, while “locals” main concerns and involvement focused on 
the institution (Gouldner).
Another early study on professionals who belonged to a labor union also 
developed a typology to characterize the attitudinal orientation of professionals 
(Wilensky, 1959). In this study, the professionals were found to be in an array of 
orientations similar to those identified in the studies of Reissman and Gouldner. For 
example, some were found to be oriented to “professional service,” which meant they 
exhibited little loyalty to the union and identified primarily with their professional field 
(economist, etc.). Others were “careerists” interested in a career in the union with a 
strong loyalty to it, and another group were “missionaries” who identified mainly with
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the abstract, theoretical notion of a labor union and its ideals. Yet another group found in 
the study was labeled “politicos” for their identification with the union but with a goal to 
obtain power in the organization as an end in itself. Overall, this study sought to 
illustrate that professionals adapted to bureaucratic organizations by either making the 
organizations’ expectations of them more compatible with their professional ideals, or 
they reoriented their focus to one where the organization assumed the primary focus 
rather than their affiliated, external professional group.
Of related interest to the Wilensky study is the work of Blau and Scott (1962) 
who found that orientation inclined towards, or from, a focus on the organization on the 
part of professionals influenced how strictly they enforced the rules of their organization. 
In this work, which examined professionals engaged in social work, Blau and Scott found 
that professionals who identified with social work as a profession were more likely to 
break, or deviate from, the rules of the organization if it served the best interests of their 
clients (Blau & Scott, 1962). The study also concluded that, conversely, professionals 
who identified more with the organization than the profession of social work were more 
likely to adhere to, and enforce, the rules of the organization (Blau & Scott).
A related finding can be found in Corwin’s study of nurses done in 1961. In this 
work degree nurses, those trained at the collegiate level, were found to remain more 
professionally oriented and more likely to question hospital rules once they entered 
employment than diploma nurses, those trained in a hospital setting (Corwin, 1961). It 
also found that diploma nurses were more likely to decrease their professional allegiance 
the further they moved from graduation while degree nurses retained their professional
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loyalty even as they became more identified with the organizational dictates of the 
hospital.
These early studies basically point to two things. First, there are divergent 
orientations within the same professions, with varying degrees of loyalty to the 
profession and the home bureaucracy. And second, the studies point out that the stronger 
the orientation is to the profession, the more likely there will be conflict between the 
professional and the organization.
As noted earlier, there are two contrary points of view regarding the relationship 
between professionals and the bureaucracies in which they may work. The first point of 
view representing the possible antithetical relationship between professionals and their 
home organizations due to the differing characteristics and objectives of the professions 
and bureaucracies has been discussed above with a review of early studies examining the 
relationship. Other and more recent work, however, points to a contrary view that calls 
into question the organizational nature of bureaucracies that are composed of significant 
numbers of professionals and considers whether they are truly ordered and controlled by 
pure, traditional bureaucratic means.
A number of studies have attempted to demonstrate that not all organizations 
where professionals work exhibit all the characteristics of a bureaucracy; thus, the 
hypothetical tensions between the objectives of the organization and those of the 
professionals may be lessened. Work on the nature of law firms, accounting firms, health 
care institutions, educational systems, and social agencies has yielded new ways to 
conceive of seemingly bureaucratic organizations because they have altered their 
traditional scheme of managing to accommodate the characteristics of professionals
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(Freidson, 1994). These changes have led to new terms to describe such altered models 
of bureaucracies such as “advisory bureaucracy” (Goss, 1961), “professional 
bureaucracy” (Smigel, 1964), and “professional organization” (Scott, 1965; Montagna, 
1968). These studies question the premise that organizations that employ professionals 
are stereotypically bureaucratic enough that they can order and control the work of the 
professionals by traditional bureaucratic methods. Cohen and March’s (1972) study of the 
governance of universities which found them modeling an “organized anarchy,” further 
challenges the concept that organizations which employ professionals are, and can be, 
traditional bureaucracies with structured abilities to control their membership. Weick’s 
study (1976) on school districts, where he equated them as “loosely coupled systems” 
rather than tight bureaucracies, lends further evidence to the notion that organizations 
consisting of large numbers of professionals are not likely to be strict models of 
bureaucratic control and authoritative hierarchy.
Related work (Freidson, 1994) noted that the key in these altered bureaucratic 
models is that the supervision of the professionals in them is done by professionals in the 
same field as required by law, or to maintain an accreditation, or by historical precedent. 
More often than not, in those organizations, or units within organizations, that employ 
predominately professionals, the supervisory, managerial and usually executive positions 
are filled by employees with similar credentials to the rank and file professionals but with 
more training or experience in administration (Schriesham, von Glinow & Kerr, 1977). 
Freidson (1994) concluded that in these situations where professionals are supervising 
similar professionals that while an individual professional might lose some autonomy 
over his/her work in that organization, overall the profession itself did not lose its
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autonomy over its field of work. It did not because supervision and management was 
conducted by professionals in the same field with presumably the same professional 
concerns, ethics, and standards. Abbott (1988), however, purported that professionals 
have lost autonomy in their work for other reasons as a result of functioning within 
bureaucracies.
According to Abbott (1988) some professions have lost their exclusive rights to 
do certain kinds of work to other professions due to competition from other professions 
or from the challenges presented to that exclusivity by new, emerging professions. While 
large bureaucratic organizations have enabled administrative work to be taken away from 
some professional groups in them, giving it to others, thus freeing the professionals to 
concentrate on their most relevant duties, it has also served to isolate them from certain 
roles within the bureaucracy. In addition, because of the requirement of, and the need 
for, physical capital to practice (such as the technology now required to practice modern 
medicine or do research in a university), the professions have had to partner with, or 
delegate to, other professions to accomplish their work. In particular, Abbott makes the 
point that professions have grown more dependent on bureaucracies to enable them to 
function in their professional role as a result of this need for the physical capital that only 
a large, well-funded organization can supply. The effect of this symbiotic relationship 
between bureaucracies and the professions is to create a challenge for the professions to 
sustain a full sense of control over all aspects of their work.
The Faculty as a Profession 
Given this background on the professions, it is important to address how the 
situation of faculty as professionals working in the unique bureaucracies of higher
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education may perceive that their professional role is altered by their interaction with the 
bureaucratic structure and its requirements for its own norms.
In a report sponsored by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of 
Teaching, the author, Burton R. Clark, writes by way of an introductory conclusion about 
the study, “We cannot help but be struck by the virtual right so many academics seem to 
possess to go their own way simply by assuming they can do largely as they please a 
good share of the time, all in the name of rational behavior” (Clark, 1987, p. 148). He 
asserted that this behavior is the result of a situation where the “scientific estate” built by 
the faculty thus with the means of the production of the institution in their own hands, 
gave rise to a situation where trustees and administrators may desire and work to arrange 
a situation of institutional control from the top, while faculty exert a push for 
determination from their own ranks about the direction of their work and that of the 
institution. Also echoing some o f the work that would come later from Rhoades (1998) 
on the stratification of the faculty profession within itself, Clark’s report also found that 
the abilities of faculty to successfully determine the direction of the institution appeared 
to change dramatically as they moved from the “entrepreneurial professionalism” of 
research universities to other higher educational entities, the more they found 
environments that “restrict professional status and privilege, leading inexorably, where 
state law permits to unionization” (p. 149).
Adding to this mix as well, Clark posits that the dispersion of authority in a 
university or college environment amongst faculty, departments, colleges, divisions, and 
the like, further yields to situations that can be politically charged in nature, driven by 
distinct individual personalities, and thus ones that change dramatically from one “center
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of authority” to another within an institution just as much as between institutions (Clark, 
1987).
Some of these aspects of the faculty profession may be corroborated by a 1995 
study on faculty, and their work satisfaction by Blackburn and Lawrence (1995). In this 
study of 120 faculty in four different types of institutions, they found that regardless of 
this institutional type faculty believed that they had less influence in their departmental 
matters o f determining the curriculum, selecting departmental chairs, selecting new 
faculty hires than what their institutions’ administrators believe faculty members have for 
authority (Blackburn & Lawrence, 1995).
The perception by faculty that their traditional roles of influence on campus had 
been eroded has been the subject of numerous works citing that changes in faculty roles 
harkens back to the post-World War II days of the late 1940s and early 1950s, peaking in 
the 1970s amidst changes in the academy that resulted from new student audiences, not 
from privileged families, entering institutions both as students and faculty, and new 
sources of private and government funding coming into the picture. (Altbach, 1980; 
Driver, 1972; Lucas, 1994; Ross; 1976; and Wolff, 1969). New lines of funding that 
demanded new accountability and assessments, and which created a rise in the use of 
non-faculty professionals to manage the enterprise (Altbach, 1980; Driver, 1972; Lucas, 
1994; Ross, 1976; Wolff, 1969).
More recent work may suggest that faculty are right in their perceptions of eroded 
professional authority. Clark, Boyer, and Corcoran point out in their 1985 work that 
“higher education seems to be undergoing a paradigm shift, termed variously from 
faculty hegemony, to student consumerism, and from education community to economic
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industry” (p. 23). With this point in mind, Bowen and Schuster (1986) concluded this 
state of affairs had led to a situation among faculty in the United States where they 
viewed such changes with “resigned disappointment [or] discontent” and as a source of 
“poor morale” and thus used these conclusions as a basis for their own study (p. 128).
Their study involved 3 8 college campuses and 542 interviewed faculty and 
administrators. It sought to find whether or not faculty thought their professional lives 
had changed, improving or declining in quality and in morale, and they also sought 
evidence of changes in collegiality [for the authors’ purposes this was defined as 
relationships among faculty within and without their departments] along with “whether 
their faculty autonomy had been compromised” over the previous fifteen years (Bowen & 
Schuster, 1986, p. 137). The study found that the professorial life “on balance is still 
attractive to its practitioners,” and concluded on the question of morale “. . .  that faculty 
at two-thirds of the campuses—twenty five of the thirty eight—ranged from fair to 
excellent.. the condition of the American faculty [was] neither bleak nor bountiful... 
but few unreservedly enthusiastic,” and “a few profoundly troubled” (pp. 160-162). In its 
findings about collegiality the authors concluded that it has suffered least but may have 
been strengthened “through sharing a common enemy” meaning establishing bonds 
against perceived administrative power threats and encroachments (pp. 143-144). In the 
area of autonomy, this study found that faculty did not feel any loss of autonomy on their 
academic freedom but did feel deeply that they had lost ground in terms of power to 
influence campus governing decisions, and held deep resentment of state interference in 
campus affairs in the case of state institutions. A single quote from a respondent in the 
study perhaps sums up the majority of responses in his regard, “Its not that being a
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faculty member is not prestigious. It’s still that. But it’s only that. We’ve lost control 
over the kind of students we encounter in our classrooms and over the direction of our 
campus” (p. 146).
A study done on the “new faculty demographic” (younger faculty with more 
minorities and women and international faculty being represented) done in 1998, but 
based on the 1993 National Study of the Postsecondary Faculty database, concluded that 
the shape of the faculty in terms of gender and ethnicity may be changing with the core of 
full-time faculty shrinking but in many ways some key characteristics were not changing 
(Finkelstein, Seal and Schuster, 1998). One overarching point was found binding the old 
and the new faculty among the tenure track or tenured faculty, that while they differed 
more in what they were than what they did; the “new entrants despite some significant 
differences in their background characteristics, were well socialized by their mentors in 
the ‘old ways’” (p. 103). In their respective attitudes about their various aspects of work 
including satisfaction with their jobs and careers, the similarities between the two cohorts 
are more obvious than the dissimilarities that separate them (Ibid).
This conclusion would appear to be substantiated by The American Faculty Poll 
conducted in 2000 by the National Opinion Research Center under the auspices of the 
TIAA-CREF (Sanderson, Phua, & Herda, 2000). This study, based on a telephone survey 
in 1999 of over 1,500 faculty members found the following: 90% were satisfied with 
their choice of career, but bureaucratic politics on campus and low compensation often 
had them considering an alternative path, and they were concerned about the future of 
higher education and the lack of their students’ pre-college preparation. But surprisingly, 
45% of the respondents strongly agreed, and another 34% somewhat agreed that
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“intrusions into their academic freedom by the administration were relatively rare” (p.
31). However, there was a finding that a “strong sentiment of ‘them vs. us’ feeling when 
it came to their own college administrators specifically especially for being “out of touch, 
and insistent on accountability by relying on numerical measures of performance, and for 
determining reward (or punishment) more on the basis of quantity rather than 
quality”(pp. 40-41). This is also a feeling which is likely to be intensified, according to 
case studies (Kerlin & Dunlap 1993), when campus austerity measures further impose 
restraints on fiscal resources and strains on salary increases, and salary structures across 
the disciplines, if there is already resentment toward the administration.
Unions and the Professions: What is the Role of Unions?
Simply put, one way to explain what unions do is that they seek to gain bilateral 
power to increase wages, and they also function as a “collective voice,” one associated 
with their representation of workers to advocate for better conditions and participation in 
the decisions affecting them and the organization (Freeman & Medoff, 1984). Freeman 
and Medoff indicated that unions are faced with the conundrum that if they raise wages 
too high the employers may employ fewer worker. But if they keep them too low, and 
the membership may be dissatisfied and vote out the union, or seek an alternative 
representative. However, the success of unions in raising wages also works best in an 
atmosphere where the market power of the organization is in a non-competitive 
environment, where new firms have difficulty entering and/or where some enterprises 
have cost advantages over this competition.
Unions, as Freeman and Medoff (1994) have pointed out, give a voice to 
employees who hold professional positions within an organization, but that voice is
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restricted to the bread and butter issues of wages, benefits, and terms and conditions of 
employment. Employees gain a collective voice that dilutes management authority, but 
does that dilution result in enhanced professional decision making? To curtail the power 
of another does not easily translate into increased power to set a separate agenda. The 
bilateral decision making of collective bargaining may do little to enhance the individual 
decision making associated with professional practice.
Unions would seem to be less necessary for professionals than for the traditional 
labor/production based wage earner, except that many professions, such as actors, 
musicians, teachers, professors, air traffic controllers, doctors, lawyers, and engineers, 
joined unions in the twentieth century (Murolo & Chitty, 2001). Bain (1970) 
hypothesized that what drew these professionals to join unions was the need more for the 
collective voice than perhaps wage protections, though the latter was important. The part 
that they share with their union members in industry is that these professionals cannot 
practice their particular style of profession without being in a bureaucratic, organized 
work atmosphere. Hence they share with traditional “blue-collar union labor” the 
necessity to deal with a management structure making decisions about their work lives 
and a situation in which they, the workers,” seek a strong collective participation.
In one very real sense the idea of white collar professionals joining together for a 
common purpose predates their unionization, the “professional society” was often a key 
ingredient to their sense of professionalism, be it a learned society to advance common 
knowledge, or a more contemporary professional society founded to share common 
interests or bolster standards (Hoffman, 1976). However, changes over the years started 
to blur the lines among learned societies and professional groups as well as unions as
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unions (Ibid.). Some examples of organizations that reformed themselves along these 
lines include a number of engineering and scientific societies that today find their final 
home in the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations 
AFL-CIO, and the National Education Association (NEA) which began life as a 
professional society in 1857 to “elevate the character and advance the interests of the 
profession of teaching and to promote the cause of education in the United States (Ibid, 
p. 54-55). Additionally, the transformation of the American Association of University 
Professors (AAUP), from a organization whose goal in 1915 was to “protect the 
professional interests of college faculties with respect to academic freedom and tenure 
seemed an “unlikely society to engage in collective bargaining in 1972” (Hoffman, 1976, 
p. 54).
However, for many researchers the concept that the traditional union model is 
antithetical to the stance of a professional has driven some of their work, even despite the 
evidence of the transformation of some professional societies into union movements. For 
example, Straus (1954), pointed out that for a professional to join a union meant a certain 
loss of status, it “means abandoning hope; it means showing hostility to the boss (whom 
they may dream of as a close associate and personal friend); it also means throwing away 
all opportunity to forge ahead on merit” (pp. 74-75). Another example of research on the 
issue of professionals unionizing is Prandy, Sykes and Burns (1946) who portrayed 
unionization as based on a “status ideology,” (possessing it meant you did not seek 
collective action but preferred individual merit and a desire to act independently), as 
opposed to “class ideology” which disposed one more to collective action and
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
35
representation (Bain, Coates, & Ellis 1973). As Burns stated, white-collar workers are 
“suspicious of unions. . . [they] focus attention on the welfare of the group and tend to 
forget the individual in the group” (Bums, 1946, p. 71). But there was also evidence that 
when professionals did join unions they did not necessarily reject their status ideology 
but “because they see unionism as a better way of obtaining them.” In other words they 
look on a union as a means of obtaining dignity, prestige, and control over environment, 
things which are denied them by an increasingly bureaucratic organization” (Straus,
1954, p. 81). Similarly, Mills found that professionals felt that unions were, “something 
to be used, rather than something in which to believe. They are understood as having to 
do strictly with the job and are valued for their help on the j ob . ... Acceptance of them 
does not seem to lead to new identifications in other areas of living” (Mills, 1951, pp 
308-309).
Faculty Collective Bargaining in Higher Education
The existing labor laws in the United States, most particularly the National Labor 
Relations Act, were not designed to effectively govern situations where 
distinctions between employers and employees is unclear, such as those 
characterizing colleges and universities where faculty members contribute 
significantly to the managerial decision-making process on the one hand and seek 
to exert power as members of a union on the other hand. The National Labor 
Relations Board and our Federal Courts have adopted a fiction about the nature of 
governance in higher education, which has questionable relevance to reality in 
today’s educational world (Kuechle, 1992, p. 81).
The above quote from Professor David Kuechle of Harvard’s Graduate School of 
Education (now retired), illustrates the two main ways in which the adoption of the 
industrial labor model has affected employer-employee relations in higher education, 
particular those between higher education institutions and their faculties. The first centers 
on the actual application of the industrial labor model to the internal mechanics of
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management of these organizations through the use of collective bargaining and its 
related accoutrements. The second focuses on the consideration of relevant court rulings, 
which are based on the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. In addition such court 
rulings were often followed by significant changes in law allowing public employees to 
unionize. So, in just two sentences Professor Kuechle has additionally illustrated the 
possible difficulties that may strike at the heart of attempting to apply the industrial labor 
relations’ model to higher education. Can such a model, and public laws that rely on 
highly distinct definitions of what is management and what is labor, find relevant 
applications in the setting of higher education where the roles of administrators and 
faculties respectively are often blurred in the name of creating a condition of shared 
governance?
The Law Changes and Public Employees Unionize
The original legislation, National Labor Relations Act (NCRA) of 1935, protected 
and structured private sector bargaining. Public employees, including professors at 
public institutes of higher education, however were not covered by the 1935 Act. 
Consequently, each state, in order to allow their employees to bargain collectively had to 
pass enabling legislation. While each state could theoretically have created legislation 
anew, most states instead borrowed liberally from the NLRA.
In 1959, only Wisconsin specifically permitted its state employees to unionize 
(Arnold, 2000). By 1962 however, this situation was beginning to change after the 
signing of Executive Order 10988 by President John F. Kennedy allowing for the 
unionization of federal employees in the executive branch of the United States
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government. President Kennedy’s bold step offered the states a role model stating that 
allowing public employees to bargain can further the public interest. For example, New 
Hampshire passed RSA 273-a which borrowed liberally from the NLRA. While most 
states eventually adopted legislation allowing their pubic employees to collective bargain 
for wages, benefits, and terms and conditions of employment, not all states followed 
Wisconsin and President Kennedy.
The states which passed legislation allowing for public sector collective 
bargaining used much of the language of the 1935 NLRA including the concept of an 
exclusive representative to bargain for a group of employees deemed to have a 
community of interest. Furthermore, the states established a National Labor Relations 
style governing board to oversee public sector collective bargaining (Harrison, 1993).
While public sector collective bargaining grew during the 1970’s so also did an 
interest in collective bargaining by some faculty of public higher education institutions, 
and though few states wrote any clauses to deal exclusively with this situation, or set of 
employees, neither were they specifically, as an employee class, excluded from such 
activity, and the lack of ambiguity of some state’s laws clearly allowing all state 
employees the same rights to self-organize for the purposes of collective bargaining (for 
example, Massachusetts and Rhode Island) allowed for an opportunity for faculty at the 
institutions of these states to unionize as early as 1971, as was the case in Rhode Island 
(Arnold, 2000; Schuster, 1974). By 1993, forty states and the District of Columbia and 
the US Virgin Islands had legislation that provided for legal frameworks for collective 
bargaining by their employees but only slightly more than have (twenty-six) have specific 
legislation that covers their public higher education faculty (Harrison, 1993).
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For the states that did have specific legislation covering the right of faculties to
unionize, it generally fell during its establishment ‘hay days’ of the 1970’s into two
specific categories, “meet and confer,” (with California’s public higher education system
the leader in this area), and collective bargaining laws (Duryea, Fisk & Associates, 1973).
By the end of the 1990’s whether the model was one of meet and confer, or collective
bargaining, as noted by Julius (1993),
with regard to industrial labor relations processes, the higher education sector is 
different but not at all unique. While it may be difficult to identify a particular 
model, many similarities exist between what unions do in academe, and what they 
do in unionized sectors of the economy. Similar laws are applied and established 
ways of handling disputes and administering agreements exist... (p. 3).
The Industrial Labor Model
The traditional industrial labor model underpinning the National Labor Relations
Act of 1935 emphasizes the separate roles of management and labor, assigning distinct
roles in the work environment to each group (Streshly & DeMitchell, 1994). Essentially
without these distinctions there is no industrial labor model. This distinction, and thus
the defined relationship between the two roles forms the crux of the model along with an
added participant in it, and one key to its operation, the union. Under this model,
university administrators become the distinct “managers” of the organization, while
faculties are regarded as “labor.” The union becomes the third party assigned with the
task of protecting labor “from the whims of management through a collectively
bargained, legally enforceable contract that defines the terms and conditions of
employment in addition to the wages and benefits associated with the job” (Streshly &
DeMitchell, 1994, p. 61). Thus, the model is imbued with an adversarial tone; creating
seemingly “permanent adversaries” whereby labor is pitted against the goals of
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management, if the mutuality of interests defined within the labor group are threatened,
with the latter group bolstered in this regard by its defender, the union (Kerchner &
Caufman, 1993). In addition, collective bargaining becomes the principal mechanism for
the interaction amongst labor, union, and management, with signed collective bargaining
agreements becoming the documents that stipulate in large part how labor and
management will interact with each other, along with their expectations of each other in
the trade of labor for wages. According to a 1975 study of faculty unions on campus,
collective bargaining assumes there is a conflict between employees and the 
employer, that a union supported by a legal framework will be the exclusive 
representative of employees, that group representation will supplant traditional 
individual negotiations, and that the terms of employment must be included in a 
binding contract between employer and union (Kemerer & Baldridge, 1975, p. 3).
and it also assumes a community of interest among its membership.
Another viewpoint on the traditional industrial labor model is that it assumes that
work produced by labor can be assessed in easily identifiable and measured units, with
less emphasis on the collaborative, professional or even artistic elements of the work
(Streshly & DeMitchell, 1994). The set structures of the traditional industrial labor model
where the employee is governed by strict rules and sharply defined definitions of their
work, separated from other employees by the boundaries of union representation may
serve to limit the involvement of employees in certain realms of their work which would
be personally enhancing, or more prove beneficial to the productivity of their
organization (Kerchner & Mitchell, 1988). Therefore, the application of the traditional
labor model to that of the modem workplace, inhabited with professionals having a stake
in the decisions that both affect the quality and quantity of their work, as well as the
mission of the organization, becomes problematic because it de-emphasizes that role in
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favor of placing more emphasis on employee rights and working conditions. However, it 
is natural that the traditional industrial labor model would ignore these characteristics for 
the modem workplace, especially that of the public sector. When public sector labor 
laws were passed, the predominant labor management model was that of the industrial 
union existing within the private sector. At the time, given the knowledge and experience 
legislators had acquired dealing with this model, public employee labor laws were written 
with the industrial union in mind.
The industrial labor model not only separates employees into labor and 
management, us and them, employees “relinquish control over the outcome of the 
product of their work,” and pass it to management, often as a trade-off for the protection 
to only bargain wages, benefits, terms and conditions of employment (Streshly & 
DeMitchell, 1994, p. 63). It became management’s right to set the goals of the unit, 
excluding labor from setting policy, and in some cases leading to the creation of 
collective bargaining agreements exclusively reserving this right to management 
(Streshly & DeMitchell). Therefore, a situation can be created whereby if something is 
not spelled out in a contract, it must be reserved to management’s prerogative, and if it is 
spelled out in the contract, it cannot be altered without further negotiation between the 
contracted parties. This serves to limit the scope of labor relations then to what can be 
bargained. While this creates a complicated picture in any arena of collective bargaining, 
this situation can be made even more complicated in the public sector.
In the public sector a state statute may determine whether a public employer has 
the right to bargain over, or the power to agree to, a given subject (Twomey, 1985). For 
example, if by state statute, teacher evaluations in public schools have to be conducted
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twice a year, it is “impermissible for a school board to agree to only one evaluation a 
year” as part of a collective bargaining agreement (Twomey, 1985, p. 500). However, 
even if something is not forbidden by state statute does not mean it necessarily can be 
bargained over. In the public sector by law some issues are “mandatory” subjects and 
others are “permissive” subjects. “A mandatory subject of bargaining is one which the 
parties are required to negotiate over, and a permissive subject of bargaining is one which 
the parties may negotiate over but which neither can insist on to the point of impasse” 
(Twomey, 1985, p. 501). The realm of mandatory subjects is presided over by the issues 
of “wages hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,” while the area of 
permissive subjects is often open to the interpretation of each particular state’s statutes 
(Twomey, 1985, p. 501). To further narrow the scope of bargaining issues, these statutes 
often contain language dictating broad management prerogatives that effectively exclude 
certain subjects from negotiation because they relate to “matters of inherent managerial 
policy” (Twomey, p. 501). The history of public sector collective bargaining to this point 
has indicated a very conservative approach by public employment relation boards and the 
courts when deciding what can be a mandatory or permissive subject for collective 
bargaining. It has been approached more conservatively than in the private sector due to 
the sensitivity shown by the courts, and labor relations boards to the issue of management 
prerogatives, and with an eye to recognizing the fiscal realities often facing public 
employers. Public sector unions are blocked from forcing employees to bargain over 
permissive subjects. Thus, permissive subjects of bargaining cannot be elevated to 
mandatory subjects by insisting on bargaining to the point of declaring impasse 
(Twomey).
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Another limiting factor that the traditional industrial labor model has is that with 
the selection of a union, an exclusive bargaining representative, the points of contact 
become restricted. The union becomes the exclusive representative of labor, its voice and 
it is through this voice that labor must communicate to a large extent with management. 
Management may in turn have its exclusive representatives (labor lawyers, contract 
administrators, personnel leaders) who are delegated the task of speaking with union 
representatives; thus, the range of who can communicate and on what issues becomes a 
potential limiting factor in fostering a collaborative working environment (Streshly & 
DeMitchell, 1994).
Application of the Industrial Labor Model to Higher Education Labor Relations
In the industrial labor model the union is essentially a political organization with
its own goals and will to live and grow. The union provides a service, securing the best
wages, benefits, terms and conditions to its clientele. It does this by appealing to the
needs of its members and gaining them concessions in the workplace that its members
believe they could not have gained on their own. Mannis (1992) wrote:
Unions are complex political, social and economic organizations. A definition I 
learned years ago stills rings true. A union is a political agency operating in an 
economic environment. Unions, as organizations, have a central objective of 
survival and growth. Union leaders want to remain in office. Organizational and 
political goals can conflict with the needs and goals of rank and file union 
members, in our case, college employees (p. 97).
Consequently, the organization’s goals may, and often do, conflict with the goals 
of the union which may in turn conflict with the goals of its rank and file members. The 
reconciliation of these competing or conflicting goals becomes part and parcel of the 
industrial labor model and may further complicate attempts to develop collaborative 
working environments expected in professional life. This, then, may become yet one
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more reason why a strict application of the traditional industrial labor model to higher 
education, without accommodations for the uniqueness of that environment, where 
collaborative and collegial working conditions are expected, would be problematic.
As noted in the introduction of this paper, use of the industrial labor model in 
higher education labor relations presents two issues. The first relates to the application of 
the almost wholesale importation of a model that was designed for a different work 
setting and different workers. The second deals with relevant court rulings which have 
their rationale in the National Labor Relations Act (and its physical embodiment in the 
National Labor Relations Board, through its rulings), and how they have been applied to 
higher education labor issues, especially those involving faculty. This section deals with 
this first set of issues.
A number of issues are raised when attempting to apply the use of the industrial 
labor model to higher education labor relations, most notably when it is applied to faculty 
and faculty unions. For the purpose of discussion they can be characterized broadly as 
those encompassing the following factors: governance, professionalism, peer review, and 
policy. While there may be some overlap among them, the identified areas seek to 
highlight the issues that are somewhat unique to higher education faculty and that overall 
environment, given the history and traditions of Western higher education.
Institutional Governance: Shared Authority?
Governance of institutions of higher education is unique. It does not share the 
top-down model found in private sector business like the automobile business or the 
mining industry often associated with the industrial union labor model. Higher education 
has long rested on the concept of “shared authority” among four components, the board
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of trustees, the president or administration, the faculty and the students, (and to some
extent the involvement of alumni and influential donors or contractors, such as the federal
government) (Cunningham, 1984; Lucas, 1994). However, regardless of how many
players are involved the concept is the same. It remains one whereby several groups, all
having a stake in the venture; share in some manner in the governance of the institution
and in defining its goals and directions.
This concept of shared authority is a conundrum in the industrial union model.
Some advocates of faculty participation in governance believe that collective bargaining
introduces an “unwelcome, adversarial aura into a relationship between faculty and
administration, and are concerned about the effect on the institution” (Cunningham, 1984,
p. 27). In this same light, for others it represents an ‘employer-employee relationship’
which may be repugnant to traditional universities, who would fear that under the
industrial model, educational policy would become the product of negotiation rather than
of deliberation (Cunningham, 1984). For other critics of unionization of faculty,
collective bargaining is seen as widening an already existing chasm in higher education
between faculty and administration. Lucas (1996), found that:
at the risk of oversimplification, it might be noted that in institutions where the 
faculty are unionized or collective bargaining is the norm, the polarization 
between administrators and faculty is apt to be even more pronounced. Faculty 
prerogatives are possibly more secure, but the security is purchased at the cost of 
reinforcing the “us” versus “them” mentality . . .  the demonology on both sides is 
well developed (Lucas, 1996, p. 26-27).
Many faculty however, have begun to question the validity of shared authority, 
because after all, faculty may be limited in their power to make certain types of policy 
decisions just as the administration is limited, by either trustee or state legislative dictate 
depending on who has final authority (Cunningham, 1984). Many faculty in public
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higher education, who many be identifying with this concept, turn to collective 
bargaining in an effort to have an impact on decisions that will affect their well being. 
Proponents of faculty collective bargaining in higher education see collective bargaining 
as a way to strengthen faculty roles and thus guarantee that shared authority does exist. In 
fact, union advocates regard collective bargaining as a form of shared governance. To 
them it is a system of shared authority, based on the process of bilateral decision-making 
by two agents, the university and the faculty, which are equal under the law, thus seeking 
to insure some sort of equity in advocating their viewpoints and having their voices heard 
(Kadish, 1969).
While many faculty resist defining themselves as employees and thus resist 
unionization on those grounds, others accepted it because they perceived they were 
already being treated as such by administration. In addition they felt disenfranchised by 
newly formed power structures being erected at many campuses since the 1960s and 
1970s composed of management specialists and technical experts. For faculty in this 
vanguard, unionization was perceived as the only way to stop an erosion of power and to 
restore the equality necessary for faculty to remain part of the decision-making process 
(Begin, 1974).
Professionalism in a Collective Bargaining Environment
Debate over the compatibility of unionization with professionalism has followed 
hand in hand with the growth of collective bargaining on campuses. For some, the 
selection of a union involves the jettisoning of key professional values such as collegial 
participation in organizational decision-making, professional independence from
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hierarchical control, and expectations of performance and rewards based on individual 
merit (Rabban, 1992).
By contrast, supporters of collective bargaining in higher education posit that it 
may be the most effective method of achieving and maintaining those professional 
values. They maintain this stance because many contracts can and have been written to 
include professional standards such as: providing mechanisms for professional 
participation in decision-making, regulating professional work, providing training and 
professional development, committing organizational resources to professional goals and 
elaborating the criteria for personnel decisions and the roles of professionals in making 
them (Rabban, 1992). However, many organizations and unions agree that professional 
values are best protected by keeping them outside the specific collective bargaining 
agreement (Rabban).
Early contract analysis work by Johnstone (1982) on a field of 89 available 
contracts, (that covered 253 campuses, or 98% of all four year unionized campuses as of 
December 1979), concluded that “the agreements that have been reached indicate that 
bargaining representatives at a majority of institutions of higher education that have 
adopted collective bargaining have worked to shape a new model that plays down the 
adversarial relationship and emphasizes the collegial one” (p. 178). His work depicted an 
optimistic picture for collective bargaining or at least left open the possibility o f positive 
outcomes for the future of collective bargaining. Certain professional issues raised in 
Rhoades’s study were not even reported as issues back in the 1982 Johnstone study, such 
as instructional technology and the extensive use of part-time faculty (though they were 
certainly used at the time). Overall, what is most striking when comparing Johnstone’s
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study to Rhoades’s study is the sharp contrast in tone of the picture of collective 
bargaining each paints. Rhoades (1998), whose work, eighteen years later, supported a 
more dire viewpoint of the current status quo surrounding faculty collective bargaining 
agreements, drew a more adversarial picture of the current state of affairs than Johnstone 
did of his contemporary scene. This is especially evident in the concluding statement of 
Rhoades’s book:
The challenge faculty and faculty unions now face is whether they can manage to 
work in concert as a collectivity to more proactively redirect the academy and 
whether they can reorganize themselves with other production workers who are 
currently at the margins of the organization, before faculty themselves are 
increasingly reorganized to the margins of the academic enterprise (1998, p. 288).
This seems in sharp contrast to Johnstone’s statement about agreements exhibiting
a model that “plays down the adversarial relationship and emphasizes the collegial one”
(1982, p. 178). In comparing the two statements, a question seems to arise, what has
transpired in the arena of faculty collective bargaining to cause such a change in outlook
regarding collective bargaining in the intervening eighteen years? One possible answer
might be that, as Rhoades has suggested, administrations at institutions engaging in
faculty collective bargaining have attempted to use the collective bargaining agreement to
manage aspects of the faculty’s work in ways not expected when collective bargaining
was introduced thirty years ago. Rather than being relegated to simply the expected areas
of working conditions, salaries and benefits, administrations may have sought to use the
contract to define further their managerial discretion in the use of technology,
retrenchment clauses, the use of part-time faculty, contracts instead of tenure, and
reorganization issues. Collective bargaining, which began as a tool for the faculty, may
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in fact have become useful for administrations in devising their strategies regarding the 
management of faculty according to Rhoades’s study of 212 contracts.
Until recently, the study of whether faculty has, or whether faculty has perceived 
that it has become part of this new category of “managed professionals,” (if this 
designation is indeed correct), through the use of collective bargaining, (most 
significantly through Rhoades’s study of contracts) has not been in the realm of available 
research on faculty unions. In addition, how collective bargaining may have affected the 
professional status and self-image of faculty has received little attention. Especially 
absent in the current decade has been any inquiry of the faculty viewpoint on how they 
feel their professional self-image and status may have altered as a result of unionization 
and the new directions in the scope of faculty collective bargaining as noted by Rhoades. 
In a review of doctoral dissertations available on UMI’s Dissertation Abstracts from 1983 
to the present, as reviewed below, the foci of research were issues of collective 
bargaining and governance, collective bargaining and the campus climate, faculty factors 
that may have precipitated a pro-union vote, and attitudes of faculty toward collective 
bargaining. Still while not directly dealing with how recent contract trends may have 
altered the professional status of faculty, the dissertations of these recent two decades 
provides some interesting and related findings.
For example, Decker (1984) found that the faculty at Illinois’ public community 
colleges felt that their decision-making authority was enhanced in some areas by 
collective bargaining such as personnel decisions, while diminished in other areas such as 
organizational structure. Phalanus (1990) concluded, after a study of 21 four-year, 
private and public institutions in the United States and their collective bargaining
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contracts, which the level of faculty involvement in governance had not increased above 
the level acquired in the early days of their collective bargaining activity. A related 
finding was that what control was attained was exercised through committee service.
And, further, in the area of governance and collective bargaining, Schaeffer (1991) 
revealed, through a study of teachers’ colleges, that the power of academic senates may 
be decreased by the presence of faculty collective bargaining, even while the scope and 
number of the senates’ committees may be expanded by it.
Dissertations of the past fifteen years under the general subject heading of 
collective bargaining and campus climate for the most part yielded varying results.
Inman (1984) compared the results of campus climate surveys at 36 institutions done in 
the 1960s and early 1970s with surveys of the same institutions done in 1980-81. Because 
half the institutions in the study had undertaken faculty collective bargaining in the 
intervening years, the goal was to look for changes in attitudes about campus climate.
The comparison indicated no significant change in attitudes, so the author concluded that 
the threat of campus unrest expected to come with collective bargaining did not come to 
fruition. Also examining campus climate and governance, a 1984 dissertation (Rich, 
1984) on 107 California community colleges found that the morale of collective 
bargaining faculty was reported to be slightly less than those not under a collective 
bargaining agreement, but those under an agreement felt they were more involved in 
campus governance. Another dissertation (McDowell, 1987), which centered on Illinois 
community colleges revealed that senior, tenured faculty felt their campuses’ 
organizational climates were improved by the presence of collective bargaining while 
new, non-tenured faculty had a less favorable attitude toward collective bargaining. But
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also in this study, all faculty were found to feel that if campuses had organizational 
climates that fostered participation in organizational decisions, the faculty would less 
welcome collective bargaining. A similar theme was found in Lipscomb’s work (1997) 
based on California’s community colleges where institutions with poor organizational 
climates and collective bargaining in place were shown to have improved feelings about 
climate after non-adversarial collective bargaining styles were used in negotiations. 
Interestingly this work also noted that faculty preferred the non-adversarial style, while 
the administrations involved preferred the traditional, industrial labor model of the 
adversarial bargaining style.
What precipitated the faculty to vote for unionization was also a frequent topic 
among the dissertations of the last two decades. For example, Anderson (1985), again 
looking at the California community colleges, found that faculty from from blue-collar 
backgrounds with past union activity in the family were more likely to vote pro-union 
than those from white collar families with no union experience in their immediate family. 
Gisler (1985), examining the first eleven years of collective bargaining at Robert Morris 
College, found that for this institution it was the perceived lack of collegiality on campus 
between the faculty and the administration that led to the vote, with economics only a 
secondary factor. Migden (1988) examined whether certain characteristics about an 
institution’s organization enhanced the propensity of a campus faculty to vote for 
collective bargaining. His finding was that faculty with higher opinions of their 
organization’s characteristics in key areas such as communication and collegiality was 
less favorably disposed to vote for unionization than faculty who found their institutions 
wanting in organization style and substance.
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Overall, how faculty felt in general about collective bargaining and unions was 
also a topic of inquiry for dissertations of the 1980s and 1990s. Moats (1983) revealed 
that faculty at Kansas community colleges aligned along lines favorably disposed 
towards faculty collective bargaining based on certain demographic characteristics.. 
Similar to the work of McDowell (1985), Moats’s research found that age and experience 
factored into how faculty felt about collective bargaining. However, while McDowell 
found older faculty with more teaching experience to be more supportive of collective 
bargaining than younger, Moats found the opposite. Cornish’s (1986) work on Illinois 
public community colleges found the faculty at this group of institutions to be very 
favorably disposed toward collective bargaining and supportive of the perceived derived 
benefits from it such as more professional autonomy, greater participation in governance, 
and improved economic conditions. Concentrating on the faculty in one discipline, 
Carbonu’s dissertation (1992) on nursing faculty in Canada examined their feelings 
towards collective bargaining. This study ascertained that most were neutral on the 
concept; with more senior faculty showing some inclination to be more favorably 
disposed if they had some union experience themselves or a history of it in their families. 
In an historical analysis, Doyle (1989) examined three public institutions in Delaware 
that each had a minimum of ten years history in collective bargaining. In this study he 
found that the majority of union faculty in them would vote again for collective 
bargaining. Their reasons for doing so were the perceived advantages it earned them 
economically, added means to affect governance, and the voice and vehicle it gave them 
to communicate about their areas of concern on campus.
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It is surprising to note that the examination of the role of faculty unions and their 
efforts towards the professional needs of their members beyond working conditions has 
been somewhat absent in published studies of recent years. Especially notable for its 
omission of the topic, even in general terms, is a 1998 study of the newest generation of 
academics entering the profession (Finkelstein, Seal & Schuster, 1998) which makes no 
mention of collective bargaining, or faculty unions, or the perception of new faculty 
toward the concepts of each. The absence of examining unions and collective bargaining 
is made even more surprising by the recent efforts of teaching assistants, from which 
many new faculty spring, to unionize on campuses across the country (Leatherman,
1998). But this alone does not make it a ripe topic for study at this time. However, what 
does perhaps highlight the need for further study of faculty collective bargaining 
agreements and their influence on the professional role of faculty is the growing evidence 
that lines are being crossed between faculty’s professional concerns and working 
conditions by both faculty unions and institutional administrations. The evidence of these 
lines being crossed and blurred by both sides of the negotiating table may be found in the 
trends of language and clauses in the collective bargaining agreements, as well as in 
recent activities by both sides.
In many cases, the faculty unions are attempting to address both the professional 
concerns of their members and their working conditions, either within the formal scope of 
negotiations, or by way of attempting to influence an institution’s policy externally. 
Therefore, how faculty’s professional lives are affected by collective bargaining 
agreements is based on the key factors of what issues are chosen by unions as bargaining 
topics and why. By way of illustration, even a cursory scan of the Chronicle o f  Higher
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Education on a monthly basis will yield numerous instances where faculty unions are 
addressing issues that, on the one hand, could be considered working conditions yet on 
the other, professional concerns. For example, the recent battle through funded studies 
and then advertisements by the American Federation of Teachers, equating distance 
education to the “five minute university” once used as a j oke on the American television 
show, Saturday Night Live (Blumenstyk & McCollum, 1999). If distance education can 
be considered a professional concern of academics, which as an alternative means of 
delivering instruction it must, then this is just one example where addressing higher 
education faculty’s professional concerns is appearing to fall within the scope of 
appropriate activities for their unions. And, as pointed out in the Rhoades (1998) study, 
distance education is showing up in collective bargaining agreements as an article for 
negotiation because it affects a faculty’s teaching loads.
In some cases administrations bring to the bargaining table issues that might serve 
to alter the professional status of faculty. A recent example is found in the Massachusetts 
state system of higher education (Footnotes, 1999). In the spring of 1999, this large state 
system composed of both two and four-year institutions, proposed to put on the 
negotiating table the concept of multiyear contracts for faculty instead of tenure. The 
plan was that faculty who accepted the multiyear contract would receive a negotiated 
premium salary payment of a proposed five to ten percent in lieu of tenure.
However, the Rhoades (1998) summary study of 212 faculty collective bargaining 
agreements may be one of the most compelling reasons to suggest that further study is 
needed at this time to examine if faculty are in reality having their professional roles 
redefined by collective bargaining agreements. This study introduced an intriguing new
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concept about the content and intent of faculty collective bargaining agreements, i.e., the 
“managed professional,” a new concept, which, if accurate, deserves further examination 
based on the challenges it poses for higher education. However, because the study was 
based on a contract analysis without a survey of faculty, it does not address the question 
of whether faculty perceive that collective bargaining has altered their professional 
status. Consequently, further inquiry into the issue, assessing faculty attitudes to examine 
the has value.
Union advocates and union officials often state that collective bargaining is a way
to gain the professional status that college faculty desire. They argue that faculty are
“employed professionals in a unique employer-employee relationship, and as such is
already in a struggle with the administration over many aspects of faculty and college
life” (Cunningham, 1984, p. 28). Thus, they can only gaining from the advocacy
provided by the union in this struggle.
Advancement of faculty is another issue associated with collective bargaining.
Cunningham (1984), found that,
Since the collective bargaining agreement binds all, individual advantages may be 
sacrificed to the demands of the whole faculty. Merit promotions or rewards 
made cede to seniority. Incremental advantages to the few may be lost in order to 
better the economic state of many (p. 28).
Therefore, those who equate collective bargaining with a loss of professionalism 
may fear as well some loss of individual recognition and rewards and, perhaps, of voice 
as well. Electing a faculty union to be the exclusive bargaining agent for the faculty does 
mean that to a large extent there is an “exclusivity” of voices communicating about 
faculty work conditions. It becomes a matter between the union and the administration. 
Those being represented by the union, if they do not support it and its goals, may argue
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that they have had their right to act and voice their concerns independently to 
administration restricted (Cunningham, 1984).
Public institutions have the added problem of whether a whole state system 
should be included or whether the faculty at each campus should negotiate its own 
contract separately (Cunningham, 1984). And there are the related issues of whether 
departmental chairpersons are excluded from the unit, and whether part-time faculty 
should be included. Some notable cases where department chairpersons have played a 
role include C.W. Post where they were excluded from the unit, while at Fordham the 
department chairpersons were not (Cunningham). While the National Labor Relations 
Board has refused to set general guidelines for defining units, preferring to decide cases 
individually, it is interesting to note that what groups are included in a unit may affect the 
outcome of who wins an election for bargaining agent. Finkin (1981) observed that an 
employee organization would inevitably seek to control its membership, desiring to 
engage only those who would support its selection ands subsequent election as the 
exclusive agent. Thus, how the battle lines are drawn may not only determine how the 
battle is fought but by whom.
Academic Policy
The role of faculty unions and collective bargaining in the formulation and 
implementation of academic policy is one area that creates major controversy on 
campuses. While negotiators of collective bargaining units are expected to bargain on 
wages, hours and other items and conditions of employment, the issues of educational or 
academic policy are not as clear as to whether bargaining over these policies is a 
permissive or prohibited subject (Cunningham, 1984)
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Kemerer and Baldridge (1976) noted that while collective bargaining may not be 
the appropriate arena for academic policy deliberations, it could coexist and even 
promote separate governance structures such as faculty senates. In fact there is evidence 
that faculty bargaining may have brought some improvement in faculty participation in 
deciding academic policy issues through the creation of faculty senates or councils and 
other governance mechanisms where they did not previously operate. Examples are 
Rider College and Fairleigh Dickinson before its unions were decertified because of 
Yeshiva (Begin, 1992). Indeed the topic of academic policy has been found to be a 
permitted area of negotiation in some states, and prohibited in some states such as New 
Jersey (Begin). In the case of Minnesota’s community colleges, as a result of the 
Supreme Court case, Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v Knight 465 U.S. 
271 (1984), a state law mandating that “meet and confer” sessions be conducted only by 
members of the union and the administration was upheld (Franke, 1992). The aspect of 
this case was that it included discussions, not just about agency fees and other direct 
union and administration matters, but also issues of academic policy as well. In this case, 
the Supreme Court ruled that a state could, if it chose, give the union the enhanced voice 
in formal institutional deliberations and that there did not exist a constitutional right for 
faculty to participate in university governance (Franke).
However, even when shared governance structures are put in place through 
collective bargaining to address academic policy, this does not mean that such a shared 
system of decision-making authority between faculty and administration equates to a 
situation where the latter delegates it to the former without a veto (Cunningham, 1984).
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Final authority is still vested with the administration and the board of trustees, and this is 
a point not likely to be bargained away.
Court Rulings and Higher Education Faculty under Collective Bargaining
As noted in the introduction, the application of court rulings related to higher 
education labor relations is also rooted in the industrial model as they are predicated on 
law embodied in the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 which followed that model. 
These rulings have significant impact on higher education labor relations. Most notably 
of these decisions is the National Labor Relations Board v Yeshiva University (1980). As 
stated previously, collective bargaining separates management and employees; what were 
once educators in public education have become “us” and “them.” The United States 
Supreme Court in Yeshiva held that the faculty of Yeshiva University were “managerial 
employees” and therefore were not eligible to form a bargaining unit under the standards 
determined by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB, 1980). The majority relied 
on the facts presented by the Yeshiva University administration that faculty at that 
institution performed critical functions in the setting of academic calendars, in curriculum 
and personnel decisions, in the grading systems for students and in admission and 
matriculation guidelines. It found that faculty recommendations were so generally 
followed that they “effectively determined” important decisions for Yeshiva University in 
these areas. This finding was dispositive in denying the faculty to bargain within the 
guidelines of the NLRA.
In the Court’s dissenting opinion on the case, Justice Brennan accused the five- 
member majority of predicating the decision on an idealized view of the university, one 
that in Brennan’s view did not comport with reality. He stated in his dissent:
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The Court’s perception of the Yeshiva faculty’s status is distorted by the rose- 
colored lens through which it views the governance structure of the modern day 
university. The Court’s conclusion that the faculty’s professional interests are 
indistinguishable from those of the administration is bottomed on an idealized 
model of collegial decision making that is a vestige of the great medieval 
university. But the university of today bears little resemblance to the ‘community 
of scholars’ of yesteryear. Education has become ‘big business’ and the task of 
operating the university has been transferred from the faculty to an autonomous 
administration . . .  (NRLB v. Yeshiva, 1980, pp. 702-3).
Though arguably the NRLB v. Yeshiva decision was applicable only to those few 
institutions whose faculties exerted absolute control over academic policy, it has in fact 
been interpreted more broadly. The NLRB conferred managerial status on all faculties 
that play a significant role in curriculum matters such as the determination of course 
content, core curriculum requirements, and grading standards (Osbourne, 1992). Because 
of the NRLB v Yeshiva decision and its broad application by the NRLB, faculty organizing 
in the private sector came to an abrupt halt, and more than twenty faculty bargaining 
representatives lost their rights (Osbourne, 1992).
While the Yeshiva case has mainly affected the faculty of private institutions’ 
ability to organize, it has also affected public institutions as their administrations have 
periodically attempted to have bargaining agents rendered decertified under Yeshiva such 
as the case of the University of Pittsburgh (Lee, 1992). However, more germane to the 
discussion here is that under the review of the NRLB, based on its interpretations of 
Yeshiva. faculty at some institutions can be considered more “managerial” than those at 
other institutions. This strikes to the very heart of the industrial labor model that is 
formulated on the separate camps of labor versus management. If there is only one party, 
“management,” on a campus, then in the eyes of the NRLB there is no mutuality of 
interests of a separate group to represent. The industrial labor model does not readily
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recognize a possible new category of professionals in the current internal configuration of 
colleges and universities, nor does it allow for the new realities of the “big business” of 
higher education. There can be no blurred lines between labor and management in the 
traditional industrial labor model, and for this reason it is less applicable to American 
higher education and its reality of blurred lines of responsibility and authority for running 
an institution under the attempted rubric of “shared governance.”
Related Studies
According to Gary Rhoades (1988), the professional autonomy of faculty, i.e., 
their ability to control certain decisions governing their professional lives within an 
institution, is affected by administration’s attempts to leverage greater managerial 
discretion over these decisions. The result of this, according to Rhoades, is that the 
management hierarchy of colleges and universities has gained greater flexibility to 
reorganize their institutions, and redirect academic labor with a related result of 
stratifying faculty into various levels with differing professional privileges and concerns. 
Rhoades sought to examine how collective bargaining agreements embodied the 
continuing negotiation between a faculty’s professional autonomy and the 
administration’s managerial discretion over decisions that not only impacted an 
institution but had an impact on the professional concerns of faculty as well.
Rhoades’s study (1998) examined 212 collective bargaining agreements for the 
faculty of two-year and four year, public and private institutions in the 1990s, a body of 
contracts estimated by the author to be 45 percent of all faculty contracts. He undertook 
a “thematic and rhetorical analysis of contractual language regarding various terms of 
faculty labor concentrating on contracts’ themes, rhetoric, specific terminology, and
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emphases . . . primarily a close reading and systematic content analysis of the contracts” 
(Rhoades, 1998, p. 6). The author also noted that he conducted some statistical review of 
the incidence of various provisions of the contracts by institutional type.
His hypothesis was that faculty in higher education are increasingly becoming 
“managed professionals” with their professional role in institutional decision making 
becoming limited, along with the available and viable constraints on the exercise of 
managerial discretion in these decisions, Rhoades proposed that this imbalance resulted 
in a stratification of the faculty profession. However, Rhoades also pointed out that 
faculty are not powerless, that through the use of the collective bargaining agreements 
faculty have been able to build in checks on managerial discretion over decisions 
affecting faculties’ professional lives. In addition, Rhoades noted that faculty collective 
bargaining agreements might work to allow faculty to determine the contractual 
conditions of their work, which shore up their professional autonomy. However, per 
Rhoades, “in the social relations of work between managers and faculty, the balance of 
managerial discretion on the one hand, and of professional autonomy and involvement on 
the other, is weighted in the former direction. But there is counterbalance; the relations 
are not one-sided” (Rhoades, 1998, p. 6). To examine these relations in the context of the 
contracts, Rhoades analyzed specific terms of faculty labor: salary adjustments for 
faculty (merit, market and equity), the reorganization of academic programs coupled with 
the retrenchment of faculty, the use of part-time faculty, the use of technology in the 
curriculum, and ownership issues pertaining to the use of faculty’s time and intellectual 
property.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
61
Briefly summarized, Rhoades concluded in his analysis of the contracts that in
regard to the salary issues studied (merit, market, and equity), “over two-thirds of the
contracts accord managers discretion to set initial salaries” (Rhoades, 1998, p. 259).
However, he also found that the labor market’s influence on salaries was considerable,
and while unions were not antithetical to the market driven nature of salaries (20% of the
212 contracts contained market provisions), unions usually promoted the collective
interests of the faculty through the use of set salary structures and across-the-board-
percentage raises. In addition, the study revealed evidence that merit also had a place in
contracts with 68 percent of four-year institutions, and 19 percent of two year, having
some form of merit, whether it was phrased in those terms or in items such as promotions
or other proxies for merit. Rhoades, however, concluded that
despite union efforts to constrain managerial flexibility in differentially setting 
and shaping faculty salaries, and to restrain salary inequities among faculty, the 
prevailing trend in salaries over two decades is increased salary dispersion, [with] 
the gap between field at the top and the bottom of the salary hierarchy has 
increased over time, as has the gap between men and women” (Rhoades, p. 260).
Furthermore, he concluded that salaries, and thus resources, have been used by
management to restructure the faculty workforce by “differentially investing and
allocating their monies across academic fields, restricting growth in some areas even as
they accelerate growth in others” (Ibid).
In his review of the findings on the retrenchment of faculty, Rhoades wrote, “due
to the efforts of faculty unions it is more procedurally (and politically) difficult than most
managers would like [and the contracts’] provisions are filled with structures that lay out
the time and energy required to lay off faculty” (Rhoades, 1998, p. 261). But Rhoades
found that managers retained most of the authority to make exceptions to established
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procedures such as the order of layoff, the reassignment of faculty, or they controlled the 
definition of new academic units for which faculty laid off may or may not be reassigned. 
For example, his study found that 178 of the 212 contracts had retrenchment clauses, and 
94 percent of this group had some provision for managerial discretion in their exercise 
including in 42 percent of the contracts (of the 178), no specific rationale given for the 
retrenchment of faculty. Fundamentally, then Rhoades concluded that despite all the 
consultation on layoffs as determined by collective bargaining agreements in that 
included faculty, “it is managers who determine whether and where to retrench” (p. 261). 
And, as he also noted, while faculty do play a role, it is mainly one that is reactive even if 
there are provisions made in contracts for management and faculty to meet prior to the 
determination that layoffs are needed.
Rhoades’ second thesis is that contract provisions that are weighted in favor of 
managerial discretion result in stratification of the faculty profession. Faculty were 
stratified as a work force in two ways. First, the contracts of four-year institutions, as 
opposed to two year, were more likely to allow for faculty discussion with retrenchment 
issues. This led to the situation where one class of benefits was provided to one type of 
faculty and not another, thus sharpening the ‘professional divide,’ i.e., stratification, 
between the faculty of two and four year institutions which already existed due to 
institutional type. Second, most retrenchment clauses allowed for seniority rights in the 
issue of layoffs, with allowances in many cases for the practice known as ‘bumping’ 
whereby senior faculty displaced junior in their positions instead of being laid off. While 
this has the professional advantage of protecting senior faculty from being targeted for
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layoff by management, it also has the effect of stratifying, and accentuating the divisions 
between types of faculty.
The next area Rhoades studied was the use of part-time faculty. He concluded 
that this area of professional concern to faculty is inadequately addressed by the contracts 
studied. For example, eighty percent of the 183 contracts that mentioned part-time 
faculty, “do not define conditions of appointment/release for part-time faculty [and] they 
do not have collective work-force provisions that limit managerial discretion in relation 
to part-time faculty” (Rhoades, 1998, pp. 164-165). Since, according to Rhoades, the use 
of part-time faculty is one way institutions can allocate (and reallocate) resources related 
to faculty, he considered it somewhat “surprising, then that unions had not more actively 
(or successfully) negotiated standard professional procedures that would make it more 
complicated for managers to utilize part-time faculty thereby discouraging them from 
utilizing as many as they increasingly do” (Rhoades, 1998, p. 263). The extensive use of 
part-time faculty, coupled with their lack of status in the contract’s language, found to be 
lending evidence that managerial discretion, was further stratifying the faculty ranks.
Instructional technology (especially delivery of courses over the Internet), the 
fourth major area of the five Rhoades examined in the contracts was an area that yielded 
a slim set of evidence. Per Rhoades, this may or may not be indicative that it is a focus of 
contractual concern between faculty and institutional management. In reviewing the 
findings he stated “it is often in managers’ best interest to keep matters out of the 
contract—that generally increases their discretion.. .absence from a large number of 
contracts does not necessarily mean lack of managerial interest in the issue. Indeed 
managerial interest is strong” (Rhoades, 1998, p. 175). While he found that the national
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faculty unions pressured local unions to include it in contracts, only about 78, or one third
of the 212 contracts examined, had provisions related to instructional technology. Only
twelve of these refer to instructional technology in some way, and eight of these gave
managers the rights to determine the utilization of technology in the classroom. Not
surprisingly, most of these provisions were found in the contracts of two-year institutions.
In his opinion after examining the contracts, Rhoades stated that
new technology offers new opportunities for establishing faculty control of 
instructional delivery . . .  if faculty do not take advantage of this opportunity 
other groups will step in to fill the void . . . new categories of nonfaculty, 
nonbargaining-unit members to support and Oversee . . . .  (Rhoades, 1998,
p. 266).
Based on his research of the contracts, Rhoades felt this might be another way in which 
faculty could be separated from the design and offering of a curriculum, as the delivery of 
Internet courses opened up another pathway for institutions to utilize part-time faculty.
Concerning the last of the five major areas of examinations in Rhoades’ study of 
the contracts, outside employment and intellectual property rights, his findings proved to 
be “counterintuitive in terms of academic hierarchy” (Rhoades, 1998, p. 266). By this he 
meant that faculty in two year institutions appeared to have greater latitude in their 
outside employment and on intellectual property rights than their colleagues in four year 
institutions. In addition, unionized faculty seemed to have greater protections in regard 
to outside employment and intellectual property rights than their counterparts in non- 
unionized research institutions. With regard to outside employment, when mentioned in 
62 percent of contract provisions found in the study of 212 contracts, most provisions 
were related to conflict of interest concerns, with references to the institutions having first 
claim on a faculty member’s time. And, when it came to who decided on what was a
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conflict of interest, in the case of 33 percent of those provisions, it was an institution’s 
administration that determined it.
Intellectual property rights were mentioned in 71 of the 212 contracts with some 
clearly defined issues for example, 60 percent of this group of contracts spelled out terms 
of ownership, according to Rhoades. In addition, he found that these clauses were no 
more likely to appear in four-year institutional contracts than two year. However, if 71 of 
the 212 contracts had these provisions, he pointed out, that meant 141 had no provisions 
at all referring to the matter.
Thus, Rhoades concluded in his study that faculty unions had advanced and 
protected their members’ interests in wages and benefits. However, they “ have been less 
successful in negotiating provisions regarding the distribution and configuration of the 
work-force, that effectively restrict managerial discretion and promote faculty 
involvement in reorganizing the work-force and in utilizing part-time faculty and 
instructional technology” (1998, p. 275).
Several things stand out in reviewing the study by Rhoades. • First, the study was 
limited to five broad types of contractual provisions: the salary issues of merit, market 
and equity; faculty retrenchment; the use of part-time faculty; instructional technology; 
and controls on faculty’s time and intellectual property. The study did not include other 
pertinent types of provisions which may or may not support Rhoades’s theory of the 
faculty as managed professionals, such as training stipulations, grievance procedures, 
management’s rights, performance reviews, or appointment/reappointment and tenure 
issues to name just a few alternate possibilities for focus.
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Second, it is hard to determine how many of the contracts of the 212 studied 
belong to four year, and how many belong to two year institutions, and what level of each 
(doctoral, baccalaureate, or community, technical, etc.). Although Rhoades does break 
down some specific contract findings by type of institution, two year or four, it is hard to 
gauge overall how his summary conclusions apply by type and level of institution. For 
example, which group had more ‘managed professionals,’ four-year faculty or two? Also 
which type of institution had a greater propensity to manage their professionals?
Finally, did union affiliation (AAUP, AFT, or NEA) impact the balance between the 
professional autonomy of faculty and the use managerial discretion?
Finally, the study does not address how contracts’ limitations and required scope 
are understood, interpreted, and complied with, in practical terms, by both administration 
and faculty. As observed in one classic study on the effect of unions on management, 
“the gap between the results and the language can be large and significant” (Slichter, 
Healy, & Livermash, 1960, 710). At the very least, it would seem to indicate that the 
areas of study explored by Rhoades are ripe for further examination and perhaps different 
approaches.
A Need for Further Study
The preceding review of the literature culminates in one overarching point—that 
the inclusion of professionals in a unionized workforce, particularly higher education 
faculty, has not been one of unquestioned acceptance. A key concern is that faculty are 
members of a learned profession that not only has enjoyed but may require working 
conditions that are antithetical to the industrial labor environment of a unionized 
workforce.
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It is important to note that there have been few reported recent studies of 
collective bargaining in higher education. While faculty members engage in new and 
healthy debate over unionization and collective bargaining in both public and private 
school sectors, and graduate student unions gain in numbers, there is still inadequate 
study of how the professoriate and higher education in general is faring with these new 
labor relationships. It is hoped that the study presented in the following pages adds, with 
pertinence and timeliness, to the body of research in this field and intrigues others to use 
any of its omissions as a stepping-stone to further inquiry.





The purpose of this study was to examine how college and university faculty 
perceived that their professional concerns were affected by working under a collective 
bargaining agreement. The review of the literature identified the following faculty 
professional concerns:
Faculty Professional Concerns
A. The ability of the faculty to effectively influence who will join and continue on
the faculty.
B. The ability of the faculty to determine the curriculum.
C. The ability of the faculty to determine what instructional practices/delivery
systems will be used their classrooms.
D. The ability of the faculty to set the requirements for granting of a degree.
E. The ability of the faculty to determine their teaching, scholarship, and service
requirements.
F. The right of the faculty to exercise their academic freedom.
G. The ability of the faculty to exercise reasonable shared governance, (exercising a
wider role in institutional governance beyond the classroom and the department 
level).
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The seven professional concerns informed the formulation of the research 
questions below.
Research Questions
1. Do faculty perceive that collective bargaining facilitates or inhibits their
professional autonomy?
2. Do faculty perceive that collective bargaining in general is important to their
sense of professionalism?
3. Do the collective bargaining agreements support professional autonomy?
The study relied on a combination of survey research and contract analysis. For 
the contract analysis phase of the research, the associated collective bargaining contracts 
of the institutions that employed the surveyed faculty were examined for language in the 
contracts that might impinge on the professional concerns of the faculty, aid them, or 
hinder them.
For the survey phase, 650 randomly selected faculty members covered by the 
contracts were surveyed to ascertain their perceptions on how the contracts may be 
affecting their professional status. A list of the institutions whose contracts were 
examined is presented below:








Connecticut Connecticut State 
University System
AAUP Central Connecticut State 
Eastern Connecticut State 
Southern Connecticut State 
Western Connecticut State
University o f  
Connecticut AAUP
U o f  Connecticut-Hartford 
U o f  Connecticut-Southeastern 
U o f  Connecticut-Stamford 
U o f  Connecticut-Storrs 
U o f  Connecticut-Torrington 
U o f  Connecticut-Waterbury
Maine
University o f  Maine 
System NEA/MEA University o f  Maine 
University o f  Maine-Augusta 
University o f  Maine-Farmington 
University o f  Maine-Fort Kent 
University o f  Maine-Machias 
University o f  Maine-Presque Isle 
University o f  Southern Maine








Massachusetts College o f  Art 
Massachusetts Maritime Academy 
North Adams State (now Mass.




U o f  Massachusetts-Amherst
(Currently the same contract with U  o f  Mass-Boston)
UMass-Boston MTA/NEA U o f  Mass-Boston
UMass-Dartmouth AFT U o f  Mass -Dartmouth
UMass-Lowell MSP/MST/
NEA
U o f  Mass-Lowell
New Hampshire Keene State NEA Keene State
University o f  New  
Hampshire
AAUP University o f  New Hampshire






Rhode Island Rhode Island College AFT Rhode island College
University o f  Rhode 
Island AAUP CCE Campus 
Kingston Campus 
Narragansett Bay 
W. Alton Jones Campus
Vermont Vermont State 
Colleges




The subjects for this study, the institutions above, were drawn from the January 
1997 edition of the Directory o f Faculty Contracts and Bargaining Agents in Institutions 
o f Higher Education (Hurd, Foerster & Johnson, 1997). For one phase of the research 
work, the contract analysis, the 13 contracts listed in the directory for full-time tenure 
track faculty at the four-year, public higher education institutions in the six New England 
states (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode island and Vermont.) 
formed the core of the population for the contracts analyzed. [Note: The service 
academies of the Coast Guard, and Maine Maritime, while public institutions were 
eliminated from the population for this study due to their unique missions and the 
compositions of their faculty]. A representative from each institutional bargaining unit or 
institutional general counsel’s office was contacted in writing for a copy of their faculty 
collective bargaining agreement which was in effect in the year 2000, and in most cases 
the contracts or excerpts of them were also available on-line at the institutions’ WEB 
sites.
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Second, for the survey of faculty, one institution per contract [a total of thirteen 
schools] formed the institutional population for the study from which the faculty sample 
was drawn. In the cases where more than one institution is covered by a contract, only 
one institution was chosen by way of random selection. Then to select faculty to receive 
the survey, the faculty at each of the thirteen institutions with one of the three titles of 
assistant professor, associate professor, or professor, were placed into a possible 
population for sampling. Then in order to select the faculty sample that received the 
survey, fifty faculty members from each of the thirteen institutions were randomly 
selected, thus yielding a total sample size of 650 faculty members. (Note: if there were 
more than one institution represented by a single contract as the case with a system, one 
institution within that system’s contract was randomly selected to draw the fifty faculty to 
be surveyed, this is further discussed in the review of the survey’s data in the next 
chapter). The survey was sent out to this sample in September 2003, with follow-ups in 
March 2004. (See Appendix B for a copy of this survey instrument).
Instrumentation
The survey instrument was a combination of Likert Scale questions and other 
selected response questions. The survey also solicited demographic information regarding 
the department of the faculty, their discipline, some personal characteristics such as 
gender, age, academic rank, and the name of the union representing faculty on-campus, 
as well as whether they are members of the union, and if, yes, how long. It also asked for 
their terminal degree, the number of years since their terminal degree had been earned, 
the number of years they had been in higher education, the size of their institution, their
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primary level of teaching assignments (undergraduate or graduate), and the highest level 
of degree awarded at their institution.
To test the survey, it was piloted to a random sample of twenty-five 
tenured/tenure track faculty at the Education Department of Sonoma State University 
during the spring of 2003. It was explained in the cover letter that this was a pilot to test 
the instrument. Responses derived from the pilot were used to test the questionnaire and 
resulted in some changes made in the final survey instrument. These included changing 
it to a “phrase version” and clarifying the wording of some of the questions.
In addition, a panel of seven experts drawn from researchers and practitioners in 
the field of law and collective bargaining were contacted to review the survey for form 
and content. Of the seven contacted four submitted both written and verbal comments 
on the survey. The four who responded were the following:
Frank Annunziato, Ph.D., Director, AAUP Chapter, University of Rhode Island 
James P. Begin, Ph.D., Professor Emeritus University of Texas Law School 
Robert C. Cloud, Ph.D., Baylor University
John F. Schwaller, Ph.D., Provost, University of Minnesota, Morris 
Their comments for changed wording, format alterations, and added content were also 
incorporated into the final version of the actual survey distributed.
Data Collection: The Survey
The survey questionnaires, with an accompanying cover letter explaining the 
survey and its purpose, were sent out in September 2003, requesting that respondents 
return then within two weeks. A postage-paid, self-addressed envelope also accompanied 
the survey to foster returns. In addition, a separate postage-paid return postcard to be
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mailed separate from the surveys was also provided so the returns could be tracked. To 
increase response rates, a random drawing raffle of returned postcards was also used with 
two recipients receiving a $125.00 gift certificate each to the on-line bookseller, 
AMAZON.COM from a random drawing of the returned postcards.
The first wave of returns yielded 140 surveys. A second survey appeal was sent 
out the first week of March 2004 in an attempt to increase the response rate. This 
produced another forty surveys, with another eleven being returned for faculty who had 
left their institutions, were since deceased or retired, plus another four with notes from 
faculty that they did not believe they could answer the survey for reasons ranging from 
“lack of knowledge” about their campus to feeling “unqualified” to know about collective 
bargaining at their institution because they were not eligible to be a member of the 
faculty union. Therefore by the time of analysis, of the original sample of 650, 180 
usable surveys or 27.69 percent were returned.
The analysis of the survey questions’ responses associated with Research 
Question #2 (Do faculty perceive that collective bargaining in general is important to 
their sense of professionalism?), questions, 26, 28, and 30 on the Likert Scale section of 
the survey also were reviewed, and in turn, those results analyzed for their variances 
resulting from the respondents’ academic ranks, disciplinary affiliations and specific 
union memberships.
Data Collection: The Contracts
Requests for the contracts of the thirteen institutions whose faculty were 
surveyed were made during the fall/early winter of 2000, with follow-ups for missing 
contracts made again in late 2003 and early 2004. The requests were made in writing
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with additional follow-up letters, telephone calls, and emails to those institutions that 
failed to respond within three weeks. In most cases copies of the contracts needed were 
available via the WEB for public viewing, (or at least sections of them were also 
available as an institution’s WEB site), or by simply requesting them in writing through 
an institution’s general counsel.
Limitations of the Study 
One of the limitations of this study is that it deals only with unionized faculty in 
New England, so caution has to be exercised if its findings are applied to other faculty 
groups. Additionally, the response rate of 27.69 percent may lack the sufficient 
percentage to fully represent the 650 faculty of the original sample.
A second limitation of this overall study is that with regard to the review of 
contracts, it was just that, a review of the contracts and their contents as a group. No 
attempt was undertaken to compare the perceptions of the faculty respondents against 
their own actual contracts, nor was work endeavored to compare specific campus 
practices with the content of each of the contracts, and also with the laws of the state, or 
the associated handbooks and other regulations of the campuses on their related system 
umbrella units. Thus, how past practices are relied upon when faculty and administrations 
interact on a campus, and the associated other factors that influenced the perceptions of 
the respondents, in addition to the contract language, was not involved in this study.
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CHAPTER 4
DATA ANALYSIS: SURVEY RESULTS AND FINDINGS
“Don’t join too many gangs. Join few if any.
Join the United States and join the family—But not much in between unless a college.”
Robert Frost, Build Soil (1932) (As cited by Bartlett, 1992)
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to examine how college and university faculty
perceived their professional concerns were affected by working under a collective
bargaining agreement. Those professional concerns identified for the purposes of the
study are delineated below.
Faculty Professional Concerns
A. The ability of the faculty to effectively influence who will join and continue on 
the faculty.
B. The ability of the faculty to determine the curriculum.
C. The ability of the faculty to determine what instructional practices/delivery 
systems will be used their classrooms.
D. The ability of the faculty to set the requirements for granting of a degree.
E. The ability of the faculty to determines their teaching, scholarship, and service 
requirements.
F. The right of the faculty to exercise their academic freedom.
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G. The ability of the faculty to exercise reasonable shared governance, (exercising a 
wider role in institutional governance beyond the classroom and the department 
level).
Coupled with these seven professional concerns were the three key research 
questions that this study sought to answer. These are:
Research Questions
1. Do faculty perceive that collective bargaining facilitates or inhibits 
their professional autonomy?
2. Do faculty perceive that collective bargaining in general is important 
to their sense of professionalism?
3. Do the collective bargaining agreements support professional autonomy?
The two respondent groups (September 2003 and the follow-up mailing results of
March 2004) were compared against one another to ascertain if there were any significant 
differences between the two waves of respondents which could affect the outcome of the 
findings. Tables 2 through 4 (and their Chi-Square tests) below show the results of the 
comparison between the first respondent group from September 2003 (N = 106) and the 
second respondents group from March 2004 (N = 35) in the key demographic areas of 
rank, tenure status, and union membership. Also depicted in Table 4 is how they are 
compared on the basis of the results to one question on the survey #31. Based on these 
findings both groups are similar enough to be combined as one group for analyzing the 
survey results as the Chi Square tests for all indicated ap  > .05.
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Table 2
Rank, Tenure, and Union Membership Comparisons
Time when respondent returned 
survey Totals
Sept. 2003 March 2004
Rank Professor 51 18 69
Associate 36 9 45
Assistant 19 8 27
Total 106 35 141
Tenure „  , , tenured 86 27 113Status
Tenure
Track 20 8 28
Total 106 35 141
Union Not 1 n 1
Membership Eligible 1 yj 1
Other 7 0 7
NEA 28 13 41
AAUP 27 11 38
AFT 31 9 40
Not a 1 1 1 'I
Member 1 i 2 13
Total 105 35 140
Table 3
Chi-Square Tests Rank Comparisons: Rank, Tenure, and Union Membership.
Pearson Chi-Square 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) df
Rank .621 2
Tenure .608 1
Union Membership .448 5




Cross Tabulation of Question 31’s Results and Times of Returned Survey
Question 31. Comparison 
Results:
Time when respondent 
returned survey Total
Sept. 2003 March 2004
As a professional, I Strongly
really cannot see Disagree 4S 16 61myself represented
by a union.
Strongly 6 1 7Agree
Neutral 15 6 21
Disagree 29 11 40
Agree 11 1 12





The resulting 141 survey respondents were also randomly arranged in terms of
their academic department, gender, other characteristics and titles, just as the 650 where, 
and further as the list below illustrates, no single institution dominated in the group of 
survey returns:




Connecticut State University System
(Southern Connecticut State University 8 5.67
Keene State College 9 6.38
Massachusetts State Colleges
(Bridgewater State College) 8 5.67
Rhode Island College 16 11.35
University of Connecticut 10 7.09
University of New Hampshire 12 8.51
University of Maine System
(University of Maine-Orono) 14 9.93
University of Massachusetts (Amherst & Boston)
(University of Massachusetts-Amherst) 9 5.67
(University of Massachusetts-Boston) 10 7.09
University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth 15 10.64
University of Massachusetts at Lowell 10 7.09
University of Rhode Island 10 7.09
Vermont State Colleges
(Castleton State College) 10 7.09
Total 141 100.00%
The Respondent Group and their Characteristics
In terms of characterizing the respondents by their answers to the demographic 
questions of the survey, the following can be stated:
• the mean age was 53 with a median age of 55;
• 68.8% or 97 were male, 44 or 31.2% female;
• the mean number of years spent in higher education was 21
• the mean number of years since they obtained their terminal degree was 21 
years;
• the mean number of years that each had been a member of a faculty union 
was 14 years, the median was 12.5 years;
• 66 or 46.8% taught only at the undergraduate level, 15 or 10.6% taught only 
at the graduate level, and 60 or 42.6% taught at both the undergraduate and 
graduate levels.
Table 5 describes the other characteristics of the respondents such as tenure 
status, rank, their terminal degrees, college-departmental affiliations, and the associated 
unions represented by the respondents, and reveals even more about their demographics.
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Table 5
Demographic Overview of Respondents (by percent)



























[Note*: To determine associated ‘academic department affiliations’ as asked with question # 6, in 
Section I on the survey, the University o f  New Hampshire’s organization o f  colleges and their departments 
was used as a framework. The category o f  “Not a Member” was used on the survey to distinguish those 
who self-identified as not having joined by choice as opposed to being ineligible by status to join the 
faculty union on their campus].
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The demographic data yielded from the surveys on the institutions of the 
respondents included the size of their institutions and the highest level of degrees offered 
at their institutions. The results below (Table 6) point to an institutional profile as 
depicted by the respondents that was predominately made up of medium sized 
institutions, (10,001 to 15,000 FTE), offering some doctorate level degrees, thus with an 
associated level of research activity.
Table 6




0-5,500 16.3 Bachelors 1.4
5,501- 10,000 29.1 Masters 21.3
10,001 -  15,000 41.8 Doctorate 76.6




The three major unions, AFT AAUP, and NEA were almost equally represented 
by the respondent group, with 28.4%, 27%, and 29.1% respectively it can be also stated 
that the average respondent was a union member of one of the three major unions or of 
their affiliates.
Research Questions
The plan for analysis for this first research question started with a descriptive 
analysis of the 27 items aligned with the seven professional concerns. (Please see 
Appendix C for a listing of the survey questions noted by professional concern with 
results.) A Pearson product-moment correlation was conducted to ascertain the 
relationship between the questions. Because the correlations were high among the 27
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items, a factor analysis starting with a principal component analysis followed. The seven 
professional concerns did not surface as separate factors. Five factors were revealed from 
the factor analysis. Those factors will be discussed below in conjunction with specific 
demographic variables (respondents’ rank, discipline and union membership).
The analysis will begin with a review of the seven professional concerns and their 
corresponding items with mean scores. They are listed below.
A. The ability of the faculty to effectively influence who will join and continue on
the faculty. (Questions 4, 5, 6, and 10). M = 3.21
B. The ability of the faculty to determine curriculum. (Questions 8, 11, and 16).
M = 3.05
C. The ability of the faculty to determine what instructional practices/delivery
systems will be used their classrooms. (Questions 14, 21, and 27). M = 3.14
D. The ability of the faculty to set the requirements for granting of a degree.
(Questions 7, 15, 17, 23, and 29). M = 3.19
E. The ability of the faculty to determines their teaching, scholarship, and service
requirements. (Questions 3, 9, 19, and 20). M = 3.19
(F) The right of the faculty to exercise their academic freedom. (Questions 12,13, 22, 
and 24). M -3 .5 2
(G) The ability of the faculty to exercise reasonable shared governance, (exercising a
wider role in institutional governance beyond the classroom and the department 
level). (Questions 1,2, 18, and 25). M = 3.55
In sum, a review of the responses to the questions associated with each of the 
seven Professional Concerns addressed in the survey indicate a positive response to the
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concerns, thus the respondents perceived that these concerns were addressed in their 
contracts. However as noted earlier, to more fully explore if these alone represent the 
professional concerns of the faculty as embedded in the answers to the survey’s 
questions, a second approach to the survey results for this research questions was also 
undertaken, a data reduction through a principal component and factor analysis.
Data Reduction: Factor Analysis of the Professional Concerns’ Questions for Research 
Question #
The seven professional concerns were formulated from a review of the literature 
and then used as a basis for developing the 27 Likert Scale survey items. While the data 
from the questions provided an overview of the professional concerns, they do not 
validate the seven professional concerns. Therefore, a Pearson product-moment 
correlation (Pearson r) was conducted for all the twenty-seven questions. (See Table 7, 
pp. 85-87.) The analysis showed a large number of significantly correlated questions 
meaning that relationships exist between and among the questions. This forms a basis for 
the next step, conducting a component analysis followed by a factor analysis to ascertain 
if the seven professional concerns manifested in the data. This analysis determined 
whether the questions clustered into the seven professional concerns, or resulted in a new 
set of factors.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ro V ) VO OO ON o - CO V) vo r - 00 ON o ( Sf S COc * i n( S l >N ONN






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8 illustrates the principal component matrix resulting from the factor 
analysis of the twenty seven questions, with Varimax rotation applied, and which 




1 2 3 4 5
question 1 .722 .295 -.159 .128 .194
question 2 .768 .105 .192 .000 .073
question 3 .751 .150 .273 -.002 -.056
question 4 .507 .400 .181 .336 -.029
question 5 .727 .162 .210 .279 -.110
question 6 .551 .339 .224 .307 -.144
question 7 -.065 -.376 -.009 -.118 .759
question 8 .282 .777 .014 .085 -.074
question 9 -.486 .137 .358 -.235 .450
question 10 .334 .226 .134 .245 .605
question 11 .307 .484 .335 -.132 .044
question 12 .622 .404 .305 -.018 .016
question 13 .625 .467 .114 .236 -.004
question 14 .161 .533 .469 .180 .026
question 15 -.135 -.056 .079 -.795 .262
question 16 .181 .149 .088 .809 .277
question 17 .638 .365 .095 .319 -.124
question 18 .310 -.035 .761 -.066 .157
question 19 .396 .083 .700 .072 -.064
question 20 -.475 -.287 -.327 -.198 .425
question 21 .447 .351 .383 .310 -.067
question 22 .478 .417 .108 .310 .288
question 23 .270 .806 .111 .166 -.102
question 24 .679 .361 .222 .178 .034
question 25 .608 .301 .373 .055 .118
question 27 -.039 .467 .658 .060 .008
question 29 .321 .793 .130 .079 -.051
Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
Rotation converged in 8 iterations.
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Table 8 makes clear that the 27 questions distilled into five factors that loaded at a 
rounded .450 o r -.450 or higher. The Eigenvalues above 1.% explained 64.596 % of the 
variance as illustrated in Table 9. As shown in this table, Factor 1 explained 23.946% of 
the variance, Factor 2 16.294%, Factor 3 10.574%, Factor 4 8.317%, and Factor 5 





Extraction Sums o f  
Squared Loadngs




















1 11.121 41.189 41.189 11.121 41.189 41.189 6.465 23.406 23.496
2 2.182 8.082 49.271 2.182 8.082 49.271 4.399 16.294 40.240
3 1.778 6.583 55.854 1.778 6.483 55.854 2.855 10.574 50.814
4 1.446 6.355 61.209 1.446 6.355 61.209 2.462 8.317 59.131
5 1.157 4.287 65.496 1.157 4.287 65.496 1.718 6.365 65.496
6 .918 3.400 68.895
7 .858 3.177. 72.072
8 .715 2.648 74.721
9 .680 2.517 77.238
10 .631 2.336 79.574
11 .605 2.240 81.814
12 .580 2.150 83.964
13 .525 1.943 85.907
14 .465 1.722 87.629
15 .411 1.522 89.151
16 .397 1.471 90.622
17 .341 1.263 91.885
18 .336 1.243 93.128
19 .324 1.199 94.327
20 .293 1.084 95.411
21 .265 .983 96.394
22 .234 .867 97.261
23 .208 .772 98.033
24 .167 .619 98.653
25 .148 .547 99.200
26 .121 .499 99.649
27 .095 .351 100.000
Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis
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In addition, the Scree plot below in Figure 1 associated with this factor analysis 
indicated further the acceptability of the five factors as there is a clear break after the five 
factors on this scale.
Figure 1.
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Table 10 (Factor Correlations) below provides further evidence that the five 
factors are significantly correlated to one another with a range from weak to strong. 
Factor 1 and Factor 2 have the strongest correlation (.710 at the .01 level). Factor 2 and 
Factor 5 have the lowest correlation (.024). In addition to being a weak correlation, it is 
not significant.




FACTOR1P FACTOR2P FACTOR3P FACTOR4P FACTOR5P
FACTOR IP Pearson
Correlation 1 ,710(**) .561(**) ,192(*) .174
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .036 .056
N 122 119 121 119 121
FACTOR2P Pearson
Correlation .710(**) 1 .484(**) .104 .024
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .240 .783
N 119 134 130 130 130
FACTOR3P Pearson
Correlation .561(**) ,484(**) 1 ,203(*) .127
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .021 .151
N 121 130 133 128 130
FACTOR4P Pearson
Correlation . 192(*) .104 .203(*) 1 .371(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .036 .240 .021 .000
N 119 130 128 132 130
FACTOR5P Pearson
Correlation .174 .024 .127 ,371(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .056 .783 .151 .000
N 121 130 130 130 136
Note: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Table 11, below, sorts the twenty-seven questions in the order in which they 
loaded into each of the five factors which surfaced from the analysis. Using .450 or -.450 
(or those rounded up to) as the cutoff to determine which questions were loaded into each 
factor these associated questions are noted below by their load score in bold type under 
each factor. According to one factor analysis expert (Kline, 1994) loadings of a .600 or 
greater are to be considered as higher and those with a .300 to be moderate, with a 
negative or positive sign having no effect on this consideration. Therefore a cutoff with a 
rounded .450 captures those with above moderate scores thus aiming for loaded questions 
that have a higher than average relationship to each other in the loading to help find a 
clarity of definition of the factor itself.












Factor Descriptors and Standardized Loadings

















Enhances the professional status o f  the faculty by its very presence on 
a campus .722 .295 -.159 .128 .194
Enhances the practice o f  shared governance on a campus .768 .105 .192 .000 .073
Effectively protects the faculty’s interests in the post-tenure review  
process .751 .150 .273 .002 .056
Protects the faculty’s ability to effectively influence who w ill be hired 
as a faculty member .507 .400 .181 .336 .029
Is effective in protecting faculty rights during promotion and tenure 
decisions .727 .162 .210 .279 -.110
Preserves the ability o f  the faculty to determine the relative weight o f  
teaching, scholarship, and service in promotion and tenure decisions .551 .339 .224 .307 -.144
Primarily addresses issues unrelated to the faculty’s professional 
issues -.486 .137 .358 -.235 .450
Protects a faculty member’s professional autonomy .622 .404 .305 -.018 .016
Protects the control that I have over my scholarship/creative efforts .625 .467 .114 .236 .004
Protects my ability to manage my classroom and give grades in the 













Is ill equipped to address issues pertaining to my professional 
responsibilities o f  teaching, scholarship and service -.475 -.287 -.327 -.198 .425
Protects my ability to determine what instructional practices I w ill use 
in my classroom .447 .351 .383 .310 -.067
Satisfactorily protects my intellectual property rights from the claim  
o f  the institution to ownership o f  them .478 .417 .108 .310 .288
Effectively protects my academic freedom .679 .361 .222 .178 .034
Adds greater importance to my voice as a faculty member when 
speaking on matters relating to institutional performance .608 .301 .373 .055 .118
Is effective in supporting the ability o f  the faculty to determine the 
curriculum .282 .777 .014 .085 .074
Restrains my institution from restructuring academic programs 
without adequate consultation or the cooperation o f  the faculty .307 .484 .335 -.132 .044
Contains adequate provisions to protect faculty determination o f  how 
new learning technologies will be implemented .161 .533 .469 .180 .026
Effectively protects the faculty’s ability to establish degree 
requirements .270 .806 .111 .166 -.102
Our collective bargaining agreement effectively protects the faculty’s 
ability to establish degree requirements .321 .793 .130 .079 .051
Insures that the administration w ill not have too much power over the 













Effectively controls the ability o f  the administration to unilaterally 
change the requirements o f  my position .396 .083 .700 .072 -.064
There are adequate provisions in the collective bargaining agreement 
to protect faculty determination o f  how new learning technologies will 
be implemented. .039 .467 .658 .060 .008
Should not address the establishment o f  degree requirements -.135 -.056 .079 -.795 .262
Should include matter related to the curriculum, and be an appropriate 
sub ject o f  collective bargaining .181 .149 .088 .809 .277
Is not effective in protecting the faculty’s ability to establish the 
requirements o f  a degree .065 -.376 -.009 -.118 .759
Facilitates the hiring o f  the best faculty through the use o f  monetary 
incentives .334 .226 .134 .245 .605
Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization 
Rotation converged in 8 interations.
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As Royce expressed it (1963; Kline 1994, p. 5.) a factor is a “construct 
operationally defined by its factor loadings,” or defined by Kline (1994, p. 5.), 
“essentially a factor is a dimension or construct which is a condensed statement of the 
relationships between a set of variables” [but] “obviously factor loadings must be 
defined.” To do this, the questions from the survey, as they loaded under each of the five 
factors, were examined for their commonalities of themes and further compared with the 
professional concerns used to create the survey questions themselves. Because these 
professional concerns were derived if om the literature review thus derived ultimately 
from research processes, they provide the external criteria that Kline (1994) indicated as a 
necessary framework upon which to define factors.
Thus taking the questions’ loadings as bolded above in Table 11 under each 
factor, and examining them in a thematic sense to see what they have in common, five 
themes arise with each accompanying set of questions. These are:
Factor 1: ‘Personal Protections for the Faculty Member’
(with three sub-themes of classroom work, personal security, 
and personal power and status). M = 3.43
Factor 2: ‘Program Controls’ M = 3.17
Factor 3: ‘Organizational Restraints’ M = 3.25
Factor 4: ‘Specified Academic Issues’ M = 3.02
Factor 5: ‘Restrictive Contract Stipulations’ M = 2.65
These Factor headings appear in Table 11 with their loading. The means for each 
factor’s question set are found in Appendix D. However, for discussion purposes, the 
mean for each factor is noted above.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
96
The definition for each factor is based on an examination of the questions. Factor 
1, called “Personal Protections for the Faculty Member,” which explains 23.946% of the 
variance in the responses (see Table 9 above). The factor encompasses those questions 
which relate to faculty members’ ability to control what goes on in their classrooms, as 
their domain, protections over their personal professional work and stature, and controls 
to keep in check threats to their personal professional security such as their autonomy and 
their research, scholarship and service requirements.
The fourth Factor, ‘Specified Academic Issues’ (M = 3.02), explaining 8.317% of 
the responses’ variance, speaks to asking the faculty what should be in the contract. The 
questions that loaded are asked the respondents to contemplate what should be in the 
contract such as measures to secure the faculty’s primary role in setting degree 
requirements and controls, but not to set the curriculum specifically, and to insure the 
faculty’s supremacy in deciding their structures and strictures, but not to put the actual 
requirements in the contracts. So it speaks to the rights of the faculty to be in charge of 
these overall matters but does not seek to have them by specific bargaining point issues, 
that it the very specifics of the degree requirements etc., rather than the control to set 
them.
This new factor subsumes all of Professional Concern F (the right to exercise 
academic freedom) and three-quarters of Professional Concern A (determines who will 
join the faculty), Professional Concern E (determines the tri-part principal components of 
the work of professors teaching, scholarship, and service requirements), and Professional 
Concern G (exercise reasonable governance). This new factor cuts across all the original 
professional concerns with the notable exception of Professional Concern B (determines
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curriculum). It is interesting that the entire Professional Concern on academic freedom 
clustered in the factor analysis. These items must reflect the literature on and practice in 
higher education.
Why the concern for curriculum does not load as a personal protection is 
unknown. This is especially true in light of the fact that Professional Concern E contains 
teaching as one of its components. It is possible then faculty perceive teaching as 
separate from the curriculum.
This factor (1) contains the question with the highest mean (3.92) for the 27 items 
on the survey, Question 5. This question, (Collective bargaining agreement is effective in 
protecting faculty rights during promotion and tenure decisions.), in many ways captures 
the essence of this factor of personal protections. The promotion and tenure decision is 
critical to professors. The responding faculty perceived that the union through collective 
bargaining protects their rights when it comes to the critical employment decisions of 
gaining tenure and winning promotion.
The next three highest means broaden the areas to be protected. The next highest 
mean (3.88) is Question 2 which focuses on the collective bargaining agreement 
enhancing the practice of shared governance. The third highest mean (3.86) concerns 
protecting the post-tenure review process (Question 3). And, the fourth highest mean 
(3.86) asks whether the collective bargaining agreement protects the faculty member’s 
academic freedom. Taken together, these four items illustrate that the respondents 
perceive that the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) protects their essential 
employment relationship between the individual and the institution, the person’s 
academic freedom rights which for many form the core of their work, and the faculty
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
98
member’s power relationship with the organization (shared governance). These are the 
highest means of all of the 27 items. And, they are the areas that the respondents 
perceive receive the greatest protection from the collective bargaining process. Their 
ability to work (promotion and tenure decisions), the core of their work (academic 
freedom), and their relationship with the university (shared governance) are protected and 
are enhanced by the essential work of the union in their perception.
Two items have a mean lower than the neutral. The first of the two items is 
Question 9 (M= 2.62), which states that collective bargaining agreements primarily 
address issues unrelated to professional issues. The responding faculty tend to disagree 
with that statement. Their disagreement can be inferred as stating that the CB A does 
address professional issues. The second item is Question 20 (M= 2.72), which posits 
that the CBA is ill equipped to address issues pertaining to professional responsibilities. 
Once again, the respondents tend to disagree with this statement.
Factor 1 has the highest mean of the five factors. It also has the largest number of 
items loading on to the factor. The respondents believe that personal protection is 
therefore a major professional concern and their collective bargaining agreement supports 
their concern. This first and largest factor appears to turn inward on the professors’ 
personal concerns and not outward on the organization or students. Therefore the CBA 
protects several of the main concerns of the faculty respondents which appear to focus on 
those of providing personal protections.
Factor 2, “Program Controls,” comprises five questions related to collective 
bargaining agreements providing controls over the programs that are most within the 
faculty’s sphere of influence. Degree requirements, curriculum, learning technology, and
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academic programs comprise the focal points of this factor. The responding faculty 
perceive that the CBA protects their ability to establish degree requirements and to 
determine the curriculum that reflects those requirements. This factor primarily 
incorporates two of the Professional Concerns, B (determine curriculum) and D (set 
requirements for granting a degree). The one item that does not fit within the two 
Professional Concerns of degree (B) and curriculum (D) is Question 14 (protecting the 
implementation of new learning technology). While four of the five items are 
programmatic Question 14 protects how rather than what. Some caution regarding the fit 
of Question 14 in the factor on controlling the program is thus advised.
It is also worth noting that three of the five questions that comprise this factor (2) 
had large neutral responses. Question 14 (39.70%), Question 23 (45.40%), and Question 
29 (40.40%) have neutral responses that approach or exceed 40 percent of the responses. 
Two of the questions (#23 and #29) concern the effectiveness of the CBA in protecting 
the faculty’s ability to establish degree. The respondents either are ambivalent about the 
issue or they lack knowledge about the efficacy of the CBA in protecting the faculty’s 
ability to establish degree requirements.
As noted above, Factor 1 and Factor 2 have a strong, significant correlation.
These two factors give faculty protection over their work, protects their security so they 
can conduct their work, and protects their power and status (Factor 1) as well as 
protecting specific aspects of their work such as determining degree requirements and the 
curriculum. As the score on one of these factors goes up the other corresponds similarly. 
These two factors can be seen as the core of professional activities that the CBA can 
protect. They tend to work closely together.
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Factor 3, “Organizational Restraints” has three items that define it. The mean 
(3.25) is the second highest mean. All three of the items restrain the decision making of 
administrators. This factor does not enable professors to do anything rather it inhibits 
administration from acting in a manner that erodes faculty power. This brake on 
administrator action supports the basic principle of collective bargaining that unilateral 
decision-making on the part of management is replaced with bilateral decision making on 
mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining. These items restrain administrations in 
general (Question 18), control administrations’ ability to change the work of the 
professor (Question 19), and restrain administrations from interfering with a professor’s 
decision of how best to implement new learning technologies (Question 27). However, it 
must be noted that the mean for Question 27 is just below the neutral (M= 2.94) meaning 
that the respondents are not sure that the CBA provides adequate protection in this area.
It must also be stated that this question had an unusually high number of neutral 
responses (42.55%). The respondents may be conflicted, ambivalent, or had no 
knowledge about how this specific question is addressed in the CBA.
The issue of protecting the faculty’s ability to determine how to implement new 
learning technology (Questions 27) has a large neutral response (42.55%). As noted 
above, Question 14 in Factor 2 also has a high neutral response (39.70%). Together, both 
questions indicate that the respondents do not have a good handle on how the CBA 
impacts new instructional technologies. This is similar to the finding in Factor 1 
regarding the ability of the CBA to protect the faculty’s control over establishing degree 
requirements. Both issues had large neutral responses.
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Factor 4, “Specific Academic Issues” is notable for what the CBA cannot and 
should not do. This factor has a mean just above the neutral (3.02) and accounts for 
8.317 percent of the variance. It has two questions. The first, Question 15, asks whether 
the CBA should address the establishment of degree requirements. The mean for the 
question is 3.48 and 52.48 percent agreed or strongly agreed that the CBA should not 
address the establishment of degree requirements. The respondents apparently believe 
that the CBA should protect their prerogative to establish degree requirements but that it 
should not be a subject of bargaining. Their viewpoint is consistent. The faculty 
respondents want the CBA to protect their ability to decide but not to proscribe the 
outcome. Since bargaining involves give and take, degree requirements could become a 
chip to be bargained in trade for some other valued item. Thus, these professors do not 
want their professional decision making to be moved to the bargaining table. In some 
ways, this can be characterized as the faculty wanting their right to determine degree 
requirements to be protected by the bargaining process but not usurped by that process.
The second question in Factor 4, Question 16 (matters related to curriculum are an 
appropriate subject of collective bargaining), had a mean score of 2.56. Less than a 
quarter of the respondents (22.70%) agreed or strongly agreed with the statement.
Similar to Question 15, the faculty carved out areas of their professional practice, 
establishment of degree requirements and curriculum, and they question whether they are 
appropriate for the bargaining table. Once again, the faculty respondents may perceive 
that the CBA should protect their professional prerogatives and not usurp them, at least 
on these specific academic issues.
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Last of all, Factor 5, “Restrictive Contract Stipulations,” consists of two 
questions. The mean (2.65) is the only mean of the five factors that is below neutral. 
Question 10 has the lowest mean for all 27 questions (2.39). Only 15.62 percent of the 
respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the CBA facilitates the hiring of the best 
faculty through monetary incentives. Collective bargaining is restricted to three large 
categories, wages, benefits, and terms and conditions of employment. As seen from the 
discussion of the other factors, the respondents overall are supportive of the role that 
collective bargaining plays in supporting and protecting their professional decision 
making. However, the faculty respondents do not perceive that collective bargaining is a 
vehicle for attracting the best faculty. Is it because the CBA cannot address the issue or 
is it because bargaining energy is not focused on the topic and is reserved for those 
faculty already hired?
The second question, Question 7 (the CBA is not effective in protecting the 
faculty’s ability to establish the requirements of the degree) has a mean of 2.91 with 61 
percent of the respondents strongly disagreeing or disagreeing with the statement. In 
other words, they believe that the contract does protect their ability to establish the 
requirements of a degree. The response to this negatively worded question is consistent 
with the views of the faculty responding that the contract does protect their ability 
(Question 23 and Question 29).
This factor (5) does not have a unifying thread other than both question that 
loaded into it have a mean score less than 3.00. Question 7 may fit best with Factor 1 and 
Question 10 may fit best with Factor 4 where other questions reveal limitations on 
bargaining. Consequently, this factor must be approached with skepticism.
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It is noteworthy that, on the whole, faculty members in this study found that the 
CBA protected the exercise of their professional duties. The collective bargaining 
agreement was supportive and not a hindrance to professional activity. While the 
responses were consistently positive about the role of the CBA, respondents did find that 
there are limits to the reach of the CBA. The respondents did not want support to turn 
into usurpation. It is also worth noting that while the support for the CBA was consistent, 
there were no means over 4.0. A comparison of the questions comprising the seven 
professional concerns with the new order of questions in each factor shows that the 
concerns did not have a close match to the factors. All the questions are accounted for in 
the loading of the factors, but now they group together quite differently. The original 
seven professional concerns collapsed into five factors. These concerns focused on the 
specific activities of professors. The factors brought many of the specific activities 
together into Factor 1 and Factor 2. A change in focus from the concerns to the factors 
was the emergence of a factor on restraints (3) and a factor on limitations (4). The last 
factor (5) does not conceptually hold together, as its two questions fit within the construct 
of two other factors
Variances Explained by Rank. Disciplines and the Unions Membership of the Faculty 
and the Factors.
This section discusses the results of ANOVA’s by each factor, rank, discipline 
(department) and union membership of the respondents.
[Note in order to recognize the capacity for experiment-wide or error in the 
ANOVAs, the LSD (least-significant difference) was used in ANOVAs as illustrated 
below. While this does not guarantee that there is no error it recognizes its possibility.
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This test may be on the liberal side of the possible sets of test available to test for the 
experiment-wide error rate but this is offset in terms of the advantage it provides by the 
statistical power that it possesses which is needed to make the analyses feasible given the 
sample size].
The ANOVA conducted with Factor 1 (‘Personal Protections for the Faculty 
Member’), and the rank, disciplines, and union memberships of the respondents to that 
question set, resulted in a finding that only differing union memberships provided any 
significant differences between the groups at the .05 level. Table 12 below illustrates 
these results. In this table the differences shown were between those ‘not members’ of a 
union, and those within the three major unions of AAUP, AFT, and NEA. Union 
members perceive that the CBA provides protection for faculty members as they exercise 
their professional discretion to a greater degree than non-union members. The mean for 
both groups, union and non-union, are above the neutral so they agree that there is a 
positive effect but they disagree on how strongly the CBA protects. There is no 
difference between members in the different unions. Therefore, union membership either 
provides a common lens through affiliation or those faculty members who chose to join a 
union are predisposed to the positive impact of the union. Two distinct groups emerge in 
this analysis based on whether they are members or non-members. The other two 
demographic factors are undifferentiated as to response.
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Table 12 
Factor 1 and Union Membership
(I) union (J) union
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval
Lower
Bound Upper Bound
i s n Not a AFT
Member
-10.9583(*) 2.90064 .000 -16.7393 -5.1774
AAUP -1 2 .9 8 3 3 0 2.92689 .000 -18.8166 -7.1500
NEA -11.9583(*) 2.90064 .000 -17.7393 -6.1774
Other -7.9167 4.28453 .069 -16.4557 .6224
AFT Not a Member 1 0 .9 5 8 3 0 2.90064 .000 5.1774 16.7393
AAUP -2.0250 2.17768 .355 -6.3651 2.3151
NEA - 1.0000 2.14226 .642 -5.2695 3.2695
Other 3.0417 3.81219 .428 -4.5560 10.6393
AAUP Not a Member 1 2 .9 8 3 3 0 2.92689 .000 7.1500 18.8166
AFT 2.0250 2.17768 .355 -2.3151 6.3651
NEA 1.0250 2.17768 .639 -3.3151 5.3651
Other 5.0667 3.83220 .190 -2.5709 12.7042
NEA N ot a Member 1 1 .9 5 8 3 0 2.90064 .000 6.1774 17.7393
AFT 1.0000 2.14226 .642 -3.2695 5.2695
AAUP -1.0250 2.17768 .639 -5.3651 3.3151
Other 4.0417 3.81219 .293 -3.5560 11.6393
Other Not a Member 7.9167 4.28453 .069 -.6224 16.4557
AFT -3.0417 3.81219 .428 -10.6393 4.5560
AAUP -5.0667 3.83220 .190 -12.7042 2.5709
NEA -4.0417 3.81219 .293 -11.6393 3.5560
Note: Based on observed means.
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
With regard to Factor 2’s (‘Program Controls’) ANOVAs by rank, disciplines and 
union memberships, there were no statistical difference among the ranks of the 
respondents but there were within the disciplines and once again with the union 
memberships. Table 13 shows that there are differences in the responses based on the 
disciplines of the respondents, where those in ‘other’ are statistically different from those 
in the liberal arts, or science and engineering, but not business and economics.
Significant differences exist between faculty members in “other” disciplines and faculty 
in the fine arts and faculty in science and engineering. There are no other significant
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differences between disciplines. Because we do not know the composition of “other,” it 
is difficult to understand what this difference means, and its small percentage of two 
percent make any meaning questionable. What we have learned from this ANOVA in 
Table 13 is that there is no significant difference between the liberal and fine arts faculty, 
the science and engineering faculty, and the business and economics faculty. These three 
faculty groups comprise the lion’s share of faculty positions in most institutions of higher 
education. The unknown reasons for the differences are worth exploring.
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Table 13




























other -6.1695(*) 2.74628 .027 -11.6289 -.7101
science and liberal and fine
engineering arts -.6382 .72653 .382 -2.0825 .8061
business and 
economics
-2.2622 1.26763 .078 -4.7822 .2577
other
-6.8077(*) 2.75233 .015 -12.2791 -1.3362
business and 
economics
liberal and fine 
arts 1.6240 1.25443 .199 -.8697 4.1178
science and 2.2622 1.26763 .078 -.2577 4.7822
engineering
other -4.5455 2.93617 .125 -10.3824 1.2915
Other liberal and fine 
arts
6.1695(*) 2.74628 .027 .7101 11.6289
science and 6.8077(*) 2.75233 .015 1.3362 12.2791
engineering
business and 4.5455 2.93617 .125 -1.2915 10.3824
economics
Note: Based on observed means.
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level
The other significant difference by demographic variables that showed a 
significant difference is by union membership as displayed in Table 14. Interestingly, the 
significant difference emerged only between faculty members designating their discipline 
as other and members of the AAUP. Similar to the significant difference for Factor 2, 
the difference is between non-members and members of the union, the AAUP. Why
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AAUP members are different from non-members over the other two unions is unknown. 
Why there is a differentiation from other unions is unknown.
Table 14
Factor 2 and Unions
(I) union (J) union
Mean Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
LSD Not a Member AFT -3.7677(*) 1.31590 .005 -6.3836 -1.1518
AAUP -3.9278(*) 1.32492 .004 -6.5617 -1.2939
NEA -3.6010(*) 1.31590 .008 -6.2169 -.9851
Other -2.4026 1.84676 .197 -6.0738 1.2686
AFT Not a Member 3.7677(*) 1.31590 .005 1.1518 6.3836
AAUP -.1601 .91344 .861 -1.9760 1.6557
NEA .1667 .90029 .854 -1.6231 1.9564
Other 1.3651 1.57781 .389 -1.7715 4.5017
AAUP Not a Member 3.9278(*) 1.32492 .004 1.2939 6.5617
AFT .1601 .91344 .861 -1.6557 1.9760
NEA .3268 .91344 .721 -1.4891 2.1427
Other 1.5252 1.58534 .339 -1.6264 4.6768
NEA Not a Member 3.6010(*) 1.31590 .008 .9851 6.2169
AFT -.1667 .90029 .854 -1.9564 1.6231
AAUP -.3268 .91344 .721 -2.1427 1.4891
Other 1.1984 1.57781 .450 -1.9382 4.3350
Other Not a Member 2.4026 1.84676 .197 -1.2686 6.0738
AFT -1.3651 1.57781 .389 -4.5017 1.7715
AAUP -1.5252 1.58534 .339 -4.6768 1.6264
NEA -1.1984 1.57781 .450 -4.3350 1.9382
Note: Based on observed means.
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level
The results of ANOVAs for Factor 3 (‘Organizational Restraints’) by rank, 
discipline, and union membership resulted in similar results to Factor 2. Rank showed no 
variances but there were significant differences found within the disciplines, and within 
union membership, as was the case with Factor 2. Factor 3’s variances by discipline were 
found between business and economics, and science and engineering, as groups as shown 
in Table 15. And with union membership, this outcome is different from Factor 1 but 
similar to Factor 2 with difference is only between AAUP and ‘not a member’ (Table 16).
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Table 15
Factor 3 and Disciplines
Mean
Differenc Std. 95%  Confidence
(I) disciplines (J) disciplines e(I-J) Error Sig. Interval
Lower Upper
Bound Bound
LSD liberal and fine arts science and 
engineering .1063 .49172 .829 -.8717 1.0843
business and
-1.5853 .84013 .063 -3.2563 .0857economics
other -.7368 1.51113 .627 -3.7424 2.2687
science and liberal and fine arts -.1063 .49172 .829 -1.0843 .8717engineering
business and _ .84809 .049
1.6916(*)
-3.3784 -.0048economics
other -.8431 1.51557 .579 -3.8575 2.1713
business and liberal and fine arts
1.5853 .84013 .063 -.0857 3.2563economics
science and 1.6916(*) .84809 .049 .0048 3.3784engineering
other .8485 1.66162 .611 -2.4564 4.1534
other liberal and fine arts .7368 1.51113 .627 -2.2687 3.7424
science and
.8431 1.51557 .579 -2.1713 3.8575engineering
business and -.8485 1.66162 .611 -4.1534 2.4564
economics
Note: Based on observed means.
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
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Table 16
Factor 3 and Union Membership
Mean
Difference
(I) union (J) union (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval
Lower Upper
Bound Bound
LSD N ot a 
Member
AFT -1.5784 .85659 .069 -3.2822 .1253
AAUP -1.8137(*) .85659 .037 -3.5175 -.1100
NEA -1.3810 .85339 .109 -3.0783 .3164
Other -.6667 1.21328 .584 -3.0798 1.7465
AFT Not a 
Member
1.5784 .85659 .069 -.1253 3.2822
AAUP -.2353 .61873 .705 -1.4659 .9953
NEA .1975 .61429 .749 -1.0243 1.4193
Other .9118 1.05884 .392 -1.1942 3.0177
AAUP Not a 
Member 1.8137(*) .85659 .037 .1100 3.5175
AFT .2353 .61873 .705 -.9953 1.4659
NEA .4328 .61429 .483 -.7890 1.6546
Other 1.1471 1.05884 .282 -.9589 3.2530
NEA Not a 
Member
1.3810 .85339 .109 -.3164 3.0783
AFT -.1975 .61429 .749 -1.4193 1.0243
AAUP -.4328 .61429 .483 -1.6546 .7890
Other .7143 1.05625 .501 -1.3866 2.8151
Other Not a 
Member .6667 1.21328
.584 -1.7465 3.0798
AFT -.9118 1.05884 .392 -3.0177 1.1942
AAUP -1.1471 1.05884 .282 -3.2530 .9589
NEA -.7143 1.05625 .501 -2.8151 1.3866
Note: Based on observed means.
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
For the first three factors, a significant difference has emerged between “not a 
member” and AAUP membership. There appears to be some unknown unifying factor or 
factors that distinguish AAUP from non-union members along the lines of personal 
protection, program control, and restraints on the organization. It appears that AAUP 
members perceive the CBA as playing a more efficacious role than non-members. While 
there is some difference between AFT and NEA from AAUP members, the difference is
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not significant. A possible explanation for the consistent significant difference only 
existing for AAUP members and not the other union members (NEA and AFT) is that the 
AAUP has its roots in and focuses on higher education and its unique work conditions in 
which professional activity is practiced. Whereas the NEA and the AFT have their roots 
in the public schools and start with a construct of professional activities that is different 
in the public schools than in higher education.
For Factor 4 (“Specified Academic Issues”), the only variance found pertained to 
the disciplines. There was no difference according to union membership. Why the trend 
of difference between AAUP and non-union members is unknown. However, this factor 
clusters around specific issues that may not fit well into a CBA. Table 17 illustrates that 
in this question set, the significant differences are between the disciplines of ‘other’ and 
those with liberal arts and science and engineering compared with those in other 
disciplines, but not business and economics. This is the same difference found for 
Factor 2 (see Table 13) for disciplines. Consequently, because “other” as a category of 
disciplines constitutes only 2.1% of the respondents, this significant difference should be 
approached with extreme caution.
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Table 17
Factor 4 and Disciplines
Mean
Difference Std. 95% Confidence
(I) disciplines (J) disciplines (I-J) Error Sig. Interval
Lower Upper
Bound Bound




.1768 .20892 .400 -.2388 .5923
business and 
economics -.5116 .35499 .153 -1.2176 .1945
other -1.9661 (*) .77717 .013 -3.5119 -.4203
science and 
engineering
liberal and fine arts
-.1768 .20892 .400 -.5923 .2388
business and 
economics -.6883
.36064 .060 -1.4056 .0290
other -2.1429(*) .77977 .007 -3.6938 -.5919
business and 
economics
liberal and fine arts
.5116 .35499 .153 -.1945 1.2176
science and 
engineering
.6883 .36064 .060 -.0290 1.4056
other -1.4545 .83091 .084 -3.1072 .1981
other liberal and fine arts 1 .9661(0 .77717 .013 .4203 3.5119
science and 
engineering 2 .1 4 2 9 (0




Note: Based on observed means.
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
An ANOVA for Factor 5 (Restrictive Contract Stipulations), and rank, the
disciplines and union membership shows that there were significant differences for 
disciplines and union membership. There were no significant differences for rank. The 
significant difference by discipline, once again, was for “other” and science and 
engineering as shown in Table 18. But the low percentage, 2.1 percent of the “other” as 
was the case for Factor 4 (Table 17), may also render this Factor 5 Finding once again 
one to be cautiously approached, Once again, the significant difference by union 
membership surfaced between AAUP and AFT members (Table 19). However, as noted
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above, since the structural integrity of this factor is suspect, extreme caution must be
exercised in ascribing meaning to these findings.
Table 18 
Factor 5 and Disciplines
































































































Note: Based on observed means.
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
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Table 19
Factor 5 and Union Membership





Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval
Lower Upper
Bound Bound
LS Not a Member AFT
D .6242 .50073 .216 -.3714 1.6198
AAUP -.1282 .50482 .800 -1.1319 .8755
NEA .2412 .49705 .629 -.7471 1.2294
Other .3718 .76088 .626 -1.1410 1.8846
AFT Not a Member -.6242 .50073 .216 -1.6198 .3714
AAUP -,7524(*) .37407 .047 -1.4961 -.0086
NEA -.3830 .36351 .295 -1.1058 .3398
Other -.2524 .68120 .712 -1.6068 1.1020
AAUP N ot a Member .1282 .50482 .800 -.8755 1.1319
AFT .7524(*) .37407 .047 .0086 1.4961
NEA .3694 .36913 .320 -.3646 1.1033
Other .5000 .68421 .467 -.8604 1.8604
NEA Not a Member -.2412 .49705 .629 -1.2294 .7471
AFT .3830 .36351 .295 -.3398 1.1058
AAUP -.3694 .36913 .320 -1.1033 .3646
Other .1306 .67850 .848 -1.2184 1.4797
Other Not a Member -.3718 .76088 .626 -1.8846 1.1410
AFT .2524 .68120 .712 -1.1020 1.6068
AAUP -.5000 .68421 .467 -1.8604 .8604
NEA -.1306 .67850 .848 -1.4797 1.2184
Note: Based on observed means.
In summary, ANOVAs conducted for rank, disciplines, and union membership 
show that there is no difference for the five factors by rank. There were, however, 
differences found for three of the four factors between non-union respondents and AAUP 
members. These two groups ascribe different values to the role of the CBA and the 
exercise of professional prerogatives. However, a difference by union membership 
versus non-union membership is not as consistently different. Why the difference centers 
around AAUP membership is unknown.
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Research Question #2: Do faculty perceive that collective bargaining in general is 
important to their sense of professionalism?
The three survey questions below listed with their survey responses in Table 20 
were used to explore the second research question above.
As indicated in Table 20, Question 26 is a negatively worded item, and it appears 
that the respondents clearly disagree with it, (46.1% strongly disagree, 31.9% disagree), 
therefore believing that academic freedom is an appropriate subject of collective 
bargaining. For Question 28 there was a strong response with 40.4% agreeing, and 42.6% 
strongly agreeing, that the administration would have too much power over the 
governance of their institution without their collective bargaining agreement being in 
place. On Question 30 (with 73.8% who agreed or strongly agreed) the respondents 
perceived that their collective bargaining agreement is important to their sense of 
professionalism and not in conflict with it. Their collective bargaining agreement should 
deal with academic freedom concerns and serve as a counterbalancing influence to the 
power the administration might have over matters related to their professional concerns.
It also appears that they prefer to work at an institution with a collective bargaining 
agreement rather than one that does not. The faculty perceive that collective bargaining 
in general is important to their work. Two of the questions (28 and 30) had means above 
4.00. If Question 26’s negative approach was reversed, it would approach the 4.0 mean. 
As noted above, no mans for the previous 27 questions were above 4.0. Those 27 
questions were more specific regarding the professional activities of the faculty than the 
broad statements found in Question 28 and 30. The overall perception is one of strong 
support for the role the CBA plays in the work lives of the respondents.



























Academic freedom is not an 





46.1 31.9 6.4 7.1 7.1 1.4
Question 28.
Without a collective 
bargaining agreement the 
administration would have 
too much power over the 




1.4 4.3 10.6 40.4 42.6 0.7
Question 30.
If given a choice, I would 
rather work at an institution 
that has a collective 
bargaining agreement than 




2.8 5.7 17 29 44 0.7
For Question 26, the ANOVA resulted in no significant differences by rank,
disciplines, or union membership of the respondents.
For Question 28, however, a significant difference was found for “not a member’, 
and a member of AAUP, AFT and NEA membership as shown in Table 21. This 
difference between membership and non-membership is consistent with the findings with 
Factors 1, 2, 3, and 5. The other significant difference is between ‘Other and AFT.’ It is 
unknown why though there is this difference.
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Table 21
Question 28 and Union Membership






Lower Bound Upper Bound
LSD N ot a Member AFT -.1019* .27802 .000 -1.6542 -.5495
AAUP -.7868* .28008 .006 -1.3432 -.2304
NEA -.8586 .27802 .003 -1.4110 -.3063
Other -.3297 .40426 .417 -1.1328 .4735
AFT Not a Member 1.1019* .27802 .000 .5495 1.6542
AAUP .3151 .20333 .125 -.0889 .7190
NEA .2432 .20048 .228 -.1551 .6415
Other .7722 .35542 .032 .0661 1.4783
AAUP Not a Member .7868* .28008 .006 .2304 1.3432
AFT -.3151 .20333 .125 -.7190 .0889
NEA -.0718 .20333 .725 -.4758 .3321
Other .4571 .35703 .204 -.2522 1.1664
NEA Not a Member .8586* .27802 .003 .3063 1.4110
AFT -.2432 .20048 .228 -.6415 .1551
AAUP .0718 .20333 .725 -.3321 .4758
Other .5290 .35542 .140 -.1771 1.2351
Other Not a Member .3297 .40426 .417 -.4735 1.1328
AFT -.7722* .35542 .032 -1.4783 -.0661
AAUP -.4571 .35703 .204 -1.2664 .2522
NEA -.5290 .35542 .140 -1.2351 .1771
Note: Based on observed means.
*The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
For Question 30, again there were no significant variances in the ANOVAs based 
on rank, or the disciplines of the respondents. However, as noted below in Table 22, 
there was a significant difference among the three main unions, AAUP, AFT, and NEA, 
and with the category of ‘other’ or ‘not a member.’ This is also consistent with the 
findings of Factors 1, 2, 3, and 5.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
118
Table 22
Question 30 and Union Membership






Lower Bound Upper Bound
LSD Not a Member AFT -1.5551* .28837 .000 -2.1281 -.9821
AAUP -1.5543* .29166 .000 -.2.2338 -.9748
NEA -1.3659* .28837 .000 -1.9389 -.7929
Other -.5265 .41931 .221 -1.3496 .3167
AFT Not a Member 1.5551* .28837 .000 .9821 2.1281
AAUP .0008 .21249 .997 -.4214 .4230
NEA .1892 .20795 .365 -.2240 .6024
Other .10386* .36865 .006 .3061 1.7711
AAUP Not a Member 1.5543* .29166 .000 .9748 2.1338
AFT -.0008 .21249 .997 -.4230 .4214
NEA .1884 .21249 .378 -.2338 .6106
Other 1.0378* .37123 .006 .3002 1.7754
NEA Not a Member 1.3659* .28837 .000 .7929 1.9839
AFT -.1892 .20795 .365 -.6024 .2240
AAUP -.1884 .21249 .378 -.6106 .2338
Other .8494 .36865 .024 .1169 1.5819
Other Not a Member .5165 .42931 .221 -.3167 1.3496
AFT -1.0386* .36865 .006 -1.7711 -.3061
AAUP -1.0378* .37123 .006 -1.7754 -.3002
NEA -.8494* .36865 024 -1.5819 -.1169
Note: Based on observed means.
*The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
Research Question #3: Do the collective bargaining agreements support professional 
autonomy?
The Contracts: A Review by Professional Concerns: The second method of 
gathering data for this study, in addition to the faculty survey, involved the review of the 
related faculty contracts in effect in the calendar year 2000 and in some cases through fall 
2001, which existed among the four year public higher education institutions in New 
England. In concert with the survey, the contract review involved an analysis of the 
twelve contracts that covered the respondent groups. The contract review analyzed the 
language in the twelve contracts in terms of the seven professional concerns.
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However, a brief note about what is not to be discussed is important as a prelude 
to the contract review. In crafting this review no attempt has been made to speculate on 
whether or not something in practice at a campus or campuses did or did not take place 
because it is or is not specified in a contract. As Rhoades (1998) pointed out in his 
contract study, “there are informal conditions, processes and power structures that formal 
agreements neither fully define nor constrain. Not everything is in a contract. Just 
because something is not formalized in a contract does not mean it does not exist” (p. 13). 
Therefore this review dealt strictly with the contracts’ articles/clauses and their specific 
language in the reviewed contracts. Additionally, the review also did not attempt to look 
at the influence of past practice provisions in the contracts and how they may pertain to 
the actual workings of the institutions as they relate to the three factors and thus the 
professional concerns of the faculty.
One further note on the review of the contracts; no attempt was made to speculate 
on the particular state laws and statutes that might preclude the mention or coverage of 
certain provisions in the contracts themselves.
Professional Concern A. The Ability of the Faculty to Effectively Influence Who Will 
Join and Continue on the Faculty.
Notes on Faculty Appointments. Eleven of the twelve reviewed contracts 
(excluding of the University of Connecticut System contract), dealt with the ability of the 
faculty to determine who would join the faculty. Several contracts also contained clauses 
on the setting of salaries for some types of new tenure-track hires (Connecticut State 
College System, University of New Hampshire), the process for and amount of merit 
increases, (University of Massachusetts Boston/Amherst and the University of
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Connecticut), and the continuing professional development needs for their peers
(Massachusetts State Colleges, Connecticut State University System). For example, the
Connecticut State University System faculty contract stipulated that:
The parties [Connecticut State University American Association of University 
Professors and the Board of Trustees of the Connecticut State University System] 
recognize that scholars have a particular responsibility to exercise their expertise 
in a particular field or activity and to judge the work of their colleagues. In the 
exercise of such expertise it is implicit that responsibility exists for both adverse 
and favorable judgments. In the area of appointments, reappointments, decisions 
not to reappoint, promotions the granting of tenure, and dismissal the exercise of 
faculty judgment through faculty personnel committees is essential to the pursuit 
and fulfillment of the goal of academic excellence (Article 4.10).
In addition to the ‘who’ that is involved in the process in the contract of the
University of Rhode Island, included were specific articles that detailed the full
procedures to be followed with faculty appointments, from announcing the vacancy, to
the type of appointment form that would be used, to how to notify the successful
candidate of his/her appointment, as well as sending a copy of the appointment letter to
the faculty union representative. For example:
Article 11.1. All members of a department at the rank of instructor or above shall 
be informed of vacancies and new positions within the departments by the 
department chairpersons.
Article 11.2. Unless circumstances prohibit, a department meeting shall be held to 
determine the basic specifications of each position to be filled, including 
academic credentials and experience in teaching and research.”
Article 11.4. When candidates are brought to the campus, department members 
shall be informed and arrangements shall be made for the candidate to meet with 
as many department members as possible.
Article 11.5. The chairperson shall seek the opinions of all those members of 
his/her department who have full-time regular and continuing university 
appointments on their choice of candidates before his/her final recommendation 
of appointment is submitted to the Dean of the college. The chairperson’s report 
shall include a report of the comments of those members of the department who 
were consulted.
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Article 11.9. If the appointment is approved by the Dean of the college, he/she 
shall recommend the appointment of the candidate to the Provost who, if he/she 
approves, makes a recommendation to the President. If the President approves, 
he/she will appoint the faculty member.
In the above article for the University of Rhode Island there was no mention of a 
procedural recourse to the faculty if the Dean, Provost, or President, disapproved the 
recommended prospective faculty member for appointment at any approval step along the 
way.
The Article within the contract of Rhode Island College (RIC) covering the
appointment of new faculty was also very detailed. Article VII., A. 7.1, stated that:
New faculty shall be recommended initially by the department chairperson after 
consultation with the department advisory committee or the whole department. 
[And] The final decision on appointment of any new faculty member shall be 
made by the President upon the recommendation of the Vice President for 
Academic Affairs after reviewing the recommendation of the appropriate dean 
and the department chairperson (Article VII.7.1 &2).
As was the case with the URI contract, the RIC contract also did not state the recourse to
the faculty if the President rejected the recommendation.
The University of Massachusetts at Lowell, had among its clauses on
appointments language with the requirement that the appointed faculty member live in
Massachusetts, (Article VII A.l), and declared the faculty ranks assigned by type of
education and experience, and the subject areas where these requirements can be waived
such as no doctorate being required for assistant professor posts in accountancy,
computer science and the health professions (Article VII. A. 2. a. b. & c.).
Notes on Faculty Promotion and Tenure, and Termination and Removal
Protections. Each of the twelve contracts contained language on the promotion and
tenure process. The University of Connecticut’s contract references the presence of the
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procedure as laid out in separate by-laws and procedures, which were established prior to
bargaining. These procedures remained in place after the contract was ratified.
In the Massachusetts State Colleges’ agreement, the promotion and tenure process
stipulates the role of the faculty member to be promoted or considered for tenure, the
chairperson, the Committee on Promotions, the Committee on Tenure, the President, and
the Board of Trustees Article VIII. E. 3- 7 and, F through I.). For example, the tenure
process begins with the department chair. The article reads:
A person shall not be eligible for tenure unless he/she shall have 
been recommended therefor[e] by the Department Chair, or by the 
Director, Library, Library Chair (Worcester State College) or Library 
Program Area, as may be appropriate, and or the Committee on 
Tenure (Article VIII. J.3.).
An example of contract language that incorporates promotion with evaluation is
found in the Connecticut State University System’s collective bargaining agreement in
Article 4.11.1. It reads:
There shall be only one (1) evaluation procedure leading to recommendations 
regarding promotion, tenure and renewal of full-time members as follows: in 
accordance with procedures as developed by the Senate and approved by the 
President in an expeditious manner, evaluations of teaching members shall be 
conducted by the Department Evaluation Committee (DPEC) of which the 
Department Chairperson may be a member, ex-officio, and by the University- 
wide Promotion and Tenure Committee.
The DPEC’s composition included tenured members of the departments, and the 
University-wide Promotion and Tenure Committee specified in terms of numbers and 
exact composition by the campus senate and approved by the President, contained only 
tenured associate and full professors, with no more than two from any given department 
serving at the same time (Connecticut State University System, Articles 4.11.4 &13).
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There was no mention of a grievance procedure for the candidate, but the
President may override the decision of the Promotion and Tenure Committee. If the
decision was to deny tenure against the Committee’s decision, the President must provide
a written explanation. If the President supported tenure in the face of a Committee denial
he/she must also provide the Committee with an explanation, and “the President’s
explanation shall be held in confidence by the Committee subject to applicable statutes”
(Connecticut State University System, Article 4.11.14).
Article 9 of the University of Maine System contract illustrates an example of a
contract that was straightforward in its approach to the promotion and tenure decision and
the involvement of faculty in it and also included a time line. For example:
The department, division, or other appropriate chairperson, or director or dean 
shall inform the appropriate peer committee that a unit member has applied or is 
eligible for tenure, continuing contract or promotion” (University of Maine 
System, Article 9.C.l).
The level of faculty involvement in the removal, retrenchment, or termination of 
fellow members, and thus bargaining unit faculty, varied slightly varied among the 
reviewed contracts. All twelve of them had sections specifically labeled “Retrenchment” 
or “Reduction Due to Financial Exigency” or used similar terms such as “Lay-offs due to 
Program Elimination,” etc. They had in common an expressed desire by the unit 
members to be completely informed as to why the need for the faculty reductions, 
(especially if it was related to a declared financial exigency by an administration), the 
need to seek alternatives to the reductions in force, the procedures to use when following 
a retrenchment course, and the conditions on the treatment of those laid-off.
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The reviewed contracts also had in common, among the sections on terminations 
and dismissals, strong outlines of the due process involved, and the involvement of 
faculty boards of peers in the instance of dismissals of tenured faculty.
As an exemplar of the type of retrenchment or financial exigency article found in 
the twelve contracts in terms of specificity, the University of Massachusetts at Lowell’s 
contract is worthy of note for it is meticulous in its detail regarding the retrenchment, as 
well as the removal of non-tenured faculty and the termination of tenured faculty 
appointments.
With regard to retrenchment, its Article XIII encapsulated the various procedures 
and paths to be taken in the event that precipitous and projected drops in enrollments, an 
extreme loss of financial resources, or a major change in a state’s educational mandates 
or via a “bona fide financial exigency” were deemed an unquestionable need to reduce 
the institution’s faculty. This Agreement declared that “the Chancellor or his designee 
first shall meet to discuss with the MSP [the faculty union] the University’s plan for a 
systematic retrenchment of Unit members” as the first priority of the Administration if a 
financial exigency was declared (University of Massachusetts at Lowell, Article XIII. 
A.6). In addition, another section of the Article sought to provide alternatives to 
retrenchment such as the reassignment of faculty. The Article prescribed a path to follow 
when reducing the faculty employment numbers with a list of the order of reductions 
starting with part-time faculty then on to non-tenured faculty with tenured faculty being 
laid off last. Issues related to the provision of services for the laid-off faculty, as well as 
procedures for recall to employment for them were also stipulated (Article. XIII. B. 
through I.).
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In contrast, the contract of the University of New Hampshire on this point of 
retrenchment concentrated on the need to retain the positions of tenured faculty over 
non-tenured, and stated the necessity to consider alternatives to lay-offs due to 
“programmatic displacement” (UNH, Article 14.4, p. 18). This Article created a Joint 
Committee to review alternatives to terminations with planned programmatic 
retrenchments (Ibid). It further allowed the union to file a grievance action to the level of 
the Board of Trustees over any planned terminations of unit member faculty if they were 
based on a program elimination recommendation made by the University President, but 
such an action stopped at the Board and was not open to arbitration.
In the area of termination and dismissal articles (not based on retrenchments or 
program eliminations), the reviewed contracts varied more among each other in content 
than they had in the area of retrenchment. However, all had some content associated with 
policies related to termination and/or dismissal.
The contracts for the most part use “termination” or “non-renewal” in the case of 
full-time non-tenured faculty members, while “dismissal” was the nomenclature for 
removal of a tenured faculty member for “just cause” and through “due process.”
One exception to this set of distinctions is found in the contract (Article 16) of the 
University of Maine System that used “termination, suspension, and discipline” as 
terminology equally among tenured, non-tenured unit members, and non-tenure track 
positions (lecturers, and those on continuing contract). While differing standards and 
timelines existed for a non-tenured, or a tenured faculty member, or a non-tenure track 
member, the treatment of the faculty member was less distinct based on tenure status that 
the other contracts reviewed, with the exemption of Keene State’s contract which had no
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specific language on the subject for any of the faculty types. Keene State’s contract
under Article III, A. Management Rights stated:
The right to direct employees; to determine qualifications, promotion and 
tenure criteria, hiring criteria, standards for work, curriculum; to grant 
sabbatical and other leaves, and to hire promote and transfer assign, retain 
employees in positions, to award reappointments; and to suspend, demote 
discharge or take disciplinary actions against an employee for just cause 
(Article, III. A.).
The language on terminations, etc., in the RIC contract, and the URI contract
were quite similar with both relying on the American Association of University
Professors (AAUP) statement on tenure and dismissal:
...A member of the [teaching, research, or extension [URI’s language] 
faculty who has been granted tenure may not be dismissed except as 
provided in the following statement on tenure formulated by the joint 
committees from [RIC] for [URI] the Association of American Universities 
[RIC ] Colleges [URI] Association of American University Professors....
Termination for cause of a continuous appointment, or the dismissal for 
cause of a teacher previous to the expiration of a term appointment should, 
if possible, be considered by both a faculty committee and the governing 
board of the institution. In all cases where the facts are in dispute, the 
accused teacher should be informed in writing of the charge against him/her 
and should have the opportunity to be heard in his/her own defense by all 
bodies that pass judgment on his/her case. He/she should be permitted to 
have an adviser of his/her own choosing who may act as counsel. There 
should be a full stenographic record of the hearing to the parties concerned.
In the hearing of charges of incompetence, the testimony should include that 
of teachers and other scholars, either from his/her own or other institutions. 
Teachers on continuous appointment who are dismissed for reasons not 
involving moral turpitude should receive their salaries for at least a year 
from the date of notification of dismissal whether or not they are continued 
in their duties at the institution” (RIC Contract, Article VIII. E. 8.24; URI 
Contract, Article, XVIII.2).
While the URI article ended with reference to the dismissal of tenured faculty 
with a short paragraph articulating that the “University of Rhode Island accepts the above 
statement as its basic policy governing dismissal under tenure” and added that URI
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considered it to also cover “members of the extension and research faculty,” the RIC 
contract further stipulated additional procedures and conditions (URI Contract, Article, 
XVIII.2; RIC Contract, Article VIII. E. 8.24). RIC’s contract also defined the timeline 
for procedures and refers an affected faculty member to the policy in the contract on 
grievance in Article XII (RIC Contract, Article VIII. E. 8.24).
The contract section for the University of Massachusetts’ (for the Amherst and 
Boston campuses) on the dismissal of tenured faculty was very extensive. It included a 
separate clause for the removal of “principal investigators” (Article XVIII). None of the 
other contracts had such a clause.
The Massachusetts State Colleges’ contract, the longest contract of those 
reviewed (owing in part to the variety of institutions represented, which included the 
Massachusetts Maritime Academy), defined “just cause.” It consisted of one of five 
things: “substantial and manifest neglect of professional duty; demonstrated 
incompetence in the performance of duties assigned pursuant to the provisions of this 
Agreement; dishonesty in research; conviction of a felony; or misrepresentation of 
academic credentials” (Article IX. E. 1. through 6.).
Discussion of Interrelated Professional Concerns: Linked and Rooted in the Contracts’ 
Language
Professional Concern B: The ability of the faculty to determine the curriculum. 
Professional Concern C: The ability of the faculty to determine what instructional
practices/delivery systems will be used their classrooms. 
Professional Concern D: The ability of the faculty to set the requirements for granting of
a degree.
Professional Concern E: The ability of the faculty to determines their teaching,
scholarship, and service requirements.
The level and depth of language in the contracts that specifically pertained to the
involvement of the faculty in curricular development and direction was more limited in
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
128
scope and content than some of the other professional concerns. However, many of the
contracts had related language in regard to the other related professional concerns about
instructional practices, (and technology in the classroom), degree requirements, and the
related concern of how faculty determined their teaching, scholarship, and service
requirements. Because these issues were so intertwined in the contracts they are treated
collectively in the following discussion.
Notes on Curricular Development. If the concept of curricular development and
direction has some related activities embedded in faculty dictums about workload and
academic responsibilities, then there were more references to it in the reviewed contracts
than if workload was not considered. Therefore, it was treated as one of the areas related
to the professional concerns relative to faculty control over their own workloads as well
as their curriculum concerns. Also it should be noted that in reviewing the contracts
some references to curricular matters were found in articles related to academic freedom,
the prerogatives of management, and the realm of boards of trustees, not under the
faculty’s work specifically.
The contract of the University of New Hampshire under Article 5, Management
Rights, placed the responsibility for curricular matters and the standards for degrees in
the realm of the Board of Trustees and as delegated to the University System and to the
University itself. Its Article 5.1 stated:
All the rights and responsibilities of the USNH Board of Trustees which have 
not been specifically provided for in this Agreement or limited by law, shall 
be retained in the sole discretion of the USNH Board of Trustees or as 
delegated to the University System and to the University including the 
academic governance structure. Except as modified by the Agreement such 
rights and responsibilities shall include but shall not be limited to ... [referring 
specifically to curricular matters it went on in Article 5.1.4 to state]: In
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accordance with the academic governance structure, the right to determine the 
curriculum, programs, and degrees to be offered... (University of New 
Hampshire, Article 5.1 and 5.1.4.).
The contract of the Connecticut State University System was specific on the topic 
of curricular issues and where it placed the seat for their responsibility. The contract, 
within the context of its article on academic freedom and professional responsibilities 
(Article 4), declared in a sub-article, 4.2.2.1, that: “All members when teaching shall 
have professional freedom to conduct their courses proven that the subject matter is that 
which has been specified by the University and the appropriate Department.”
The University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth’s contract language on curricular 
matters was extensive. The language specifically stated: “The individual faculty 
member shall have the sole responsibility to determine course content and texts, limited 
only by course descriptions approved by the appropriate curriculum committee”
(UMASS Dartmouth, Article III A. 3, 2001, p. 9).
The contract of the Massachusetts State College Association (MSCA) contained 
the most specific language with regard to curricular matters of the contracts reviewed. 
While that of UMASS Dartmouth was detailed in its framework for the curriculum 
committees and their compositions and charges, this contract of the MSCA was even 
more content rich in that area. (Please note that the explicit contract dates of the MSCA 
contract were for July 1995 through June 30 1998, but as of 2000-2001 the year of this 
contract review period, no new contract had been signed by the aforementioned parties. 
They continued to work under the same contract with only an updated letter of agreement 
extending its terms for the specific years of 1999 and 2000).
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In this contract’s Article VI, H. Establishment of Departmental Committees, there 
was a stated description of the composition of a committee for each academic 
department, that included its departmental chair along with members chosen by the usual 
“departmental procedures” and also included two students registered as majors in it or as 
minors, if it did not offer the subject matter as a major. It was the charge of this 
committee “to review and make recommendations concerning the undergraduate 
curriculum” [and] “review the long-range educational objectives of the department as 
those may relate to its academic curriculum and to the goals and objectives of the 
college” (Agreement Between the Higher Education Coordinating Council and the 
Massachusetts State College Association, July 1, 1995-June 30, 1998, Article VI. H.I., 
p. 72).
The contract provided a detailed framework for the assignment of contact hours 
and semester hours of credit instruction for every mode of instruction from shop 
instruction to clinical work, to studio institution and critiques on artistic works. It also 
defined the number of contact hours a faculty member would be assigned and credited for 
when involved with teaching graduate courses, working in a specific counseling center or 
facility, and/or with field work supervision or cooperative education involvement (Ibid., 
pg. 203-204).
Notes on Workload. The two contracts reviewed from the state of New 
Hampshire, Keene State College and the University of New Hampshire, were not lengthy 
on the subject of workload. Keene State’s contract stipulated that it was part of 
management’s rights to “direct employees, to determine qualifications, promotion and 
tenure criteria, hiring criteria, standards for work, curriculum; to grant sabbatical and
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other leaves... ” (Article III, A.). Language on workload was contained in a 
Memorandum of Agreement that declared, “The parties agree to continue annual sharing 
of workload information including but not limited to, overloads, reassigned time, 
numbers and percent of courses taught by non-bargaining unit members’ contact hour and 
average class size” (Keene State, Memorandum of Understanding Between the USNH 
Board of Trustees and the Keene State College Education Associate, #8.). The Keene 
State contract had no other provisions that referred to the delivery of courses and/or the 
requirements of the awarded degrees.
On the related matter of workload, the contract of the Connecticut State 
University System devoted a specific article, (#10) to this concern. Under Article 10, the 
contract reviewed the matter of such items as the work year, holidays, instructional load 
limits, credit for student teacher supervision, class size, team taught courses, and load 
credit for independent study and master’s direction, the scheduling of class times, office 
hours and other duties assigned that would replace credit loads such as granted funded . 
research, and reassignments to some administrative functions.
Notes on Instructional Practices. One of the elements of the Connecticut State 
System contract that marked a distinct notice of the changing delivery of the curriculum 
in higher education and instructional practices was the sub-section on distance education. 
In this distance education section of the contract, Article 10.15, (which also referred to 
other delivery technologies such as all interactive media and computer modeling 
programs), the clause spoke of an “incentive” to encourage the use of these 
aforementioned new curricular delivery systems. The incentive being that “faculty 
preparing the first offering of such as course may receive additional load credit not to
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exceed the total credits for the course for such development” and that “the member shall 
receive the normal load credit for teaching the course unless the members and the 
appropriate dean expressly agree otherwise for compelling reasons” (UCONN, Article 
10.15).
Notes on Degree Requirements. In addition to the specific curriculum decisions 
and tangential ones charged to the committees above as depicted in the Massachusetts 
State Colleges contract, a separate section in the same Article VII, “Participation in the 
Decision-Making Process” entitled, “ Plans for Academic Reorganization,” stipulated 
that if there was a
change [in] any academic program, curriculum or structure at any one or 
more of the State Colleges, the Board of Trustees, or the Higher Education 
Coordinating Council [HECC], as the case may be, shall transmit such plan 
or part thereof, to the extent that the same will, if implemented, change any 
academic program, curriculum, or structure at any college, through the 
President of such College to the All-College Committee [which in turn] shall 
refer such plan to any such standing committee or committees within whose 
jurisdiction such plan thereof falls... (Agreement Between the Higher 
Education Coordinating Council and the Massachusetts State College 
Association, July 1, 1995-June 30, 1998, Article VII. F., pp. 95-96).
Changes in the curriculum that might result in adding or discontinuing degree
programs and thus affecting faculty employment were also covered in this contract under
Article XA, “Academic Program Development/No Lay Off.” In this Article, specified
faculty committee involvement in the decision-making process related to the
retrenchment of faculty due to the discontinuation, or cutback, of academic programs was
sharply delineated, and it further prescribed the involvement of the All College
Committee along with the affected programs and departments, and union leadership, and
the President of the College extending then to the Chancellor and the Board of Trustees
(Ibid., Article XA. A-K., pp. 168-179).
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In the contract of the University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth, the approach 
taken with regard to degree requirements focused on the Faculty Senate, where as framed 
in the contract’s Article V. H., it was ‘the’ body responsible for the policies governing the 
admission of students, residency requirements for graduation, and grading and related 
academic rules (UMASS Dartmouth, Article III A. 3, 2001).
Notes on the Determination of Teaching. Scholarship and Service Requirements. 
The Massachusetts State Colleges contract’s articles as they related to the professional 
work of faculty were noted in Article XII of that contract entitled, “Workload,
Scheduling and Course Assignments. In this section the reference to full-time faculty 
stated that in addition to the duties of teaching, instructional preparation for it, student 
advising and assistance, and continuing scholarship, there was also a recognition of the 
following other areas of activity in keeping with a faculty member “as a 
professional.. .including the following areas of participation as a professional in public 
service; participation and contribution to the improvement and development of the 
academic programs or academic services of the College; and the participation in and 
contributions to the professional growth and development of the College community” 
(Agreement Between the Higher Education Coordinating Council and the Massachusetts 
State College Association, July 1, 1995-June 30, 1998, pg. 196).
Of note also was the statement further along in this Article that described that “it 
is understood and agreed that the engagement of each full-time faculty member of the 
bargaining unit to render professional services to a State College in accordance with the 
provisions of this Agreement represents his or her primary professional employment, 
[and], it is further understood that no member of the bargaining unit shall engage in any
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other professional activities where to do so constitutes a violation of any provision of 
Chapter 268 of the General Laws {State of Massachusetts]” (Ibid., pg. 196).
Professional Concern F. Protections on Academic Freedom for the Faculty Member 
This concern is central to the exercise of professional duties within his/her 
education. Thus, all of the twelve contracts contained some reference to it although they 
varied in their extent and content. The contract of the Vermont State Colleges illustrates 
the range of language on this topic. Article 7 states:
(A). Vermont State Colleges shall continue it policy of maintaining and 
encouraging full freedom of inquiry teaching and research. Such academic 
freedom shall encompass the unconditional freedom of discussion of any 
material relevant to any course which a faculty member has been assigned to 
teach and, to this end, there shall be no unreasonable restrictions upon 
instructional methods.
(B). In a faculty member’s role as citizen, he/she/shall continue to have the 
same rights as other citizens, provided that in his/her extramural utterances 
he/she shall disclaim any representation on behalf of the Vermont State 
Colleges when such representation could reasonably be perceived within the 
community where such utterance is made (Agreement Between Vermont State 
Colleges and Vermont State Colleges Faculty Federation UPV. AFT. LOCAL 
3180. AFL-CIO. Article 7, A. & B., September 1,
1999-August 31, 2003, p. 13).
And to give another example of a contract with similar content, the contract of the 
University of New Hampshire in effect for 2000, was equally to the point in its article 
concerning academic freedom, Article 2:
(2.1) The Board of Trustees and the AAUP recognize the essential importance of 
academic freedom to an institution of higher education and affirm their continuing 
commitment to the principles of academic freedom and its protections as provided 
in the AAUP Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom.
(2.2) When making public statements, members of the bargaining unit should take 
care to avoid the impression that they are representing the University.
(2.3) Members of the bargaining unit will carry out their responsibilities 
faithfully and in a manner consistent with the traditions of academic freedom and 
professional excellence.
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(2.4) The parties agree that grievances involving alleged violations of this article 
that are pursued to arbitration will only be heard by arbitrators who are from an 
academic community of higher education. (Collective Bargaining Agreement 
USNH Board of Trustees and AAUP-UNH Chapter. July 1. 1998-June 30. 2003. 
Article A., p. 108).
Both of the above contract articles literally took their language and its tenor from 
the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) 1940 Statement of Principles 
on Academic Freedom and Tenure with 1970 Interpretive Comments (AAUP, 1999).
This may well be an example of boilerplate language or an example of a well-settled 
concept. The Interpretive Comments read:
a. Teachers are entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of 
the results, subject to the adequate performance of their academic duties; but 
research for pecuniary return should be based upon an understanding with the 
authorities of the institution.
b. Teachers are entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing their 
subject, but they should be careful not to introduce into their teaching 
controversial matter which has no relation to their subject....
c. College and university teachers are citizens, members of a learned 
profession, and officers of an educational institution. When they speak or 
write as citizens, they should be free from institutional censorship ort 
discipline, but their special position in the community imposes special 
obligations. As scholars and educational offices they should remember 
that the public may judge their profession and their institution by their 
utterances. Hence they should at all times be accurate, should exercise 
appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinions of others, and 
should make every effort to indicate that they are not speaking for the 
institution (AAUP, pp, 1-2).
In sharp contrast to all of the reviewed contracts, the strongest counterpoint to 
extensive language discussed above, the University of Connecticut’s CBA succinctly 
covered academic freedom:
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The Board of Trustees recognizes the paramount importance in an institution 
of higher education and reaffirms its continuing commitment to the principles 
of academic freedom and its protections as described in The University of 
Connecticut Laws and By-Laws, (12th edition, revised 1997). This article on 
academic freedom is a statement of intent and policy and is not subject to the 
Contractual Grievance Procedure (UCONN, 1997, pp. 5-6).
Although the passage was short, it is significant in while academic freedom is
protected, it is not subject to the contractual grievance procedures. It is a stated right, but
not a protected right. Does this make academic freedom a right without a remedy at the
University of Connecticut?
Professional Concern G: The Ability of the Faculty to Exercise Reasonable Shared 
Governance
Shared governance means the ability of the faculty to influence decision-making 
in general matters relating to the management and planning of the institution, not just 
specifically in those areas very distinctly related to the faculty and academic matters. This 
section includes a discussion of some of the contract items that specifically point to some 
protection for faculty involvement in shared governance. While shared governance may 
manifest in various contract sections, this analysis looked for specific language through a 
stated article section. A specific article is more indicative of a comprehensive approach 
to the topic of shared governance as opposed to inferential or vague language that may 
address a specific issue that is only tangentially related to the concept of shared 
governance.
Of the twelve contracts, six have references to the faculty’s involvement, via 
union leadership notification, in advance of the consideration by the administration of 
certain main issues such as budget difficulties and possible financial emergencies, two 
contracts had more extensive language very specifically detailing procedures to follow in
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the event of budget difficulties and this program eliminations, and two relied on 
interconnected and interlocking committee structures to influence administrative 
decisions in matters ranging from support staff utilization to policies for the assignment 
of office space (MSCA and UMASS Lowell).
Those contracts that did not contain references to shared governance typically 
had clear statements of management rights, and possible consultative rights, for the 
union. For example, the University of Rhode Island’s (URI) contract does not contain an 
article specific to shared governance with just a reference to the role of the administration 
in this regard. In Article II it was stated that “The Association [faculty] recognizes that 
the Board [trustees], the Commissioner of Education and the Administration of the 
University, have responsibility and authority to manage and direct, on behalf of the 
public, all the operations and activities of the University to the full extent authorized by 
law” (URI, 2000, pg. 5). A separate article, V, may have left open the idea of 
consultation between the officers of the faculty association, and the President of the URI 
and/or the State of Rhode Island’s Department of Education but this was to discuss what 
might be considered appropriate in deciding the “proper subjects of collective 
negotiation” and meeting might also be called for “if matters of mutual concern arise of 
an urgent or emergency nature” (URI, p. 6). Yet the contract does not contain language 
on shared governance.
An example of nested language regarding shared governance is found in Article 
VII of the Massachusetts State Colleges (MASS State). Article VII, “Participation in the 
Decision-Making Process,” described a detailed nested structure of committees overseen 
by a penultimate, “All-College Committee,” with the responsibility for specific standing
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committees within each of the institutions’ colleges (MASS State, 1995, p. 83). These 
committees are to be convened by each college at each MASS State institution for the 
following four areas: curriculum, academic policies, student affairs, and long-range 
planning. Earlier in this chapter the requirement of the MASS State contract to create 
curriculum and academic committees was reviewed under the discussion on the reviewed 
contracts and their influence on the curriculum. In this section, it is the work of the 
student affairs and the long-range planning committees, and the oversight of the all­
college committee, wherein lies the influence of the bargaining agreement to establish a 
structure for the exercise of shared governance in a specified way for the institutions and 
faculty represented in the contract.
According to Article VII, it is the responsibility of the All College Committee to 
“encourage the participation of all members of the bargaining unit, members of the 
college administration, members of the student body in the process of decision-making” 
(MASS State, p. 81). The purpose also of the All College Committee was to serve as the 
agency that would coordinate and implement the participation of the various institutional 
constituencies, as the contract stipulated, and the use of the standing committees noted 
previously, (for curriculum, academic policies, student affairs, and long-range planning). 
The All-College Committee was the starting point for all matters submitted by any party 
of the institution, individual or group, and which were then referred by the All-College 
Committee to one of the standing committees, or if more appropriate, to a new ad hoc 
committee devised by the All-College Committee.
The All-College Committee was created to “resolve any conflicts and difference 
in the recommendations of the standing or ad hoc committees prior to passing along said
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recommendations of the ad hoc or standing committees before they were passed on to the 
appropriate administrative officer or to an institution’s president” (Ibid).
Without of course guaranteeing that all decisions were made through this 
committee structure it can be inferred from this section of the contract that the 
expectation was that this was the path to be followed, and if it was not, and a major 
decision made at one of the institutions covered by the contract, it could be a subject of 
grievance under the terms of the contract by the faculty. Given this situation, the 
establishment of the standing committees of student affairs and that of long-range 
planning, therefore opened up to a faculty-driven committee decision making process 
some areas outside the usual contractual areas that had been described in some of the 
other reviewed contracts.
To sum up this section of the review of contract clauses and the professional 
concern related to shared governance entries in the contracts, the following is a 
restatement of a few points made earlier in this paper about the reality on campuses and 
the content of contracts.
The absence of specific language in the contracts should not be interpreted to 
mean that there was, is, or cannot be a actual practice of shared governance through such 
bodies as faculty senates and other committees, or other faculty representative structures 
on the campuses that belong to the faculty contracts reviewed. As has been noted earlier 
in this work, past practice, institutional by-laws, state regulations and statutes, and related 
edicts, and actual dealings are outside the consideration of this research. Also not 
included in this research is how in day-to-day reality, the administration, the faculty,
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students, trustees and other influencing parties, work to influence how a campus is 
governed and run in de facto terms.
Concluding Statements of the Contract Review for Research Question #3 
This research surveyed a random sample of faculty about their perception of how 
their collective bargaining agreement affected their professional concerns. Additionally, 
the research included a review of the contracts under which the surveyed faculty actually 
worked. A review of the contract revealed that all of the professional concerns developed 
from the review of the literature were contained in the contracts. The extensiveness of 
the language varied reflecting the context and history of the institution and the issues 
brought to the bargaining table. Twelve institutions or systems of higher education 
bargained issues pertaining to professional practice. It seems reasonable to posit from the 
research that the collective bargaining process is an established venue for faculty to 
discuss and pursue their professional concerns.




The University is a Paradise, Rivers of Knowledge are there, Arts and 
Sciences flow from thence. Counsel Tables are Horde conclusive, (as it is 
said in the Canticles,) Gardens that are walled in, and they are Fonts signet,
Wells that are sealed up; bottomless depths of unsearchable Counsels there.
John Donne (as cited in Sayers, 1936)
Purpose of this Study 
Essentially, this dissertation is an examination of the relationship between the 
professional concerns of faculty and collective bargaining. The driving questions 
centered on whether unionization was fundamentally compatible with the traditional 
definition of a “professional,” as perceived by the faculty surveyed, and what faculty 
perceived about their collective bargaining agreements as being agents of hindrance or 
facilitation when it came to examining their professional concerns. These concerns were:
• The ability of the faculty to effectively influence who will join and continue on the 
faculty.
• The ability of the faculty to determine the curriculum.
• The ability of the faculty to determine what instructional practices/delivery systems
will be used their classrooms.
• The ability of the faculty to set the requirements for granting of a degree.
• The ability of the faculty to determine their teaching scholarship and service
requirements.
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• The right of the faculty to exercise their academic freedom.
• The ability of the faculty to exercise reasonable shared governance, (exercising a 
wider role in institutional governance beyond the classroom and the department 
level).
Coupled with these professional concerns were also three key research questions that the 
study sought to answer. For review these were:
• Do faculty perceive that collective bargaining facilitates or inhibits their professional 
autonomy?
• Do faculty perceive that collective bargaining in general is important to their sense of 
professionalism?
• Do the collective bargaining agreements support professional autonomy?
To accomplish this work, the study relied on a combination of survey research 
and contract analysis. For the survey phase, 650 faculty were drawn from thirteen four 
year public institutions within New England and surveyed to ascertain their perceptions 
on how their contracts may be affecting their professional concerns, as defined above.
For the contract analysis phase of the research, the associated collective bargaining 
contracts of the institutions that employed the surveyed faculty were examined to see if 
there was language in the contracts that might facilitate or hinder the professional 
concerns of the faculty.
Findings
Research Question #1, (Do faculty perceive that collective bargaining facilitates or 
inhibits their professional autonomy?)
Twenty-seven Likert style questions were developed based on the review of the
literature. A review of the questions by their foundational framework, the professional
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concerns of the faculty, (as noted above), and then a factor analysis, resulting in five 
factors formed the core of this inquiry, along with ANOVAs seeking the variance with 
the factors’ results based on the rank, academic disciplines, and union memberships of 
the faculty. The five factors are:
Factor 1: Personal Protections for the Faculty Member 
Factor 2: Program Controls 
Factor 3: Organizational Restraints 
Factor 4: Specified Academic Issues 
Factor 5: Restrictive Contract Stipulations 
An analysis of Factor 1 (M =3.43) found that the respondents perceived their 
collective bargaining agreements as providing them with protections in the areas of the 
tenure and promotion review process, the post-tenure review process, a manner of control 
over their efforts and scholarly endeavors, added weight to their individual voices in 
institutional decision-making, and protected their professional autonomy as well as 
helped to secure their right to conduct their teaching according to their own dictums. 
Therefore the survey respondents perceived that their collective bargaining agreements 
extended these protections to them as individual faculty members and protected their 
autonomy as professionals, and protected their academic freedom.
For Factor 2 (M = 3.17) ‘Program Controls,’ the respondents perceived that their 
collective bargaining agreements provided controls over the altering of their academic 
programs without faculty involvement. The respondents perceive hat their contract 
provides protection so that their ability to determine degree requirements are not eroded 
by management. The contract is a block to management encroachment, they believe.
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However, there was a large neutral response for three of the five questions for this factor. 
Why there is a large neutral response is unknown. It may point to some ambivalence on 
the part of the faculty or a lack of knowledge about the contract.
Factor 3 (M = 3.25) responses showed that the faculty perceived the union and 
the collective bargaining agreement to be an effective counterbalance to the power of the 
institution and its possible thrust, or inclinations, to mandate unilateral change. The data 
associated with this Factor 3 denoted a positive perception by the faculty responding that 
their union and its bargaining agreement were effective in counterbalancing the power of 
the institution to affect unilateral change without faculty involvement.
The analysis for Factor 4 (M = 3.02) has a mean slightly above neutral or the 
midpoint. The factor has two questions. The questions raise the interesting point of 
whether the respondents want the contract to protect their ability to act (Factor 1) but they 
may be concerned about the collective bargaining process replacing their ability to act. 
This factor may carve out niches in which faculty believe that the collective action of 
bargaining should not be used in place of action taken through normal academic 
channels.
Results for Factor 5 (2.65), ‘Restrictive Contract Stipulations’ encompassed two 
questions that dealt specifically with two distinct contract issues, the hiring of new 
faculty using monetary incentives, and provisions in the contract that protected the 
faculty’s ability to establish degree requirements. As they disagreed with the two 
questions, the mean is one on that side of the Likert Scale, they disagreed that their 
contracts facilitated the hiring of new faculty with monetary incentives, and disagreed 
that their contract was not able to protect their right to establish degree requirements.
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This factor does not have a conceptual base that binds the two questions. Consequently, 
caution is urged when applying this factor to other research questions.
An ANOVA was conducted for each Factor using three key demographic 
characteristics of the respondents: their academic rank, their disciplines, and their union 
memberships. The results are summarized below.
Academic Rank. No significant differences were found in any of the five factors.
Disciplines. Significant differences by discipline were found with Factors 2, 3, 4, 
and 5. For Factor 2, ‘Program Controls,’ there were significant differences ip < .05) 
between those in the category o f ‘other’ and those in the liberal arts, and 
science/engineering, but not with business /economics. In the situation of Factor 3, 
‘Organizational Restraints’ the significant differences ip < .05) were between 
science/engineering and business/economics. While Factor 4, ‘Specified Academic 
Issues,’ mirrored that of Factor 1 with significant differences (p < .05) between those in 
the category of ‘other’ and those in the liberal arts, and science/engineering, but not with 
business /economics. Factor 5, ‘Restrictive Contract Stipulations,’ displayed significant 
differences (p < .05) between ‘other’ and science/engineering. There is no apparent 
theme that links all of the responses. Consequently, these findings are of limited value.
Union Membership: For Factor 1, ‘Protections for the Faculty Members’, the 
members of the three main unions, AFT, AAUP and NEA, showed significant differences 
ip < .05) with those faculty who by choice were not union members. Factor 2, ‘Program 
Controls,’ showed an exact parallel finding, and Factor 3 ‘Organizational Restraints,’ 
showed only a significant difference ip < .05) between AAUP and those not in a union. 
Factor 4 had no significant differences among the union memberships, and Factor 5
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‘Restrictive Contract Stipulations,’ indicated a significant differences (p < .05) between 
members of AFT and AAUP. Members in the AAUP differ from non-union respondents; 
members of the NEA and AFT differ to a lesser degree from non-union respondents. The 
clear, and not unexpected explanation, is that union members differ in perceptions from 
those who joined a union. There was no significant difference between the unions except 
for Factor 5. But, once again, caution is urged regarding this finding.
Taken together, the analysis of the first research question leads to the finding that 
collective bargaining agreements facilitate the exercise of professional autonomy. The 
CBA plays a role in protecting faculty professional autonomy. Clearly, the CBA is not an 
impediment to professionalism in higher education.
In sum, on the question of whether or not collective bargaining facilitates or 
inhibits professional autonomy thus research Question 1, the responses of the faculty to 
the survey indicate that not only does it facilitate, in some areas such as exercising 
restraint on the administration to change programs, alter the curriculum and support the 
voices of the faculty outside the classroom, among some of the faculty respondents it 
may be considered vital. There also did not indicate to be any strong perceptions of 
conflict among the respondents between their being a member of a profession, and having 
their associated professional rights such as their academic freedom protected by a 
collective bargaining agreement, a mechanism not usually relied on upon or associated 
with the professions.
Research Question, #2 (Do faculty perceive that collective bargaining, in general, is 
important to their sense of professionalism?)
Three survey items addressed this question. The results of which indicated that 
the respondents believe that academic freedom is an appropriate subject of bargaining,
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that collective bargaining balances the power of administration, and that the respondents 
prefer to work under a collective bargaining agreement than to work without one. 
Therefore, the faculty respondents perceive that collective bargaining is important to their 
professional lives.
However, when these questions are analyzed by demographic variables a more 
nuanced view of the responses is revealed. There were no variances found for any of the 
questions based on the rank or disciplines of the respondents. However, the responses 
for Question 28, (“Without a collective bargaining agreement the administration would 
have too much power over the governance of my institution.”) and Question 30, (“If 
given a choice, I would rather work at an institution that has a collective bargaining 
agreement than that does not.”), vary significantly (p < .05) by union membership. In the 
case of Question 28, there were significant differences among those not members of a 
union and those in the three unions AFT, AAUP, and NEA. There was also a significant 
difference between those in a different union, ‘other’ and AFT. For Question 30, the 
significant difference (p < .05) was between, ‘’not a member’ and those in AFT AAUP, 
and NEA, but there were no differences between ‘other’ and those not members of a 
union. For Question 30, the significant differences were between those ‘not a union 
member,’ also those in ‘other’ unions and AFT, AAUP, and NEA. This difference 
between union membership and non-membership persists in both research questions.
This clearly indicates that the two groups differ in perceptions. What supports the 
difference of perceptions is unknown.
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Non-union members may have a philosophical view about the work of unions that 
spurred them to not join and thus to not see the work of a union favorably. Without 
further study, we are left with speculation.
Research Questions # 3. (Do the collective bargaining agreements support professional 
autonomy?)
This question focused on the contracts and not the survey. The contracts revealed 
a range of coverage with regard for the professional concerns of the faculty (as defined 
for the purposes of this study), with some contracts providing a spartan approach and 
others providing extensive coverage. In one case, what was perceived by the literature as 
being a very strong faculty concern, (who will join and continue on the faculty), was 
found to a large extent within the contracts reviewed but registered lower in the factor 
analysis of the professional concerns among the faculty survey responses; thus leading to 
a conclusion that it was less important than the other professional concerns to the faculty. 
In contrast, a reading of the contracts alone might result in the opposite conclusion given 
the amount of content in all the contracts centering on this aspect of faculty 
appointments, and the provision of tenure. This was the clearest disparity between the 
level of importance given to a concern by the faculty and the amount of space it occupied 
in most of the contracts.
A comparison of the contracts by professional concern and the responses to the 
survey questions by the respondents, overall demonstrate that the faculty appear to have a 
good awareness of what was in their contact, in the sense that many of the items they felt 
strongly about (academic freedom, personal tenure/post-tenure review protections and 
due process right etc., and their role in curriculum planning, and work in the classroom) 
were actually in their contracts, so they answered apparently from a basically informed
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position. However, how strong their collective bargaining agreement is in application 
and how the respondents perceived it to protect their voice in governance, acting as a 
control on arbitrary administrative decision-making, may be subject to debate. Most 
contracts contained little language and were vague when they did contain any reference 
to shared governance.
All the contracts devoted space, some of it quite extensive, to the adding of new 
faculty and especially in some instances the use of adjuncts, the how and when to use and 
how many can be used. It is interesting that all of the contracts contained language 
regarding new faculty. It was a professional concern identified throughout the literature, 
but it did not surface as a factor. A reasonable explanation may be that the process for 
hiring new faculty is an important concern of unions but it may not be recognized as an 
exercise of individual professional autonomy.
Conclusions
Without a doubt, the respondents indicated by their answers to the survey that 
they perceived their professional concerns, at least as embodied in the survey, to be more 
than adequately addressed by their collective bargaining agreements. They also did not 
indicate any real conflict over being members of a union and being a professional. In 
addition, the areas of protection they sought to be provided in their contracts, especially 
protections for the personal roles and for their roles in the classroom, were actually to be 
found in the contracts. To a lesser extent what they sought in their contracts in terms of 
protections for a firm faculty role in shared governance or as a counter balance to 
administrative powers were less distinct, but in many contracts there was some language 
even if only in shell form. But in the perceptions of the faculty, their shared governance
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role and their voice in campus issues would be less secure if the collective bargaining did 
not exist at all.
Therefore, does the need then for faculty to have a union, and a collective 
bargaining agreement, result in part from a desire to procure a more secure foothold on a 
way of traditional professional life that is perceived to be diminishing? Is it a way to 
preserve a view of faculty life that current faculty members recall that their advisors and 
faculty enjoyed when they were students? Is it then, in fact, this perception of a 
professional life linked to an institution, one of the reasons faculty enter into the 
academic profession?
Recommendations
As with any study, sometimes the actual result is to end up with more questions to 
be explored than ones answered and so further studies, hopefully, can come forward and 
add to the developing trail of research.
Some of the issues to be explored might include the following:
• more studies with a larger population could examine the influence of departmental 
and college affiliations. The number in this study was not large enough to fully 
explore each sub-set.
• additional exploration of the of new tenure-track faculty, with further study after they 
have achieved tenure, may also inform further on any attitudinal changes resulting 
from being a union member.
• examination if membership in a union as a graduate assistant re-enforces the 
perceived need to be a member of a faculty union.
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• more studies on the interplay of laws and past practices and the contracts intertwined 
with further study of faculty perceptions and perhaps behavior.
• a follow-up study to this in other states to see if the results parallel these (Florida, 
California, New York) to examine if there are regional differences.
In addition to the above mentioned follow-up studies as well as others that might 
find a source of inspiration in this study, it is hoped that information gained from this 
study may assist unions in understanding the impact that their management of the 
collective bargaining process might have on a faculty’s professional concerns. It may 
also aid faculty in understanding more about the perceptions of their colleagues with 
regard to the role collective bargaining plays in influencing specific aspects of their 
professional lives and its roles. In addition, administrations could find this information 
useful in understanding the collective bargaining process and its impact on faculty and 
institutional administration relations.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
152
REFERENCES
Abbott, A. (1988). The system o f professionals: An essay on the division o f 
expert labor. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Altbach, P .G. (1980). The crisis in the academy. The Annals o f the American 
Academy o f Political and Social Science, 448, March 1980, pp. 1-14.
Albrow, G. E. (1970). Bureaucracy. New York: Praeger. American Association 
of University Professors. (1999). 1940 statement of principles of academic freedom and 
tenure with 1970 interpretive comments. American Association of University Professors 
Web Site [On-line], Available: www.aaup.org. 1940stat.html.
Anderson, M. (1985). Factors affecting the vote of community college faculty 
members in collective bargaining elections [CD-ROM]. Abstract from: ProQuest File: 
Dissertation Abstracts Item: 8429964.
Arnold, G .B. (2000). The politics o f faculty unionization: The experience o f  
three New England Universities. Westport, CT: Bergin & Garvey.
Bain, G. S. (1970). The growth o f white collar unionism. London: Oxford 
University Press.
Bain, G. S., Coates, D., & Ellis, V. (1973). Social stratification and trade 
unionism. London: Heinneman Educational Books.
Bartlett, J., & Kaplan, J. (Ed.). (1992) Bartlett’s familiar quotations (16th ed.). 
Boston: Little, Brown and Company
Begin, J. P. (1974). Faculty governance and collective bargaining. Journal o f 
Higher Education, 45(8), 552-92.
Begin, J. P. (1992). Changes in the United States system of industrial relations: 
Its impact on collective bargaining in higher education. In B. Hillman Johnson (Ed.),
The impact o f collective bargaining on higher education: A twenty year retrospective. 
New York: National Center for Collective Bargaining in Higher Education and the 
Professions, Baruch College, CUNY.
Bennett, J. B. (1998). Collegial professionalism: The academy, individualism, 
and the common good. Phoenix, AZ: American Council on Education and The Oryx 
Press.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
153
Blau, P. M., & Scott, W. R. (1962). Formal organizations: A comparative 
approach. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co.
Blumenstyk, G., & McCollum, K. (1999, April 16). 2 reports question utility and 
accessibility in distance education. The Chronicle o f Higher Education, p. A31.
Blacknur, R.T., & Larence, J. H. (1995). Faculty at work: Motivation, 
expectation and satisfaction. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Unversity Press.
Bowen, H. R., & Schuster, J. H. (1986). American professors: A national 
resource imperiled. New York: Oxford University Press.
Brint, S. (1994). In an age o f experts: The changing role ofprofessionals in 
politics and professional life. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Burns, R. K. (1946). Unionization of the white-collar worker. Personnel Series 
No. 110, New York: American Management Association.
Carbonu, D. M. (1992). Attitudes of Canadian nursing faculty toward unions and 
collective bargaining in higher education [CD-ROM}. Abstract from: ProQuest File: 
Dissertation Abstracts Item: 9136364.
Clark, B. R. (1987). The academic life: small worlds, different worlds.
Princeton, NJ: The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching/Princeton 
University Press.
Clark, S. M., Boyer, C. M., & Corcoran, M. (1985). Faculty and institutional 
vitality in higher education. In Shirley M. Clark and Darrel R. Lewis (Eds.). Faculty 
vitality and institutional vitality. New York: Teachers College Press.
Cohen, M. D., & March, J. G. (1972). The American college president. New 
York: McGraw Hill.
Collins, V. H. (1996). The faculty role in governance: A historical analysis of 
the influence of the American Association of University Professors and the Middle States 
Association on academic decision making [CD-ROM]. Abstract from: ProQuest File: 
Dissertation Abstracts Item: 9609387.
Connecticut State University. (1997) Collective Bargaining Agreement between 
Connecticut State University American Association o f University Professors and Board 
o f Trustees for Connecticut State University System. Hartford, CT: Office of the 
Chancellor, CSU.
Cornish, D. (1986). Faculty perceptions of collective bargaining in selected 
Illinois public community colleges (institutional governance, economic benefits,
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
154
academic excellence, professional autonomy) [CD-ROM]. Abstract from: ProQuest 
File: Dissertation Abstracts Item: 8616844.
Corwin, R. G. (1961). The professional employee: A study of conflict in nursing 
roles. American Journal o f Sociology, 66, May, 604-615.
Cunningham, J .J. (1984). Collective bargaining and governance in higher 
education. JLexington, MA: Ginn Custom Publishing.
Decker, R. H. (1984). Faculty impact in selected areas of institutional decision 
making in Illinois community colleges (collective bargaining, personnel, unionization) 
[CD-ROM]. Abstract from: Dissertation Abstracts Item: 8408588.
Doyle, E. T. (1989). Faculty collective bargaining: A study of faculty attitudes 
at three institutions participating in collective bargaining [CD-ROM], Abstract from: 
ProQuest File: Dissertation Abstracts Item: 8914341.
Dreucci, R. G. (1985). Institutional governance through committees 
(effectiveness, collegiality, Yeshiva) [CD-ROM]. Abstract from: ProQuest File: 
Dissertation Abstracts Item: 8429857.
Driver, C. (1972). The exploding university. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill.
Fichter, J. H. (1961). Religion as an occupation. Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press.
Finkelstein, M. J., Seal, R. K., & Schuster, J. H. (1998). The new academic 
generation. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Finkin, M. W. (1981). Regulation by agreement: The case of private higher 
education, part III. Academe, 67, 67-80.
Footnotes. (1991, May 14). The Chronicle o f Higher Education, p. A14.
Franke, A. H. (1992). Seminal legal developments of the past twenty-five years 
effecting higher education collective bargaining. In B. Hillman Johnson (Ed.), The 
impact o f collective bargaining on higher education: A twenty year retrospective. New 
York: National Center for Collective Bargaining in Higher Education and the 
Professions, Baruch College, CUNY.
Freeman, R. B. and Medoff, J.L. (1984). What unions do? New York: Basic
Books.
Freidson, E. (1994). Professionalism reborn: Theory, prophecy, and policy. 
Chicago,IL: University of Chicago Press.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
155
Garbarino, J. W., & Aussieker, B. (1975). Faculty bargaining: Change and 
conflict. A report prepared for the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education and the 
Ford Foundation. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Gisler, S. R. (1985). A case study of faculty collective bargaining at Robert 
Morris College (unionization, Pennsylvania) [CD-ROM]. Abstract from: ProQuest File: 
Dissertation Abstracts Item: 8517990.
Gouldner, A. W. (1957). Cosmopolitans and locals: Toward an analysis of latent 
social roles-I. Administrative Science Quarterly, 2, December, 281-306.
Gouldner, A. W. (1958). Cosmopolitans and locals: Toward an analysis of latent 
social roles-II. Administrative Science Quarterly, 2, March, 444-480.
Goss, M. (1961). Influence and authority among physicians in an outpatient 
clinic. American Sociological Review, 26, pp. 39-50.
Harrison, S .L. (1993). Collective bargaining with public university employees: 
Before and after enabling legislation In Daniel J. Julius (Ed.), Managing the industrial 
labor relations process in higher education (pp. 195-207). Washington, DC: College 
and University Personnel Association.
Hoffman, E. B. (1976). Unionization o f professional societies. New York: The 
Conference Board
Hurd, R., Foerster, A., & Johnson, B. H. (Eds.). (1997). Directory o f faculty 
contracts and bargaining agents in institutions o f higher education. New York: National 
Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education and the Professions, 
Baruch College, CUNY.
Inman, D. (1984). The impact of collective bargaining on campus climate as 
perceived by faculty [CD-ROM], Abstract from: ProQuest File: Dissertation Abstracts 
Item 8322212.
Johnstone, R .J. (1982). The scope offaculty collective bargaining.
Westport,CT: Greenwood Publications.
Julius, D. J. (1993). The status of employee unions in colleges and universities: 
1930s-1990s. In Daniel J. Julius (Ed.), Managing the industrial labor relations process 
in higher education (pp. 1-16). Washington, DC: College and University Personnel 
Association.
Kadish, S. H. (1973). Faculty collective bargaining. In R.G. Hewitt (Ed.), The 
effects o f faculty collective bargaining in higher education (pp. 9-27). Boston: New 
England Board of Higher Education.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
156
Keene State College. (1999). Collective Bargaining Agreement between USNH 
Board of Trustees Keene State College and the Keene State College Education 
Association. Durham, NH: Office of the General Counsel, USNH.
Kemerer, F. R. & Baldridge, J.V. (1975). Union on campus. San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass.
Kemerer, F. R., & Baldridge, J. V. (1976). The myth of the collegial bargaining 
model. College and University Personnel Journal, 27, 19-46.
Kerlin, S. P. & Dunlap, D. M. (1993). For richer, for poorer: faculty morale in 
periods of austerity and retrenchment. Journal o f Higher Education, 64, 3, 348-377.
Kerchner, C. T., & Caufman, K. D. (1993). Building the airplane while it is 
rolling down the runway. In C.T. Kerchner & J.E. Koppich (Eds.), A union o f 
professionals: Labor relations and educational reform (pip. 1-24). New York: Teachers 
College Press.
Kerchner, C. T., & Mitchell, D. E. (1988). The changing idea o f a teacher’s 
union. London: The Falmer Press.
Kline, P. (1994). An easy guide to factor analysis. New York: Routledge Press.
Kuechle, D. (1992). When collective bargaining fails: The Boston University, 
Temple University, University of Bridgeport and Yeshiva University cases. In B. Hillman 
Johnson (Ed.), The impact o f collective bargaining on higher education: A twenty year 
retrospective (pp. 81-94). New York: National Center for Collective Bargaining in 
Higher Education and the Professions, Baruch College, CUNY.
Leatherman, C. (1998, August 14). Graduate students gather to learn ‘organizing 
101’. The Chronicle o f Higher Education, pp. A1Q-A11.
Lee, B. A. (1992). Individual and collective rights in the academy: Peer review 
and the union: Hero or hostage? In B. Hillman Johnson (Ed.), The impact o f  collective 
bargaining on higher education: A twenty year retrospective. New York: National 
Center for Collective Bargaining in Higher Education and the Professions, Baruch 
College, CUNY.
Lipscomb, L. G. (1997). The effect of faculty/administrator collective bargaining 
strategies on California community college climates (organizational climate) [CD-ROM[. 
Abstract from: ProQuest File: Dissertation Abstracts Item: 9731523.
Lucas, C. J. 11996). Crisis in the academy. New York: St Martin’s Press.
Lucas, C. J. (1994). American higher education: A history. New York: St. 
Martin’s Griffin.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
157
Mannix, T. M. (1992). When collective bargaining fails: A management 
perspective. In B. Hillman Johnson (Ed.), The impact o f collective bargaining on higher 
education: A twenty year retrospective (pp. 95-100). New York: National Center for 
Collective bargaining in Higher Education and the Professions, Baruch College, CUNY.
Massachusetts State Colleges. (1995). Agreement between the Hisher Education 
Coordinatins Council and the Massachusetts Teachers Association/NEA Massachusetts 
State Collese Association. Boston, MA: Massachusetts Board of Higher Education.
McDowell, B.J. (1987). Relationships between faculty perceptions of 
organizational climate and academic collective bargaining in Illinois public community 
colleges [CD-ROM]. Abstract from: ProQuest File: Dissertation Abstracts Item: 
8624198.
Migden, J. (1988). The relationship between organizational characteristics and 
faculty attitudes toward collective bargaining [CD-ROM]. Abstract from: ProQuest File: 
Dissertation Abstracts Item: 8801596.
Mills, C. W. (1951). White collar. New York: Oxford University Press.
Moats, H.S. (1983). An analysis of the attitudes of faculty members toward 
collective bargaining in public community colleges in the state of Kansas [CD-ROM], 
Abstract from: ProQuest File: Dissertation Abstracts Item: 8309304.
Montagna, P. (1968). Professionalization and bureaucratization in large 
professional organizations. American Journal o f Sociology, 784x pp. 138-145.
Murolo, P. & Chitty, A. B. (2001 )_From the folks who brought you the weekend: 
a short illustrated history o f labor in the Unnited States. New York: The New Press.
National Labor Relations Board v Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672, (1980).
Osbourne, W. B. (1992). Twenty-five years of seminal legal developments in 
higher education collective bargaining. In B. Hillman Johnson (Ed.), The impact o f 
collective bargaining on higher education: A twenty year retrospective. New York: 
National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education and the 
Professions, Baruch College, CUNY.
Parsons, T. (1969). Politics and social structure. NewYork: Free Press.
Parsons, T. (1971). The System o f modern societies. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall.
Pavalko,R.M. (1971). Sociology o f occupations and professions. Itasca, IL: F.E. 
Peacock Publishers Inc.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
158
Phalunas, R.W. (1990). Perceived control by unionized faculty committees in 
institutional governance (CD-ROM], Abstract from : ProQuest File: Dissertation 
Abstracts Item: 9001092.
Prandy, K. (1965). Professional employees. London: Faber.
Rabban, D. M. (1991). Is unionization compatible with professionalism? 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 45 (1), 97-112.
Rabban, D. M. (1992). Is unionization compatible with professionalism? InB. 
Hillman Johnson (Ed.), The impact o f collective bargaining on higher education: A 
twenty year retrospective (pp. 18-22). New York: National Center for Collective 
Bargaining in Higher Education and the Professions, Baruch College, CUNY.
Reissman, L. (1949). A study of role conceptions in bureaucracy. Social Forces, 
22, March, 305-310.
Rhoades, G. (1993). Retrenchment clauses in faculty union contracts. Journal o f 
Higher Education 64(3), 312-347.
Rhoades, G. (1998). Managed professionals: Unionized faculty and 
restructuring academic labor. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Rhode Island College. (2000). Agreement between The RIC/AFT and the Rhode 
Island Board o f Governors. Providence, RI: Office of the President/Legal Counsel, URI.
Rich, J. A. (1984). An examination of the relationships between morale and 
teaching faculty participation in institutional governance on collective bargaining and 
non-collective bargaining public California community college campuses [CD-ROM], 
Abstract from: Pro-Quest File: Dissertation Abstracts Item: 8418175.
Rich, J. M. (1984). Professional ethics in education. Springfield, IL: Charles C. 
Thomas.
Riggs, F. (1979). Introduction: shifting means of the term ‘bureaucracy.’ 
International Social Science Journal 31(4), pp. 563-584.
Ross, M. G. (1976). The university: Anatomy o f academe. New York: 
McGraw-Hill.
Sanderson, A., Phua, V. C., & Herda, D. (2000). The American faculty poll. New 
York: TIAA-CREF; Chicago: National Opinion Research Center.
Sayers, D. L. S. (1936). Gaudy night. New York: Harper Collins Publishers.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
159
Schaeffer, M. A. (1991). The state of academic senate: architect or artifact of 
faculty governance? [CD-ROM[. Abstract from: ProQuest File: Dissertation Abstracts 
Item: 9121205.
Schriesheim, J., von Glinow, M. A., & Kerr, S. (1977). Professionals in a 
bureaucracy: A structured alternative. TIMS Studies in Management Science 5, pp. 55- 
69.
Schuster, J.H. (1974). Encountering the unionized university. San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass.
Sciulli, D. (1986). Voluntaristic action as a distinct concept: theoretical 
foundations of societal conceptualism. American Sociological Review 51, pp. 743-766.
Scott, W. R. (1965). Reactions to supervision in a heterogeneous professional 
organization. Administrative Science Quarterly, 10, pp. 65-81.
Scott, W. R. (1966). Professionals in bureaucracies. In H. Vollman & D.L. Mills 
(Eds.), Professionalization (pp. 265-275). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc.
Slichter, J., Healy, J., & Livermash, E.R. (1960). The impact o f collective 
bargaining on management. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
Smigel, E. 0 . (1964). The Wall Street lawyer: Professional organization man? 
New York: Free Press.
Strauss, G. (1954). White-collar unions are different! Harvard Business Review, 
52, pp. 73-82
Streshly, W. A., & DeMitchell, T. A. (1994). Teacher unions and TQE.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press.
Sykes, A. J. M. (1964) The problem of clerical trade unionism. Scientific 
Business, II, pp. 176-183.
Twomey, D. P. (1985). Labor law and legislation. (7th ed.). Cincinnati, OH: 
South-Western Publishing, Co.
University of Connecticut. (1997). The Collective Bargaining Agreement 
between the University o f Connecticut Board o f Trustees and the University o f  
Connecticut Chapter o f the American Association o f University Professors. Storrs, CT: 
Office of the President, UCONN.
University of Maine System. (1999). Agreement between University Maine 
System and Associated Faculties o f the University o f Maine System, MEA/NEA. Augusta, 
ME: Office of the General Counsel, UMASS.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
160
University of Massachusetts Amherst/Boston. (1998). An agreement between the 
Board o f  Trustees o f the University o f Massachusetts and The Massachusetts Society o f 
Professors Faculty Staff; Union/MTA/NEA. Boston: Office of the General Counsel, 
UMASS.
University of Massachusetts Dartmouth. (2001). An agreement between the 
Board o f  Trustees o f the University o f Massachusetts and the American Federation o f 
Teachers Local 1985, AFL-CIQ Faculty Federation at the University o f Massachusetts 
Dartmouth, Boston: Office of the General Counsel, UMASS.
University of Massachusetts Lowell. (2001). An agreement between the Board o f  
Trustees o f the University o f Massachusetts and The Massachusetts Society o f  
Professors/Lowell; An Affiliate o f The Massachusetts Teachers Association National 
Education Association. Boston: Office of the General Counsel, UMASS.
University of New Hampshire. (1998). Collective Bargaining Agreement USNH 
Board o f  Trustees and AA UP-UNH Chapter. Durham, NH: Office of the General 
Counsel, USNH.
University of Rhode Island. (2000). Agreement between Rhode Island Board o f 
Governors and University Cahpter American Association o f University Professors. 
Kingston, RI: Office of the General Counsel, URI.
Vermont State Colleges. (1999). Agreement between Vermont State Colleges and 
Vermont State Colleges Faculty Federation UPV, AFT, Local 3180, AFL-CIO.
Waterbury, VT: Office of the Chancellor, VSC.
Waters, M. (1989). Collegiality, bureaucratization, and professionalism: A 
Weberian analysis. American Journal o f Sociology 94, 5, pp. 945-972.
Webster’s new universal unabridged dictionary (2nd ed.). (1983). New York: 
Simon & Schuster.
Weick, K. (1976). Educational systems as loosely coupled systems. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 21, pp. 1-19.
Wilensky, H. L. (1959). Intellectuals in labor unions. New York: The Free
Press.
Wolff, R.P. (1969). The ideal o f the university. Boston: Beacon.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
APPENDICES




U n i v e r s i t y  of  N e w  H a m p s h i r e
August 29, 2003.
Nancy Hamer 
Education, Morrill Hall 
Durham, NH 03824
IRB # :  2986
Study: College and University Faculty Perceptions of the Effects of Collective
Bargaining Agreements on their Professional Roles 
Approval Date: 08/29/2003
The Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research (IRB) 
has reviewed and approved the protocol for your study as Exempt as described in Title 
45, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 46, Subsection 101(b). Approval is granted 
to conduct your study as described in your protocol.
Researchers who conduct studies involving human subjects have responsibilities as 
outlined in the attached document, Responsibilities o f Directors o f Research Studies 
Involving Human Subjects. (This document is also available at 
http://www.unh.edU/osr/comoliance/IRB.html.j Please read this document carefully 
before commencing your work involving human subjects.
Upon completion of your study, please complete the enclosed pink Exempt Study Final 
Report form and return it to this office along with a report of your findings.
If you have questions or concerns about your study or this approval, please feel free to 
contact me at 603-862-2003 or Julie.simpsonOiunh.edu. Please refer to the IRB #  
above in all correspondence related to this study. The IRB wishes you success with your 
research.
For the IRB,
\ j/ilie F. Simpson 
^Manager
cc: File
Research Conduct and Compliance Services, Office of Sponsored Research, Service 
Building, 51 College Road, Durham, NH 03824-3585 * Fax: 603-862-3564




Faculty Perceptions of the Effects of Collective Bargaining Agreements on Their 
Professional Roles: The New England Higher Education Experience
SECTION I.
Please write in, or check, the one most appropriate response for each question.
1. Age : ________
2. Gender: Female  Male_____
3. Rank:
Instructor  Assistant Professor  Associate Professor___Professor___
Other, please specify__________
4. Years in Higher Education________
5. Tenured_______  Tenure Track_______  Other, please specify ____________
6. My current academic department affiliation is with the:__________________
7. I am a member of the (check one): AFT , AAUP , NEA ,
or other, (please specify_________ ). I am not a member__________
If yes, how many years?_______________
8. Select the level of your current, primary teaching assignment:
Undergraduate  Graduate  Both ________
9. Approximate size of your institution (number of students):
Less than 500___ 500-1000___ 1001-3500___ 3501-5500___ 5500-7500_
7501-10,000___ 10,001-15,000___ 15,001-20,000__  20,001-25,000___
25,000-30,000___ more than 30,000___
10. Highest level of degree awarded at your institution:
Bachelors Masters Doctorate____
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11. My terminal degree is :_________________________
12. Number of years since obtaining terminal degree: ________________
SECTION II.
Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements as each relates to 
the opening phrase, “(The, A, or My) Faculty Collective Bargaining Agreement...” by 
circling the one most appropriate response to the right of each statement.
ANSWER KEY:
SD= Strongly Disagree D=Disagree N=Neutral A=Agree 
“(The, A, or My) Faculty Collective Bargaining Agreement...,
1. .. .enhances the professional status of the faculty by its very 
presence on a campus.
2. .. .enhances the practice of shared governance on a campus.
3. .. .effectively protects the faculty’s interests in the post-tenure 
review process.
4. .. .protects the faculty’s ability to effectively influence who 
will be hired as a faculty member.
5. .. .is effective in protecting faculty rights during promotion 
and tenure decisions.
6. .. .preserves the ability of the faculty to determine the relative 
weight of teaching, scholarship, and service in promotion 
and tenure decisions.
7. .. .is not effective in protecting the faculty’s ability to
establish the requirements of a degree. SD D N A SA
8. .. .is effective in supporting the ability of the faculty to
determine the curriculum. SD D N A SA
9. .. .primarily addresses issues unrelated to the faculty’s
professional issues. SD D N A SA
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Appendix B (continued)
10... .facilitates the hiring of the best faculty through the use
of monetary incentives. SD D N A SA
11... .restrains my institution from restructuring academic 
programs without adequate consultation or the cooperation
of the faculty. SD D N A SA
12. ...protects a faculty member’s professional autonomy. SD D N A SA
13. .. .protects the control that I have over my
scholar ship/creative efforts. SD D N A SA
14. .. .contains adequate provisions to protect faculty 
determination of how new learning technologies will be
implemented. SD D N A SA
15... .should not address the establishment of degree
requirements. SD D N A SA
16. ...should include matter related to the curriculum, and be an
appropriate subject of collective bargaining. SD D N A SA
17. .. .protects my ability to manage my classroom and give
grades in the manner I feel is best. SD D N A SA
18. .. .insures that the administration will not have too much
power over the governance of my institution. SD D N A SA
19. .. .effectively controls the ability of the administration
to unilaterally change the requirements of my position. SD D N A SA
20. ...is ill equipped to address issues pertaining to my professorial 
responsibilities of teaching, scholarship, and service. SD D N A SA
21. .. .protects my ability to determine what instructional practices
I will use in my classroom. SD D N A SA
22. ...satisfactorily protects my intellectual property rights
from the claim of the institution to ownership of them. SD D N A SA
23. .. .effectively protects the faculty’s ability to establish
degree requirements. SD D N A SA
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24. ...effectively protects my academic freedom. SD D N A SA
25. .. .adds greater importance to my voice as a faculty member 
when speaking on matters relating to institutional governance SD D N A SA
SECTION III.
And finally, please signify your level of agreement next to each complete statement 
below:
26. Academic freedom is not an appropriate subject of collective 
bargaining. SD D
27. There are adequate provisions in the collective bargaining 
agreement to protect faculty determination of how new learning 
technologies will be implemented. SD D
28. Without a collective bargaining agreement the administration 
would have too much power over the governance of my 
institution. SD D
29. Our collective bargaining agreement effectively protects the 
faculty’s ability to establish degree requirements. SD D
30. If given a choice, I would rather work at an institution 
that has a collective bargaining agreement than one does not. SD D
31. As a professional, I really cannot see myself represented SD D
by a union.
Thank you very much for assisting me with this survey. Please return it in the 
enclosed, addressed and postage paid envelope, by October 17, 2003 to:
Nancy J. Hamer 
University of New Hampshire 
Verrette House, 6 Garrison Avenue 
Durham NH 03824 
603-862-1934
email: nhamer@maple.unh.edu (for contact on questions regarding the survey)
To confirm the submission of your survey, and to be entered in the drawing for one 
of two $125.00 AMAZON.COM gift certificates, please also return the enclosed 
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Overview of Survey Response Questions on Section II and III: By Professional Concern
Distribution o f  Responses
Strongly
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree
Strongly
Agree Total Missing
Likert Scale 1 2 3 4 5
Professional Concern A: The ability o f the faculty to effectively influence who w ill join and continue on the faculty. POST DEFENSE
“(The, A, or My) Faculty Collective Bargaining Agreem ent...
Question 4
protects the faculty’s ability to effectively influence who will be 













































preserves the ability o f  the faculty to determine the relative weight 


























































Professional Concern B: The ability o f  the faculty to determ ine the curriculum .
Question 8























restrains my institution from restructuring academic programs 






















should include matter related to the curriculum, and be an 





















M ean f o r  P rofessional Concern B: 3.05
Professional C oncern C: The ability o f  the faculty to determ ine what instructional practices/delivery system s will be used in their classroom s.
Question 14
contains adequate provisions to protect faculty determination o f  






















protects my ability to determine what instructional practices I will 



































There are adequate provisions in the collective bargaining 
agreement to protect faculty determination o f  how new learning 





















M ean f o r  P rofessional Concern C: 3.14
Professional Concern D: The ability o f  the faculty to set the requirem ents for the granting o f  a degree.
Question 7
is not effective in protecting the faculty’s ability to establish the 












































Protects my ability to manage my classroom and give grades in 

























































Our collective bargaining agreement effectively protects the 



















M ean f o r  Professional Concern D: 3.19
Professional C oncern E: The ability o f the faculty to determ ine their teaching, scholarshi p and service requirem ents.
Question 3:














































effectively controls the ability o f  the administration to 






















is ill equipped to address issues pertaining to my professional 


































Professional C oncern F: The right o f  the faculty to exercise their academ ic freedom.
Question 12













































satisfactorily protects my intellectual property rights from the 























































Professional Concern G: The ability o f  the faculty to exercise reasonable shared governance.
Question 1
enhances the professional status o f  the faculty by its very 












































insures that the administration w ill not have too much power over 






















adds greater importance to my voice as a faculty member when 


































Overview of Survey Response Questions in Factor Order
D istrib u tion  of R esp onses
Strongly






A gree M issin g Total
Likert Scale 1 2 3 4 5
"(The, A, or M y) Faculty C ollective Bargaining  
A g reem en t...
Factor 1 -  "Personal P rotection s for th e  Facu lty  M em ber"
Q u estion  1
enh ances the p rofession a l status of the faculty b y  its very  





















Q u estion  2





















Q u estion  3
effectively  protects the facu lty's in terests in  the post-tenure  





















Q u estion  4
protects the facu lty 's ab ility  to  effective ly  in fluence w h o  
































Q u estion  5
is effective  in  protecting faculty rights d uring prom otion  





















Q u estion  6
p reserves the ability  of the faculty to  d eterm ine the relative  
w eig h t o f teaching, scholarsh ip , and service in  p rom otion  





















Q u estion  9
prim arily a d d resses issu es unrelated  to the faculty's  





















Q u estion  12





















Q u estion  13
protects the control that I h ave over m y  





















Q u estion  17
protects m y ability to m anage m y classroom  and g ive  





















Q u estion  20
is ill eq u ip p ed  to ad dress issu es  pertain ing to  m y  


































Q u estion  21
protects m y ability to  d eterm ine w h a t instructional 





















Q u estion  22
satisfactorily  protects m y intellectual property rights from  





















Q u estion  24





















Q u estion  25
adds greater im portance to m y vo ice  as a faculty m em ber  






















T otal M ean  Factor 1 3.43
Factor 2 -  "Program  C ontrols"
Q u estion  8
is effective in su pp ortin g  the ability o f the faculty to 



















Q u estion  11
restrains m y in stitu tion  from  restructuring academ ic  


































Q u estion  14
contains adequate p rov ision s to protect faculty  
determ ination  o f h o w  n ew  learn ing tech n o log ies w ill be  





















Q u estion  23






















Q u estion  29
O ur co llective b argain ing agreem en t e ffective ly  p rotects the 





















T otal M ean  Factor 2 3.17
Factor 3 -  "O rgan ization a l R estraints
Q u estion  18
insures that the adm inistration  w ill n o t h ave too m uch  





















Q u estion  19
effective ly  controls the ab ility  of the adm in istration  to  





















Q u estion  27
There are adequate p rov ision s in  the co llective b argain ing  
agreem en t to protect facu lty  determ in ation  of h o w  n ew  


































Factor 4 -  " S p ec ified  A cad em ic  Issu es"
Q u estion  15






















Q u estion  16
sh ou ld  in clu d e m atter related to the curriculum , an d  be an  





















T otal M ean  Factor 4 3.02
Factor 5 -  "R estrictive C ontract S tip u la tion s"
Q u estion  7
is n ot effective in  protecting the facu lty's ability to estab lish  





















Q u estion  10
facilitates the hiring of the b est facu lty  through  the u se  of 





















T otal M ean  Factor 5 2.65
